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ABSTRACT 
Do Desperate Times Call for Desperate Measures? Strategic Responses to Regulatory 
Punctuations in the Mexican Banking Industry, 1991-2004. (August 2006) 
Luis Antonio Perez Batres, B.S., Tecnológico de Monterrey-Campus Laguna; 
M.S., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Lorraine A. Eden 
 Dr. Michael A. Hitt 
 
Drawing insights from liability of foreignness, the punctuated equilibrium model 
and the resource-based view, this dissertation develops an integrated model to identify 
the successful strategies and characteristics of both domestic and foreign firms operating 
in emerging markets, affected by regulatory punctuations. Accordingly, three research 
questions are addressed: Why are some foreign firms more likely to survive than other 
foreign firms? Why are some domestic firms more likely to survive than other domestic 
firms? Are there any similarities between successful foreign firms and successful 
domestic firms? 
Using event-history methodologies and the Mexican banking industry as the unit 
of analysis, this dissertation shows the following results: Foreign firms (banks) from 
countries with stronger commercial ties to Mexico (the focal emerging market), were 
less likely to exit the banking industry. Also, the likelihood of exiting the industry, by a 
foreign firm, was negatively related to domestic firm (bank) acquisitions. For the 
domestic firms (banks), there was a positive relationship between international 
diversification and firm survival and a negative relationship between aggressive (loan) 
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growth and firm survival. Also, marginal support was found about the positive 
relationship between “grupo” affiliation and firm survival. 
This research contributes to the extant literature by extending current theories 
when considering the effect of radical change. For instance, while punctuated 
equilibrium provides a good “environmental” explanation about a firm’s need to adapt to 
radical change, it does not suggest how firms should adapt to this change. However, by 
providing an explanation on how firms suppose to adapt to this radical change, this 
dissertation had expanded the theoretical implication of the punctuated equilibrium 
model. Similarly, the present dissertation provides a theoretical extension to liability of 
foreignness by finding that not all foreign firms face the same liability of foreignness. 
Lastly, the resource-based view is also extended by this dissertation research, as it is 
found to have implications for emerging markets firms that are different from foreign 
developed market firms. 
 v 
 
 
DEDICATION 
I dedicate this dissertation to my family. Cristina, my lovely wife, without your 
love, support and encouragement; I could not have done it! You are my inspiration. I 
love you… 
Luis Antonio, beloved son, you are the light of my life and my best friend in the 
whole wide world. You bring joy and happiness to my life. I love you… 
Mom and Dad, your unconditional love, your example of honesty, hard work, 
family values, and above all, your trust in our Lord Jesus Christ have been a priceless 
legacy. I thank God for sending me such wonderful parents! I love you… 
Lucy, Alex, and Christian (Lulu & Diego), always dear children, I often thought 
about you during this challenging process. You complete my family! I love you… 
Aunts Prieta, Yolis, Lichita, and uncle Manolo (Gaby, Gaby, Karina, Gloria & 
Verónica), I have always felt your love and support during the special and not so special 
moments of my life! I love you… 
It is a privilege to dedicate this dissertation to all of you! My family… 
 vi 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This dissertation represents the hard work of many people. I thank God for 
having the magnificent group of individuals who led me through this effort.  
First of all, I would like to acknowledge the members of my dissertation 
committee: Dr. Lorraine A. Eden, Dr. Michael A. Hitt, Dr. R. Duane Ireland and 
Dr. Dudley L. Poston, Jr. 
Lorraine, while I will always be thankful for all the time and energy you put in 
mentoring and training me over the past few years. What I admire the most about you is 
your passion for research. Lorraine, you have succeeded in many academic fields, and 
yet you have humbly shared your time and wisdom with me. I always felt that I could 
come to your office and talk to you. I knew everything would be better after that! 
Without question, your guidance has inspired me during my time at TAMU and will 
continue to influence me throughout my career. I will be forever grateful that you agreed 
to chair my dissertation. Thank you, Dr. Eden… 
Mike, I am very grateful that you agreed to co-chair my dissertation, even though 
you had just come back to TAMU and had a million and one other things on your 
agenda. You were always available and provided me with priceless advice. You always 
managed to listen to me during the struggles and joys that a research effort of this 
magnitude brings to a doctoral student. Mike, I particularly appreciate that you always 
recognized my research improvements (even the minor ones). And although this is 
always pleasant, coming from someone that has contributed to the management arena in 
such an exceptional manner does have an impact on one’s life. Thank you, Dr. Hitt… 
 vii 
 
 
Duane, you provided invaluable comments, time and energy in my writing this 
dissertation. Also, as department head, I always felt I could approach you. You always 
had time to listen despite your busy schedule! Thank you, Dr. Ireland... 
Dudley, I almost did not take your sociology class. A friend of mine; however, 
advised me to do so. Thanks to you I re-learned statistics (that simple). I believe all the 
hard work you put into your class helped me conduct my dissertation analysis. Further, 
your help in the last leg of the dissertation, the results chapter, was most helpful. Thank 
you, Dr. Poston… 
Next, I want to recognize the help of other magnificent individuals. As a previous 
member of the committee, I owe special thanks to Dr. Bert Cannella (Arizona State 
University). Bert, I also appreciate what you did for all of us students in your role of 
Ph.D. Coordinator! Likewise, the efforts of Dr. Klaus Uhlenbruck (University of 
Montana), a previous member of my committee, are very much appreciated. Thanks, 
Klaus… 
Special thanks also go to professors: Paige Fields (for allowing me access to her 
Bankscope database), Trevis Certo (methods inquiries), Elizabeth Umphress, Richard 
Woodman, Mike Pustay, Ramona Paetzold, Maura Belliveau, Mike Wesson, Asghar 
Zardkoohi, Len Bierman, Jonathan Brookfield, Cindy Devers, Chris Porter, and Don 
Hellriegel from whom I received support and encouragement. Also, I would like to thank 
Dr. Colella, Dr. DeNisi and Phyl Washburn for their administrative support. 
The financial support provided by the Mays Business School and the Center of 
International Studies for the purchase of the database on the Mexican banking industry is 
 viii 
 
 
very much appreciated. Thank you, Dr. Griffin! Thank you, Dr. Gaspar! Thank you, 
Dr. DeNisi! 
Last but certainly not least, I like to acknowledge my fellow Ph.D. students: 
Carrie Belsito, Celile Gogus, Chazara Clark-Smith, John Bingham, and Race Yu. 
Meeting you the first day of class was an honor. Thanks for your friendship… 
Jamie Collins, Bill Worthington, Chris Reutzel and Chris Tuggle, I enjoyed our 
“chow time” and our academic trips. Thanks for your friendship… 
Also, my stay in College Station has been made more enjoyable thanks to: Dan 
Li, Matt Semadeni, Tim Holcomb, Michael Holmes, Brian Connelly, Aneika Coleman, 
Lily Ren, Mary Triana, Victor Franklin, Justin Webb, Fernanda, Harry Kim, Jay Lee, 
Toyah Miller, Laura Riedel, Susan Zhu, Sandra Wolverton, and Y-Lo. Thanks for your 
friendship…
 ix 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Page 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... iii 
DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..............................................................................................vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................ix 
LIST OF FIGURES...........................................................................................................xi 
LIST OF TABLES ...........................................................................................................xii 
CHAPTER 
 
 I INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ..................................1 
Motivation and Research Question.................................................................1 
Expected Contributions...................................................................................7 
Organization....................................................................................................8 
 
 II LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................10 
The Punctuated Equilibrium Model..............................................................10 
Emerging Markets.........................................................................................17 
Liability of Foreignness ................................................................................24 
Summary and Conclusions ...........................................................................28 
 
III THEORY AND HYPOTHESES..................................................................30 
MNE vs MNE ...............................................................................................31 
Domestic vs Domestic ..................................................................................39 
MNEs vs Domestic Firms.............................................................................51 
Summary.......................................................................................................52 
 
IV PILOT TEST:  A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS ...........................................55 
The Four Regulatory Punctuations ...............................................................56 
Firm Responses to Regulatory Punctuations ................................................60 
MNEs vs MNEs ............................................................................................61 
Domestic vs Domestic ..................................................................................70 
Summary.......................................................................................................74 
 x 
 
 
CHAPTER Page 
 
V METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................75 
Sample ..........................................................................................................75 
Measures .......................................................................................................76 
Dependent Variables.....................................................................................76 
Independent Variables ..................................................................................79 
Control Variables ..........................................................................................86 
Statistical Models..........................................................................................87 
Model Justification .......................................................................................89 
 
VI EMPIRICAL RESULTS...............................................................................90 
Descriptive Statistics.....................................................................................90 
Results of Hypothesis Testing ......................................................................94 
Foreign Banks ...............................................................................................94 
Domestic Banks ............................................................................................99 
Ex-Post Analysis of Results........................................................................105 
Foreign Banks Database .............................................................................105 
Domestic Database .....................................................................................108 
Summary.....................................................................................................109 
 
VII DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ......................................................111 
Discussion...................................................................................................111 
Conclusions.................................................................................................123 
Limitations and Future Research ................................................................130 
 
REFERENCES...............................................................................................................133 
APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................149 
APPENDIX B ................................................................................................................157 
APPENDIX C ................................................................................................................164 
APPENDIX D ................................................................................................................169 
VITA ..............................................................................................................................172 
 xi 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE Page 
1.1 Regulatory Punctuations and Firm Performance .............................................4 
 4.1 Bank Entries ...................................................................................................67 
 4.2 Bank Failures..................................................................................................67 
 4.3 Banks’ M&A Activity....................................................................................68 
 4.4 Market Share Participation.............................................................................68 
 4.5 Total Number of Banks ..................................................................................69 
 xii 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE Page 
 3.1 Commercial Banks Reprivatized by the Mexican Government (1991-1992)......45 
 3.2 Summary of Hypotheses ......................................................................................53 
 4.1 Top 25 Banks of the World (The Banker 6/2003) ...............................................63 
 4.2 Entries and Market Share of Multinational Banks in Mexico..............................64 
 4.3 Mexican Banking Industry Entries, Exits and Other Statistics ............................66 
 4.4 Market Share of Original Banks per Period .........................................................73 
 5.1 Dependent Variables ............................................................................................77 
 5.2 Independent Variables..........................................................................................78 
 5.3 Control Variables .................................................................................................79 
 6.1 Foreign Banks Database Descriptive Statistics ....................................................92 
 6.2 Domestic Banks Database Descriptive Statistics .................................................93 
 6.3 Foreign Banks Weibull Distribution (Model 1, Control Variables) Foreign 
Banks Gompertz Distribution (Model 2, Full Model) Dependent Variable = 
Exit ........................................................................................................................ 96 
 
 6.4 Domestic Banks Weibull Distribution (Model 1, Control Variables) 
Domestic Banks Weibull Distribution (Model 2, Full Model) Dependent 
Variable = Exit ...................................................................................................100 
 
 6.5 Domestic Banks Exponential Distribution (Model 3, Full Model) 
Dependent Variable = Exit .................................................................................102 
 
 6.6 Foreign Banks Database (Fixed Effects, Random Effects Regressions and 
Hausman Test) Dependent Variable = ROE ......................................................107 
 
 6.7 Foreign Banks Database (Ex-post Analysis Comparison: Gompertz, Fixed 
and Random Effects) Dependent Variable = Exit, ROE, and ROE, 
Respectively .......................................................................................................109 
 xiii 
 
 
TABLE Page 
 
 6.8 Domestic Banks Database (Ex-post Analysis Comparison: Exponential 
Model, Logistics Regression, and Cox Model) Dependent Variable = Exit......110 
 1 
 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
There is nothing more difficult than to take the lead in the introduction of a new 
order of things. 
 -Niccolo Machiavelli 
 
You can never rest in your laurels, apart from higher performance targets, 
unprecedented environmental change requires us to create a culture of continuous 
change. 
 -Percy Barnevik, former CEO of ABB 
Motivation and Research Question 
The ability to understand the external environment has been long recognized as a 
key determinant of organizational performance (Porter, 1990). In the last few years, 
however, profound transformations of the business landscape have taken place as a result 
of globalization and technological advances (Hitt et al., 1998). Therefore, it has been 
suggested that successful organizations will be those with the ability to adapt to radical 
environmental change (Richardson, 1996; Volberda, 1996). 
While the importance of radical environmental change has been recognized (e.g., 
Meyer et al., 1990; Gersick, 1991, 1994; Wollin, 1998; Sabherwal et al. 2001), firm 
strategies and characteristics that facilitate or hamper firm performance, under radical 
                                                 
The style and format for this dissertation follow that of the Academy of Management 
Journal. 
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environmental change, have not received the same attention (Keister, 2002). Also, 
because emerging economies1 have experienced a more radical transformation in their 
business landscapes, examining firms operating in these regions should allow us to better 
identify the causes behind a successful or failed (radical) adaptation. For instance, 
DeCastro and Uhlenbruck (1997) suggest that different government privatization 
approaches (from former communist countries) evoked diverse multinational firm 
strategies, as privatization policies drastically changed the business landscapes of these 
countries. According to Peng and Heath (1996), the old institutional rules of the 
communist system became useless under the new environment. Similarly, after major 
liberalization policies carried out by most Latin American governments during the 
1990s, multinational firms (MNEs) suddenly could easily enter the Latin American 
markets after 50 plus years of government protectionism (Sheahan, 1987, 1997; Toulan, 
2002). In turn, this abrupt policy change forced domestic2 firms to quickly adapt to the 
new landscape. 
The strategic management and international business literatures have produced a 
wealth of research gauging the actions and strategic shifts of large multinational 
corporations (e.g., Ferrier, 2001; Luo and Peng, 1999). However, this research has 
emphasized performance comparisons between multinational and domestic firms, largely 
                                                 
1 As defined by Hoskisson et al. (2000, p. 249) “Emerging economies are low-income, rapid-
growth countries using economic liberalization as their primary engine of growth. They fall into two 
groups: developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East and transition 
economies in the former Soviet Union and China.” 
2 Throughout this paper, the words domestic and local are used interchangeably to refer to firms 
that are owned by the citizens of a particular emerging market. 
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overlooking the performance differences among foreign multinational firms competing 
in a third host market (Rangan and Drummond, 2004). 
Also, there has been a dearth of research gauging how domestic firms in 
emerging markets from all over the globe are adjusting to these radical environmental 
changes (e.g., globalization). A review of the literature reveals a need to better 
understand domestic firms’ strategic responses to radical environmental change. For 
instance, Doh (2000) recognized the scarcity of studies on firm-level responses to 
privatization, while Hoskisson et al. (2000) commented on the need to study the larger 
institutional context on individual firm responses. 
Since it would be impossible to identify all the possible causes of radical 
environmental change, this dissertation focuses on firms’ responses to regulatory 
punctuations. Following Haveman et al. (2001: 254), regulatory punctuations are those 
discontinuities originated by “sudden and extensive shifts in state constraints on business 
operations.” Therefore, this research identifies the characteristics and strategies of 
successful multinational and domestic firms adapting to regulatory punctuations in a 
given (emerging) host market. Figure 1.1 illustrates the performance implications of the 
firms’ strategic responses and characteristics after a regulatory punctuation. 
Furthermore, the present study takes advantage of the Mexican banking industry’s recent 
regulatory punctuations. These punctuations came in the form of nationalization, 
reprivatization, and market liberalization policies (1991-1998), which dramatically 
altered the banks’ business landscape. Thus, the Mexican banking industry’s radical 
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transformation presents an excellent opportunity to study the characteristics and 
strategies of successful firms adapting to regulatory punctuations in emerging markets. 
 
FIGURE 1.1 
Regulatory Punctuations and Firm Performance 
 
 
 
Integrating ideas from liability of foreignness (LOF), business groups in 
emerging markets, and the punctuated equilibrium model, this research is designed to 
answer the following research questions: 
Why are some MNEs more likely than other MNEs to survive regulatory 
punctuations in an emerging host market? Why are some domestic firms more likely 
than other domestic firms to survive regulatory punctuations in their home emerging 
Firm Characteristics 
 
• Nationality (Domestic v. Foreign; 
strength of home-host country ties) 
Firm Strategies 
 
• Corporate Strategy (conglomerate 
structure) 
• Business Strategy (specialization 
strategies; aggressive competitive 
behavior) 
• International Strategy 
(international alliances; FDI) 
• Acquisitions 
• Social Capital 
Firm 
Performance 
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market? Are there any similarities between successful MNEs and successful domestic 
firms in their strategic responses to regulatory punctuations in an emerging market? 
Answering the first research question addresses the more general question of why 
some multinational firms perform better than others. However, this approach is different 
from previous studies in the literature which emphasize the comparison between 
multinationals and domestic firms (e.g., Ataullah & Le, 2004; Mezias, 2002; Zaheer, 
1995; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). In contrast, this research question explores the 
relationship between MNE strategies and characteristics and firm performance; thus, the 
focal unit of analysis is the MNE. In so doing, the study follows an LOF rationale 
focusing on the sociopolitical-relational costs of doing business abroad, namely, 
unfamiliarity, relational and discriminatory costs (Eden & Miller, 2004). Thus, 
measuring the effectiveness of multinational firms’ strategies and firm characteristics 
that might help multinational firms reduce LOF is at the heart of this research question. 
Particularly for firm strategies, the effect of strategic alliances (with local partners) on 
MNE performance is addressed. For firm characteristics, however, the strength of the 
MNE’s home nation sociopolitical-relational ties with those of the host nation and their 
effect on firm performance is investigated. 
Answering the second research question addresses successful strategies of 
emerging market domestic firms (EMFs) in response to radical environmental change in 
that home market. Essentially, exploring the effectiveness of domestic firm strategies in 
response to regulatory punctuations (i.e., radical change), judged by their ultimate 
outcome (survival or death), allows us to identify the link between domestic firms’ 
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strategies and firm performance. Furthermore, our research approach is different from 
previous studies in the literature that emphasize the comparison between MNEs and 
domestic firms (e.g., Miller & Parkhe, 2002; Zaheer, 1995). In so doing, our study is 
designed to answer why some emerging market firms were successful, relative to their 
domestic counterparts; thus, the unit of analysis in research question two is the domestic 
firm. 
Among the domestic firms’ strategies considered for this research question, I 
explore the firms’ corporate strategy, that is, the effect of conglomerate structures and 
business structures on firm performance. Also, I consider the effect of strategic alliances 
and business level strategies on firm performance. The answers theoretically draw from 
different literatures, namely, LOF (e.g., Eden & Miller, 2004), business groups (e.g., 
Guillen, 2000), and the punctuated equilibrium (e.g., Gersick, 1991). 
In sum, answering research questions one and two allow us to identify how 
certain strategies affect MNEs and domestic firms’ performance, respectively. On the 
other hand, the answer to research question three seeks to identify the similarities 
between successful MNEs and successful domestic firms’ strategies and characteristics. 
Although research question three revisits the comparison between the performance of 
MNEs and domestic firms, it does not ask whether MNEs outperform domestic firms, or 
vice versa. Rather, the question focuses on whether there are certain firm strategies or 
characteristics that allow either MNEs or domestic firms to gain a competitive 
advantage. In so doing (identifying superior firm strategies and characteristics), 
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answering research question three allows us to also identify unsuccessful firm strategies 
and characteristics. 
Essentially, research question three asks if, for foreign or domestic firms 
operating in emerging markets during regulatory punctuations, there are certain firm 
strategies or characteristics that allow them to better fit the new environment. Thus, 
finding if MNEs outperform domestic firms or vice versa is irrelevant for research 
question three. The key issue is to understand which certain firm strategies and 
characteristic are equally effective (or ineffective) for both MNEs and EMFs. 
Expected Contributions 
From an academic perspective, it is worth noting that studies about strategic 
responses of either multinational or domestic firms operating in emerging markets, when 
the rules of business have changed so radically, have been scarce. Thus, the present 
study contributes to the business literature by addressing this gap. In so doing, I attempt 
to confirm what other studies have found about the opportunities that most recent 
regulatory punctuations have provided for foreign firms (e.g., privatization and market 
liberalization policies). However, the present study goes one step further by explaining 
why, despite regulatory punctuations’ normally positive effects on foreign firms, there 
are some multinational firms that performed poorly. Conversely for domestic firms, our 
study seeks to explain why, despite regulatory punctuations’ normally negative effects 
on domestic firms, there are some domestic firms that manage to overcome these 
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negative effects. Thus, by linking environment and strategy we demonstrate why some 
multinational and domestic firms perform better than other multinational and domestic 
firms, respectively. Also, this research explores whether there are certain “universal” 
firm strategies or firm characteristics that enable either MNEs or domestic firms to better 
align with the new business landscape (after a regulatory punctuation). 
From a practical perspective, Porter (1998: 57) suggests, “we are entering a new 
phase (of globalization) which is more counterintuitive because now globalness is 
assumed.” In this sense, we believe our research can provide practical managerial 
implications for multinational firms trying to enter new international markets, and also to 
domestic firms trying to defend their local market position from international 
competitors. 
Organization 
This dissertation is organized in the following manner. Chapter II presents a 
review of the extant literature on the punctuated equilibrium model, emerging markets, 
and the liability of foreignness (LOF). The chapter’s goal is to set the stage for the 
theoretical framework developed in the next chapter. Chapter III presents the theoretical 
framework of this research with its corresponding hypotheses, aiming at answering the 
research questions presented in the introductory chapter. Next, Chapter IV offers a 
descriptive (qualitative) pilot test of four hypotheses offered in Chapter III. Chapter V 
discusses the traditional quantitative approach on sample selection, data collection 
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issues, operationalization of variables, and statistical testing techniques. The results of 
these statistical procedures are exhibited in Chapter VI. Finally, Chapter VII presents 
conclusions, limitations, as well as avenues for future research once the analysis is 
completed.
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a review of the extant literature on the punctuated 
equilibrium model, emerging markets, and the liability of foreignness (LOF). The 
chapter’s objective is to present a logical sequence of this study’s research questions 
(i.e., environmental punctuation? firm response). The punctuated equilibrium model 
literature review offers a general perspective on radical environmental change and 
organizational response. In contrast, the literature review on emerging markets and LOF 
offers a more specific account of the types of environmental punctuations and firm 
responses covered in this research. In other words, these literatures explore the 
punctuations occurring in emerging markets and the strategic responses of both the 
MNEs and EMFs operating in them (i.e., market liberalization policies? firm 
strategies). The chapter ends with a brief summary and conclusions about the relevance 
of considering the effects of radical environmental change and firm strategies. 
The Punctuated Equilibrium Model 
Theoretical Antecedents 
Research on organization-environment alignment is not scarce. For instance, 
population ecology theory (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & Freeman, 1977, 1984) suggests 
that environmental changes reshape organizations. The theory is deterministic in that it 
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assumes environmental selection rather than organizational adaptation (Carroll, 1984). 
Adaptation models, on the other hand, assume that organizational actors are purposeful 
and able to respond properly to environmental challenges (Allmendinger & Hackman, 
1996). More recently, population ecologists have come to accept, to some extent, the 
organizational importance of actors. Likewise, adaptation theorists have come to accept 
the importance of environmental forces and that sometimes choice is nonexistent 
(Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995). 
To bridge these two polar views, Hambrick and Finkeltstein (1987) conceptualize 
‘discretion’, as a measure of the managers’ latitude of choice, which would estimate the 
decision makers’ ability to influence the firm in a given environment. Further, 
Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) identify several industries that allow decision makers 
different levels of discretion. Despite the well-deserved attention lent to the importance 
of organizational-environment alignment, Sabherwal et al. (2001) recognize a dearth of 
research on the dynamics of alignment. Also, Gersick (1994: 11) suggests halting the 
debate between selection and adaptation and rather focusing on “when and how 
organizations steer successfully through changing environments.” However, most 
research on how organizational systems develop and change had been conducted with a 
static view. According to Haveman et al. (2001), even longitudinal studies would not 
necessarily satisfy the requisite for dynamics of alignment research given their ahistoric 
nature. Further, these authors caution that gradual change is only an assumption of social 
theory but not a fact of social life.  
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Almost 40 years ago, Thompson (1967: 234) viewed environmental alignment as 
a ‘moving target.’ More recently, Hitt et al. (1998) acknowledge frequent strategic 
discontinuities cause rapid transformations on the competitive landscape, and Boeker 
(1997) stresses the change in the focus of organizational research from static to more 
dynamic organizational research. In light of both recent and abrupt changes of the 
business landscape, such as privatization and globalization policies enacted in several 
countries, Gersick (1991, 1994) calls into question the traditional Darwinian assumption 
about how change unfolds. Gersick (1991) suggests that organizational theories 
traditionally at odds with each other, such as resource dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) and population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), are not always in conflict. 
Rather, they are valid at different times depending on the system’s stage. 
Conceptualization and Dimensions 
As an alternative to Darwinian gradualism, Eldredge and Gould (1972), 
evolutionary biology theorists, conceive evolution as punctuated equilibrium. They 
disputed the notion that ecosystems evolve steadily from one state to the next, or evolve 
toward preset ends. Rather, they suggest that frame-breaking change took place through 
sudden and revolutionary punctuations. Indeed, Gould and Eldredge (1977) recognize 
incremental evolution, but emphasize that a system reaching its breaking point would 
precipitate discontinuities. Also, Eldredge and Gould’s arguments are strikingly similar 
to those made by Kuhn’s (1970) structure of scientific revolutions. Among the earliest 
organizational scientists incorporating some conceptualization of severe environmental 
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punctuations, Meyer’s (1982) jolts, Tushman and Romanelli’s (1985) revolutionary 
change, Tushman and Anderson (1986), and Anderson and Tushman’s (1990) 
technological discontinuities stand out. However, Gersick’s (1991) seminal piece is the 
most comprehensive ‘translation’ of the punctuated equilibrium model from 
evolutionary biology to organizational theory. For Gersick, the punctuated equilibrium 
model consists of three main dimensions: 1) Deep Structure, 2) Equilibrium Periods, and 
3) Revolutionary Periods. 
Deep Structure 
Deep structure is the way a system is organized through stable routines. Gersick 
(1991; 16) justifies a system’s stability due to its path dependency, comparing it to a 
decision tree. Necessarily, she states, “a trial of choices made by a system rules many 
options out, at the same time as it rules mutually contingent options in.” For 
Fox-Wolfgramm et al. (1998), deep structures favorably compare to management 
systems. Greenwood and Hinings (1993) called these deep structures design archetypes 
or holistic patterns. These archetypes or ‘templates for organizing’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991: 27) are the firm’s psyche or ‘interpretative schemes’ (Ranson et al., 1980: 1052). 
Thus, change consistent with prevailing interpretative schemes is convergent (non-
radical) because it occurs within the parameters of an existing archetype. 
On the other hand, radical, frame-breaking change occurs if an organization 
departs from its current template to pursue a different one (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996; Ouchi, 1980). According to Sabherwal et al. (2001), because organizational 
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archetypes evolve without specific pattern, punctuated equilibrium models cannot be 
equated to life cycle theories. In other words, the punctuated equilibrium model does not 
assume an orderly transition towards a desired end-state. Wollin (1999) suggests, 
however, that organizations’ deep structure or archetype changes are not chaotic either. 
For him, firms’ deep structures are nested within a hierarchy where elements of 
suprasystems and subsystems are interdependent with one another. In sum, deep 
structures are ways in which a system is organized through stable routines (Gersick, 
1991: 16). In turn, the deep structure would last as long as it allows organizations to be 
aligned with the business landscape. 
Equilibrium Periods 
Gersick’s (1991) equilibrium periods are similar to ‘rules of engagement’ in a 
game. That is, even though there are different ways to play a game, all the alternatives 
are bounded by its rules or paradigm and there is limited uncertainty on how to proceed. 
For instance, in a chess game, a very good player is able to recognize up to 1,300 game 
patterns, while a grand master recognizes about 50,000 (Simon, 1979: 369). In this 
sense, as long as chess rules do not change dramatically, chess grand masters are likely 
to stay grand masters even though every match could evolve differently. In this example, 
the chess game mimics a system in equilibrium where only incremental adjustments can 
take place. However, if chess rules were to change abruptly, suddenly recognizing 
50,000 (old rule) game patterns could become worthless. Essentially, “solutions based 
on past experiences or analogy may (at a given time) be inappropriate” (Prahalad & 
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Bettis, 1986: 493). In other words, as long as the environment does not force the 
system’s deep structure to change, it will remain in equilibrium (Wake, Roth and Wake, 
1983). 
Gersick (1991) also suggests that inertial forces keep a system in equilibrium. 
Thus, it appears that archetypes are reinforced by (accepted) institutional mechanisms. 
For old institutionalism, “institutions are nothing more than imperfect and practical 
solutions to solve past conflicts” (Scott, 1995: 3). The older are the firms, the more 
likely they will follow their institutional routines that enhance their legitimacy and allow 
them to resist pressures to adapt (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). However, when abrupt 
environmental change occurs, coercive pressures can cause organizations to radically 
alter their structures (Haveman, 2001). In sum, an equilibrium period lasts as long as the 
organizations operating in a certain business landscape conform to a deep structure. 
Revolutionary Periods 
The revolutionary period starts when the organizations’ deep structure collapses 
(i.e., suffers a punctuation). At this point, there is no environmental equilibrium; chaos 
sets into the system and the path to cosmos (order) or new alignment begins. However, 
because this change is not part of a life cycle, end-states are unknown. Under these 
circumstances, firms try to reconfigure their archetypes in accordance to the new set of 
environmental rules (Gersick, 1991).  
Deep structure punctuations may come from the inside when changes break the 
harmonious way (alignment) in which the pieces are integrated. For instance, Gold 
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(1999) suggests that a leader’s sudden succession can destabilize an organization. Also, 
Haveman (1992) recognize that deep structure punctuations can be caused by external 
events such as political turmoil or major changes in government regulation that might 
devalue the systems’ resources (Gersick, 1991). According to Baum et al. (1995), abrupt 
environmental change may create new habitats where new organizational designs can 
flourish. However, abrupt environmental change may also induce the extinction of 
existing habitats. In other words, radical changes can force organizations to change 
tracks or structural coherence. 
In fact, Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 1993) consider four track possibilities: 
1) Inertial, or major resistance to fundamental reorientations in policy (Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1985). 2) Aborted Excursions, essentially 360-degree interpretative scheme 
‘trips’, where organizations briefly depart from their current archetype only to come 
back to it. 3) Reorientations, where organizations successfully move from their current 
archetype to a new one. And 4) Unresolved Excursions, or organizations’ successful 
departures from original archetypes, combined with unsuccessful adoptions of new ones. 
According to this classification, reorientation and unresolved excursion tracks 
depict the organization trying to replace its original deep structure. In both cases the 
response signals revolutionary, second-order change. Conversely, inertial and aborted 
excursion tracks present the organization as ultimately following its original 
interpretative scheme; thus, any change would be within the bounds of equilibrium or 
first-order change (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998). 
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In sum, revolutionary periods should be understood as transition periods. During 
these unstable periods organizations try to transform their deep structures to reach a new 
equilibrium. Thus, revolutionary periods should last until the organizations that operate 
in an abruptly changed business landscape are able respond to the challenges brought 
about by this change. In the following section, the literature review on emerging markets 
depicts how the organizations operating in that business landscape were forced to change 
their deep structure as revolutionary periods came to pass because of abrupt policy 
changes. 
Emerging Markets 
Economic Model (From Protectionism to Liberalization) 
Hoskisson et al. (2000) identified 64 countries as emerging markets. According 
to Wright et al. (2005), these emerging markets represented 12 per cent of the world’s 
foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows in 2002. Wright et al. (2005) further suggest 
these countries had recently attracted higher amounts of FDI because of the widespread 
implementation of economic liberalization policies (liberalization). Before the adoption 
of liberalization, however, most emerging markets followed protectionist policies. To 
better understand the importance of the business landscape change on emerging markets, 
this section offers a brief description of the Latin American and East Asian economic 
models prior to the implementation of liberalization. The description serves as a 
depiction of the ‘original’ business landscape on emerging markets. 
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The world depression of the 1930s showed that countries dependent on primary 
exports could be vulnerable to adverse changes in the world economy. The depression 
cracked the foundation of the primary export model and drove Latin America and East 
Asian economies toward intensive import substitution industrialization (ISI) (Ranis, 
1995; Sheanan, 1987). By the early 1950s, substitution in light manufacturers was far 
more advanced in Latin America, thus, further industrialization could come about only 
through protectionist policies (Diamond, 1978). For instance, Brazil and Mexico had 
already nationalized their electrical and oil industries (Haggard, 1990). By contrast, East 
Asian economies moved into primary import substitution between 1953 and 1963. 
According to Ranis, larger economies such as those of Brazil and Mexico took longer 
time to reach domestic saturation than those from Singapore, Malaysia or Taiwan. Thus, 
once their domestic markets became saturated with import substitution products, East 
Asian economies move cleverly into primary export substitution (Sheanan, 1987, 1997). 
One of the most costly effects of the ISI strategy in Latin America was that it 
worked against industrial exports and tied the growth of industrialization to the rate of 
growth of domestic demand. In turn, the domestic industry was unable to finance its own 
import needs (Sheanan, 1987). In contrast, the East Asian economies share of the World 
exports eight-folded from 0.19% in 1960 to 1.59% in 1975. In that same period, 
however, the Latin American export share of world exports only grew slightly from 
1.23% to 1.26% (Ranis, 1995: 182). 
According to Edwards (1995), the inward orientation of the Latin American 
economies meant that foreign exchange supply remained dependent on volatile primary-
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product markets. As a result, the oil shocks of the 1970s quickly consumed their foreign 
exchange reserves and governments turned to international loans to pay for oil and other 
imports. East Asia economies, however, while experiencing economic difficulties in the 
post 1973 years and in the late 1990s, never followed the ISI path of Latin America to as 
great an extent, and poverty was never as widespread. In fact, East Asian economies kept 
healthy industrial export growth rates from an already high base, despite high-energy 
prices, global inflation, and recession. 
In August 1982, Mexico announced it could no longer service its foreign debt, 
marking the beginning of Latin America’s ‘debt crisis’ (Crisp & Kelly, 1999). As a 
result both the IMF and the World Bank mandated ‘structural adjustments’ in five areas:  
liberalization policies, exchange-rates, tax reform, financial reform, and public enterprise 
reform and privatization (Edwards 1995). In turn, several Latin American countries 
passed the policies. For instance, the Mexican liberalization appeared successful for the 
first few years (1987-1993), until the economy hit a spectacular crisis in December 1994 
(Sheanan, 1997). However, the Mexican economic crisis was not the only one in the 
region. Brazil suffered its last crisis in 1997 and Argentina in 2000. Park (1996) noted 
that liberalization had made several East Asian countries more prone to financial crisis. 
East Asian markets also suffered a similar economic crisis due to liberalization in 1997 
(Chang & Velasco, 2000). 
In sum, after the 1930s world economic depression both Latin American and East 
Asian economies selected inward industrialization development policies. However, East 
Asian economies moved to outward industrialization development policies in the late 
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1950s as world trade reopened. Latin American economies, however, kept its ISI 
strategies until the crisis years of the early 1980s. As a result, Latin American firms only 
focused on conquering their respective domestic markets. In other words, whereas East 
Asian firms have been competing in the world markets for almost fifty years, Latin 
American firms have only begun to do so within the last fifteen years. However, both 
Latin American and East Asian firms have confronted limited outside competition within 
their home markets. The implications for emerging market firms are further explored. 
Emerging Market Firms (Before Liberalization) 
Extant literature suggest that because emerging market institutions are less 
perfect than those in developed markets, unrelated diversification strategies makes sense. 
For instance, Khanna and Palepu (1997) argue that local conglomerates3 or business 
grupos4 are superior structures designed to internally reproduce the functions of perfect 
capital, labor, product markets, and contract enforcement. Wan (2005) also suggests that 
inadequate institutions mean difficulty in obtaining needed country resources. Thus, 
Wan (2005) concludes that (domestic) emerging market firms are better off 
monopolizing country resources rather than improving production efficiency or 
transformational capabilities. In this sense, Schuler et al. (2002) found that when facing 
                                                 
3 Although the concept of conglomerates is not exactly the same as the one for grupo firms 
(grupos), through out this study both words are used interchangeably to mean that the firm follows an 
unrelated diversification strategy. 
4 For Khanna and Rivkin (2001) a grupo is a set of legally independent firms that are bound 
together by formal and informal ties and which actions are coordinated. According to Strachan (1979), 
business groups are diversified in several industries. 
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the possibility of foreign competition (i.e., new entries), domestic firms lobby their 
government to impose restrictions on FDI. 
Pollack (1985) also suggests that business conglomerates (family firms) are 
prevalent in emerging markets due to their ‘low-trust’ business environment. For 
instance, Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996) found that kinship-based conglomerates, 
characterized by strong hierarchical authority and trust, are the prevalent business 
structure in many Asian countries. 
While it is widely accepted that emerging market firms business structures allow 
them to overcome external capital market failures (Williamson, 1975), and ‘low trust’ 
environments (Pollack, 1985), conglomerate structures also foster sociopolitical-
relational advantages. For instance, Guillen (2000) argues that business grupos in Latin-
America, Korea, India and Turkey have been able to resist the threat of international 
competition in their own soil because of their superior informational capabilities. Thus, 
according to Guillen (1997), this superiority in local information exchange capabilities 
allows domestic firms an asymmetric access to resources and opportunities, and a 
competitive advantage over their foreign counterparts. In other words, we can assume 
that grupo firms have familiarity advantages since their structure allows them to access 
information in several industries at a time. Also, conglomerate structures lead to multiple 
interactions with the host country’s authorities, which could translate in both relational 
and preferential treatment advantages (e.g., access to information) that firms with other 
business structures cannot enjoy. Apparently, in emerging markets conglomerate 
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structures could carry sociopolitical-relation advantages that are absent in other kinds of 
business structures. 
In sum, the international business literature recognizes that conglomerates have 
been successful business structures in emerging markets. Thus, unrelated diversification 
strategies can be thought as successful firm responses to the emerging markets business 
landscape. Business scholars have utilized four main theoretical perspectives to 
understand the business landscape on emerging markets, institutional theory, agency 
theory, transactions costs theory and the resource-based view (Wright et al., 2000). 
However, as emerging markets business landscapes change radically from a set of 
known institutional ‘rules of the game’ (derived from protectionist policies) to 
liberalization, extant literature has not yet provide enough insights to a new question: 
“How do organizations play the new game when the new rules are not completely 
known?” (Peng, 2003: 283). 
Emerging Markets (Domestic Firms Response to Liberalization) 
While there has been a reasonable amount of research on MNEs on emerging 
markets, research on domestic firm responses to liberalization is scarce. Among the few 
studies about the specific effects of market liberalization (i.e., a regulatory punctuation 
on local firms), Toulan (2002) contends that vertical integration decreases following the 
opening of the economy. His study shows that firms responding to market liberalization 
were more likely to reduce their presence in peripheral aspects of the value chain, thus 
increasing their focus on core competencies. In other words, because liberalization 
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intensifies firm competition (Mortimore, 2000), Toulan concludes that local firms realize 
they will no longer be able to compete in every phase of the value chain as effectively. 
Guillen (2000) advocates that local firms’ advantages are the result of 
asymmetric access to resources, thus, that conglomerate structures allow domestic firms 
to obtain a competitive advantage. Toulan (2002) on the other hand, argues that once 
liberalization takes place, local firms seek efficiency by focusing in their core 
competencies through vertical integration. According to Toulan (2002: 559) “…a closely 
related subject which is also in need of further research is the impact of the former (i.e., 
market liberalization) on the horizontal scope of the firm.” 
Analyzing the effect of liberalization on partner selection in Russia and China, 
Hitt et al. (2004) suggest that emerging market firms pay special attention to the 
prospective partner’s technological capabilities. They further advocate that because of 
the lack of intellectual property rights in these economies, domestic firms are ill 
prepared to compete against the MNEs’ higher research and development capabilities. 
Also, Ahlstrom and Bruton (2001) notes that emerging market firms have a higher need 
for establishing legitimacy in their home markets; thus alliance partners with strong 
reputation allow domestic firms to acquire legitimacy in their respective home market. 
Echoing Hitt et al. (2004) and Ahlstrom and Bruton (2001), the study by Gillespie and 
Teegen (1995) illustrate the motives behind the formation of strategic alliances between 
American and Mexican firms after NAFTA. Gillespie and Teegen (1995) found that 
Mexican firms needed greater customer orientation and seek alliances to satisfy the new 
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demands of the business landscape such as new technology and internationally 
recognized brand names (legitimacy). 
The present study seeks to build in this (recent) research stream of emerging 
market firms’ responses to radical business landscape change (e.g., responses to rapid 
liberalization). 
Liability of Foreignness 
This (LOF) literature review hinges in answering three questions: whether LOF 
exists, when it exists, and what drives it. Following Eden and Miller (2004), our focus 
goes beyond the well-known advantages related to costs of production, distribution, and 
other economic-based advantages (i.e., OLI advantages) advocated by traditional IB 
theorists (e.g., Dunning, 1995; Rugman, 1981). Thus, our focal point lies in 
understanding the “sociopolitical-relational” hazard of foreignness, whether it exists, 
when it exists, and what drives it.  
Hymer (1976) was the first to argue that, when going abroad, foreign firms 
would be at a disadvantage to domestic firms. In his view, these disadvantages or cost of 
doing business abroad (CDBA) arose out of the heightened barriers to entry in a host-
country market. For instance, Hymer identified three types of such increased barriers or 
disadvantages, namely: 1) informational, 2) discriminatory, and 3) currency exchange. 
According to Eden and Miller (2004), CDBA is a well-accepted concept in the 
international business literature. However, for years, international business scholars 
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favored the study of MNEs firm-specific advantages instead of their added costs of 
doing business abroad (e.g., Dunning, 1977; Dunning & McQueen, 1982; Rugman, 
1981;). As a result, during the 1970s and 1980s the CDBA literature did not progress 
(Eden & Miller, 2004). 
Recently, the interest for studying the CDBA concept has reemerged, as 
international management scholars are examining whether the phenomenon exists, when 
it exists, and what drives it. For instance, Zaheer (1995), following Hymer’s CDBA 
conceptualization, suggests that foreign firms are at a competitive disadvantage with 
their local counterparts because of their unfamiliarity with the host-country market, and 
because they are subject to differential treatment by local organizations (e.g., 
government, suppliers). Zaheer calls this set of disadvantages that are only borne by the 
foreign firm liability of foreignness (LOF). Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) conclude 
that LOF decreases over time and eventually disappears as exit rates of foreign and local 
firms behave similarly. Miller and Parkhe (2002) find evidence for LOF from a firm-
level perspective, using an improved way to measure firm performance in banks. In 
contrast, Nachum’s (2003) study on financial service firms in London illustrates the 
absence of LOF. Not only that, but she finds that foreign firms outperformed domestic 
firms. Nachum contends that her findings help to identify the sources of foreign firm 
advantages; thus, she suggests the study is consistent with extant LOF theoretical 
framework. 
On the question about the temporality of LOF, or when does it exist; Zaheer and 
Mosakowski (1997) conclude that LOF decreases after the first two years of operating in 
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the host-country and lasts no more than 16 years. Lu and Beamish (2001) demonstrate 
that after an initial negative relationship between a firm’s FDI activity and its 
performance, performance markedly improves as LOF decreases.5 Thus, according to 
extant literature, LOF decreases as foreign firms become familiar with the local 
environment (Zaheer, 1995; Lu and Beamish, 2001), gain access to information 
networks (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997) and earn legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
According to Hitt et al. (1998), because the competitive landscape is nowadays 
more global and technologically driven, frequent discontinuities causing rapid 
transformations are more likely to occur. Haveman et al. (2001) also note that sudden 
environmental discontinuities caused by shifts in regulatory policies and technological 
breakthroughs are likely to precipitate radical organizational change. In this regard, some 
LOF theorists have considered the effects of such discontinuities, in particular, the 
effects of market liberalization on LOF. For instance, Ataullah and Le (2004) finds that 
after market liberalization, the performance of foreign banks in Pakistan and India was 
equal or higher than that of Pakistani and Indian banks, respectively. And Zaheer and 
Mosakowski (1997) find that under financial market deregulation, local firms are more 
likely to exit the market than foreign firms. Also, Nachum (2003) suggests that a 
plausible explanation for the absence of LOF in her study of financial services firms in 
London is that British policies did not discriminate against foreign firms. In fact, 
                                                 
5 They actually found evidence of an S curve relationship between a firm’s FDI activity 
(internationalization) and its performance. Explaining the whole aspect of the relationship is beyond the 
scope of the question of when LOF exist. 
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Nachum (2003) comments that the Big Bang liberalization of the British stock exchange 
enhanced the status of the city of London as a premier international financial center. 
Taken together, these studies have demonstrated that market liberalization (i.e., a 
regulatory punctuation) decreases the negative effects of LOF at the expense of the local 
firms. More importantly, these studies allow us to expand our understanding of when 
LOF exists, and more importantly, to recognize the external factors that increase or 
decrease LOF. 
As Eden and Miller (2004: 196) put it, the main disadvantage of an international 
firm when going abroad is being a “stranger in a strange land.” In this sense, CDBA and 
LOF are no longer seen as interchangeable concepts (Zaheer, 2002). In fact, Eden and 
Miller (2004) argue that CDBA consists of both economic-activity decision making 
having to do with cost of production, distribution and the like, and LOF. They argue 
LOF should (only) be seen as sociopolitical-relational costs, namely: unfamiliarity, 
relational, and discriminatory hazards. This clarification is important because it allows 
us to better understand the theoretical drivers of LOF. In this sense, Eden and Miller 
(2004) identified institutional forces as key drivers of LOF. According to these authors, 
legitimacy and institutional distance explain how MNEs adjust to the ‘rules of the game’ 
or business environment of the host-country (i.e., unfamiliarity, relational, and 
discriminatory hazards). 
Mezias’ (2002) study is a good empirical illustration of the importance of these 
sociopolitical relational costs. He finds that foreign firms conducting business in the US 
were more likely than their American counterparts to face unfavorable labor lawsuit 
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judgments. The study supports his claim that American firms’ familiarity with their 
domestic legal system plays a key role avoiding undesirable outcomes (i.e., labor 
lawsuits). Also, Rangan and Drummond (2004) demonstrate that MNEs from home 
countries with closer ties (i.e., less sociopolitical-relational costs) outperform firms from 
home countries with more distant ties. 
Both Mezias (2002) and Rangan and Drummond (2004) lend credence to Eden 
and Miller’s (2004) argument favoring the importance of the sociopolitical-relational 
costs beyond the well understood economic-based ones. What is more, these 
sociopolitical-relational costs can be understood from the perspective of both foreign and 
domestic firms. That is, the unfamiliarly, relational and discriminatory hazards faced by 
foreign firms can also be seen as advantages for domestic firms competing with foreign 
firms in their home market. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The main tenets for developing this research are based on previous research on 
punctuated equilibrium, emerging economies and liability of foreignness literature. 
Because this research explores firm responses to radical environmental change, the 
punctuated equilibrium model is utilized to help frame the theoretical environmental 
context in general terms (i.e., regulatory punctuations). The emerging markets literature 
succinctly addresses both the specific domestic business landscape (i.e., the 
environment) and how domestic firms from these markets developed their business 
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strategies, both before and after liberalization. Finally, LOF explores the three 
dimensions of sociopolitical-relational disadvantages of MNEs when going abroad, 
namely: unfamiliarity, relational, and discriminatory hazards. 
Following Hoskisson et al. (2000) and Wright et al. (2005), the review implicitly 
acknowledges some of the multi-theoretical lenses that various authors have used when 
studying emerging markets (i.e., institutional theory, agency theory, transaction cost 
theory and resources-based view). Thus, the present research further contributes on three 
of the four strategic options suggested by Wright et al. (2005), namely: 1) firms from 
developed markets entering emerging economies, 2) domestic firms competing within 
emerging markets, and 3) firms from emerging markets entering developed markets. 
As stated in the introductory chapter, the specific contribution of this research 
rests on exploring firms’ strategic responses to punctuations on the emerging markets 
business landscape. In so doing, the study implicitly considers the emerging markets’ 
institutional environment (e.g., institutional theory), the most efficient business 
structures follow by emerging market firms (e.g., transaction costs), and how some firms 
obtain access to valuable resources (e.g., resourced-based view). However, these ideas 
are explored within the framework of the punctuated equilibrium model, emerging 
markets and liability of foreignness.
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CHAPTER III 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The main purpose of Chapter III is to develop the theoretical rationale to address 
the research questions from Chapter I. The hypotheses presented in this chapter seek to 
identify the successful strategic responses and characteristics of both multinational and 
domestic firms trying to adapt to regulatory punctuations. In so doing, the chapter is 
divided in three sections. In the first section, the chapter offers hypotheses about the 
strategic responses and characteristics of MNEs. The goal is to contribute to the 
international business and strategy literatures by uncovering why some MNEs perform 
better than other MNEs in a host (emerging) market, affected by regulatory 
punctuations. Next, the chapter presents hypotheses conducive to identifying why some 
domestic firms perform better than other domestic firms. Thus, in this section, the 
hypotheses are about the success of the strategic responses of domestic (emerging 
market) firms facing regulatory punctuations in their home market. The third section 
does make a performance comparison between MNEs and domestic firms. However, the 
emphasis is placed on the strategic choices made by these firms. In other words, the one 
hypothesis posed in this last section seeks to understand if similar strategies are equally 
successful for MNEs and domestic firms. The chapter ends with a recount of the 
hypotheses. 
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MNE vs MNE 
Characteristics 
The Strategic Management and International Business literatures have largely 
overlooked the performance differences among MNEs competing in a third host market 
(Rangan & Drummond, 2004). However, in light of the profound transformations of the 
business landscape of the last few years (e.g., globalization), competition among MNEs 
in emerging markets is becoming more pervasive (Rangan & Drummond, 2004). Indeed, 
emerging markets have moved from protectionism (e.g., Latin America) or central 
planning policies (e.g., Russia) towards market oriented policies (Sheanan, 1987, 1997; 
Spicer et al., 2000). Because this policy shift effectively changes the ‘rules of the game’ 
in several emerging markets, firms operating in these markets had to adapt quickly in 
order to survive. 
Institutions, defined by Scott (1995: 33) as “cognitive, normative, and regulative 
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior”, reduce 
uncertainty by providing dependable and efficient frameworks for economic exchange 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). However, during revolutionary periods, such as the ones 
brought about by regulatory punctuations (e.g., liberalization policies), following old 
institutional rules could become useless as these rules rapidly lose legitimacy (Peng & 
Heath, 1996). Apparently, under these conditions, following old institutional rules no 
longer reduce uncertainty as they are no longer the consensus for efficient economic 
exchange. 
 32 
 
 
 
Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) found that under financial market deregulation, 
local firms are more likely to exit the market than foreign firms. Ataullah and Le (2004) 
found that after liberalization, the performance of foreign banks in Pakistan and India 
was higher than that of Pakistani and Indian banks, respectively. Judging by these 
results, the change of rules (after liberalization) did not affect MNEs as much as it did 
domestic firms. Perhaps, because the policy change signified a move towards market 
oriented economic policies, MNEs did not experience as much uncertainty as their 
domestic peers because MNEs already knew how to operate under market oriented 
conditions. While the literature demonstrates that MNEs outperformed their domestic 
counterparts after liberalization, implying a sharp decrease of LOF (e.g., Zaheer & 
Mosakowski, 1997), we are yet to know why some MNEs outperformed other MNEs 
after liberalization. 
Eden and Miller (2004) identify institutional forces as key drivers of LOF. 
According to these authors, legitimacy and institutional distance explain how MNEs 
adjust to the ‘rules of the game’ or business environment of the host-country (i.e., adjust 
to the host-country’s unfamiliarity, relational, and discriminatory hazards). However, 
during a regulatory punctuation (e.g., liberalization), emerging market institutions are in 
a state of flux. According to Gersick (1991), during a punctuation (i.e., a revolutionary 
period), firms try to adapt to a new set of environmental rules. Yet, because this change 
is not part of a life cycle, end-states are unknown. Under these circumstances of 
evolving institutionalization where new rules for economic exchange are being tested 
and selected, carefully gauging how institutions evolve should allow MNEs to better 
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adapt to the new environmental rules. In other words, Eden and Miller’s (2004) assertion 
that institutional distance explains the MNEs ability or inability to adapt to the new 
‘rules of the game’ of a host country, should become even more important during 
regulatory punctuations.  
Rangan and Drummond (2004) found support for the notion that MNEs that are 
from (institutionally) closer host nations, that is, MNEs whose home nation has stronger 
ties to a focal host nation will outperform their competition. For instance, they mention 
that the Dutch Unilever and the American Procter & Gamble, two equally large and 
powerful MNEs, dominate each other in Europe and North-America, respectively. 
According to them, this is because the Netherlands have stronger ties with European 
host-nations than America does, while the US has stronger ties with their North-
American neighbors than the Netherlands does. 
Following this rationale, it seems that MNEs from countries with closer ties to 
the target host market are better aligned to the host market’s business landscape (Rangan 
& Drummond, 2004). It is also apparent that after liberalization, old institutions from 
emerging markets began to collapse as protectionist and central planned economic 
policies were substituted by market oriented policies (Peng & Heath, 1996). Because 
MNEs had experience operating under these conditions, MNEs outperformed domestic 
firms during this regulatory punctuation (e.g., Ataullah & Le, 2004). However, because 
new institutions in emerging markets would probably evolve slowly and would not 
become exact replicas of those from developed markets, MNEs from countries with 
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stronger ties to the target host market will be in a better position to align to the evolving 
institutions. Following this explanation, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1. Among MNEs competing in an emerging host market, MNEs from 
countries with stronger (closer) ties to that host market will outperform6 MNEs from 
countries with weaker (more distant) ties to that host market. 
Strategic Alliances 
Liability of foreignness advocates that when firms enter a foreign market they are 
at a disadvantage compared to their local counterparts because they face unfamiliarity, 
relational and discriminatory hazards (Eden & Miller, 2004). Thus, often times MNEs 
form cooperative arrangements with domestic firms to improve their ability to gain a 
competitive advantage in the host market. For instance, Glaister and Buckley (1996) 
suggest that international strategic alliances are critical for firm success. According to 
Oliver (1990), an alliance could be formed due to one of five reasons: 1) asymmetry, to 
increase power and market share; 2) reciprocity, to obtain synergies in technology and 
information sharing; 3) efficiency, to achieve economies of scale; 4) stability, to share 
risks when entering new markets, and 5) legitimacy, for enhancing the profile of the 
organization within the industry. 
Doz (1996) argues that strategic alliances improve the partners’ environmental 
adaptation, and Kraatz (1998) also finds that strategic alliances enhance the firms’ 
                                                 
6 According to Barney (2002), survival is one of the four major approaches used to measure firm 
performance. In this study, firm survival is the measure of firm performance. 
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adaptability to their business landscape through their improved ability to acquire 
knowledge. In a related vein, Osborn and Hagedoorn (1997) acknowledge that strategic 
alliances have gained popularity as a means for entering international markets. 
Apparently, firms entering new markets need to obtain certain resources or develop 
certain capabilities to remain competitive (Hitt et al., 1999). Thus, it is clear that through 
strategic alliances, firms seek to effectively respond to the challenges of the new 
business landscape (Bettis and Hitt, 1995; Das and Teng, 1996; Prahalad, 1999). 
Beamish (1994) suggests that when forming alliances, MNEs emphasize market 
knowledge and access to customers and distribution channels. Particular to the context of 
emerging markets, Hitt et al. (2000) argue that when forming strategic alliances, MNEs 
also seek to learn about the culture and idiosyncrasies of the host market. Thus, they 
conclude that MNEs form strategic alliances with emerging market firms mainly to gain 
knowledge about the local (emerging) market. In contrast, Hitt et al. (2000) find that 
emerging market firms (i.e., local firms) want technological capabilities and intangible 
assets from their alliance partners. 
In congruence to these arguments, Gillespie and Teegen (1995) explain the 
motives behind the strategic alliances between American and Mexican firms in light of 
the NAFTA. Gillespie and Teegen (1995) found that Mexican firms needed greater 
customer orientation and seek alliances to satisfy the new demands of the business 
landscape such as new technology and internationally recognized brand names. In 
contrast, their American partners’ main motivations were to increase geographic market 
access, geographic market knowledge, customer access, and access to marketing 
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infrastructure. While access to local knowledge is always desirable as it decreases LOF, 
because the business landscape changes radically during regulatory punctuations, the 
need to adapt to this changing environment is critical for the success of the MNE. Also, 
because MNEs are in competition against one another, they need to adapt quickly in 
order to be successful. 
In other words, MNEs that form alliances with local firms will be better able to 
acquire the necessary resources to compete successfully in the focal host market than 
those MNEs without local alliances. According to Hitt et al. (2000), MNEs are likely to 
have the necessary absorptive capacity to obtain local knowledge. Thus, in congruence 
with these arguments, I predict the following: 
Hypothesis 2. Among MNEs competing in an emerging host market, MNEs 
forming strategic alliances with local partners will outperform MNEs that do not. 
International Diversification Strategies 
Franko (2004) demonstrates that developed market firms turned away from 
unrelated diversification strategies, and even related diversification strategies, in favor of 
focused strategies. His study shows that among the top American, European and 
Japanese firms, the number of product diversified firms (those with more than 20 percent 
of their sales outside their main industry), dropped by half between 1980 and 2000. In 
contrast, Franko (2004) also finds the number of developed market firms turning away 
from product diversification strategies (those with 95 percent or more of their sales 
within their main industry), increasing dramatically during that same time frame. 
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Nonetheless, the relationship between product diversification and firm performance has 
remained elusive (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). According to Hill et al. (1992) this could be 
because most of the research on diversification has overlooked the importance of firm 
internal organizational arrangements. 
More recently, however, the topic of international diversification has gained 
favor among corporate diversification scholars (e.g., Delios & Beamish, 1999; Hitt et al, 
1994). Because international diversification strategies seek to leverage firm-specific 
capabilities or ownership advantage (Dunning, 1977), Geringer et al. (2000) argue that 
higher international diversification should be preferred as long as MNEs can maintain 
their ownership advantage. In a related vein, Hitt et al. (2000) suggest that because 
MNEs are likely to have a higher number of learning experiences than local emerging 
market firms, MNEs should possess higher absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990). Thus, it follows that MNEs can profit from international diversification not only 
through their ownership advantage (Dunning, 1977), but also through increasing their 
learning experience repertoires. 
Previous studies find that international diversification is positively related to firm 
performance, albeit not linearly (e.g., Geringer et al., 1989; Hitt et al., 2001). Hitt et al. 
(2002: 265), however, caution that international diversification can be carried too far, 
meaning that “firms can grow only so large and diverse before becoming 
unmanageable.” According to Delios and Beamish (1999), the positive effect of 
international diversification on firm performance comes as a result of both the 
possession of superior resources (i.e., proprietary assets) and the acquired ability to 
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develop new technological expertise. For instance, Kim et al. (1993) argue that the more 
internationally diversified a firm is, (i.e., ‘the more multinational’), the greater the 
opportunities to leverage its resources and increase its performance. However, the extant 
literature has yet to test the link between the MNE’s international diversification and the 
performance of its subsidiary in a focal emerging market. In other words, do more 
internationally diversified MNEs hold an advantage over less diversified ones when 
entering a new (emerging) market? 
Important to the context of the present study, regulatory punctuations are likely 
to create the need for new organizational designs (Baum et al., 1995). Thus, under these 
circumstances, organizations might need to change their current business archetypes 
(Gersick, 1991). According to Greenwood and Hinings (1988, 1993) organizations 
facing such revolutionary periods will seek to reconfigure their business archetypes 
based on their learning experiences or repertoires. In this sense, because during 
revolutionary periods (Gersick, 1991), organizations operating in these contexts are 
trying to make sense of the evolving business landscape, it follows that firms with larger 
business repertoires should adapt more quickly. In other words, more internationally 
diversified firms7 (i.e., firms with larger repertoires) should be quicker to identify the 
proper business archetype for that particular market based on their previous experiences. 
Following this explanation, I hypothesize the following: 
                                                 
7 This statement assumes firm manageability (Hitt et al., 2002) and the maintenance of the firm’s 
ownership advantage (Dunning, 1977). 
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Hypothesis 3. Among MNEs competing in an emerging host market, more 
internationally diversified MNEs will outperform less internationally diversified MNEs. 
Domestic vs Domestic 
Diversification Strategies  
Corporate Diversification. Because emerging economies lack adequate 
institutions, emerging market firms typically use conglomerate structures as a means to 
internally reproduce the functions of capital, labor, and product markets (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997). As a result, several conglomerates have secured monopoly status as 
unrelated diversification facilitates frequent interaction between firms and local 
governments (Chazan, 2000). 
These internalization strategies of conglomerates in emerging markets translate 
into sociopolitical-relational advantages. For instance, Guillen (2000) argues that 
business conglomerates have been able to resist the threat of international competition in 
their home market because of their superior informational capabilities. According to 
Guillen (2002), this superiority in local information exchange capabilities gives domestic 
firms asymmetric access to resources and opportunities, and thus, a competitive 
advantage over their foreign counterparts. Congruent to the idea of asymmetric access to 
information, Wan (2005) suggests that emerging market firms succeed with unrelated 
diversification because it fosters social ties with key stakeholders (e.g., government 
officials or bank officers). 
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Considering the effects of market liberalization on local firms, Toulan (2002) 
contends that vertical integration decreases following the opening of the economy. His 
study shows that firms responding to liberalization were more likely to reduce their 
presence in peripheral activities of the value chain, thus increasing their focus on core 
competencies. In other words, because liberalization intensifies firm competition 
(Mortimore, 2000), local firms realized they were not able to compete in every phase of 
the value chain as effectively as before. In contrast, Guillen (2000) advocates that local 
firms’ advantages are the result of asymmetric access to resources; thus, business grupos 
are the superior business structure in these environments. 
The extant literature has not addressed the performance implications of either of 
these strategies, following liberalization. In this sense, we still do not know whether an 
emerging market firm (following liberalization), should favor vertical integration 
(market capabilities) or grupo membership (non-market capabilities). 
According to D’Aveni and Macmillan (1990), under strenuous situations (e.g., a 
regulatory punctuation), firms should focus their attention on the external environment 
rather than on the internal aspects of the business. Their argument rests on the notion 
that most internal aspects of the business are not necessarily aligned with the new 
business landscape and will need to change. Thus, they demonstrate that firms focusing 
on the internal aspect of the business during challenging circumstances are indeed 
focusing on what might no longer work (given the new environment). 
Because regulatory punctuations force local firms to reinterpret their new 
business landscape (i.e., the external environment), it follows that firms with greater 
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informational capabilities should have an advantage over firms with lesser informational 
capabilities. Under this rationale, grupo firms, which Guillen (2000) argues have 
superior abilities to scan the environment, should have an advantage over those firms 
that are not part of a grupo, and thus, do not have the same environment scanning 
abilities. Thus, in congruence with these arguments, I predict the following: 
Hypothesis 4. Among local firms competing in an emerging market, those local 
firms that are members of a grupo will outperform local firms without such membership. 
Product Diversification 
Indeed, Toulan (2002) finds emerging market firms turning away from vertical 
integration, after liberalization, in order to focus more on their core competencies. 
However, he also recognizes that extant literature has yet to find whether there is a link 
between corporate diversification and performance. Product diversification is defined as 
a firm’s diversification into several product markets within a single business unit (Wan 
& Hoskisson, 2003).8 Wan and Hoskisson demonstrate that product diversification is 
positively related to firm performance in the context of less munificent environments. In 
other words, it follows that under emerging market contexts, ‘non-market capabilities’ 
(e.g., social ties) should be more important than market capabilities (Wan, 2005). 
Bae et al. (2002) illustrate the importance of social ties in emerging markets 
under a regulatory punctuation by showing that adverse shocks to Korean banks also had 
                                                 
8 This definition is consistent with Wan and Hoskisson’s (2003). However, the present study 
focuses on the product diversification of the single business unit. Thus, this is not corporate 
diversification. 
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a negative effect on the value of their clients’ firms. Thus, they conclude that when a 
bank does poorly and suffers from a decreased ability to lend, the client’s firm is also 
negatively affected because the firm loses the benefits of the durable bank relationship. 
In this sense, under regulatory punctuations, emerging market firms should be more 
likely to diversify their products to emphasize their non-market capabilities over their 
market capabilities. Following this explanation, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 5. Among local firms competing in an emerging market, local firms 
with higher product diversification will outperform local firms with lower product 
diversification. 
International Diversification 
International business scholars argue that MNEs have two main motivations to 
engage in international diversification: 1) exploiting their capabilities in international 
environments (Hymer, 1976; Dunning, 1977), and 2) exploring or augmenting their 
knowledge base (Cantwell, 1989). For local firms facing a new business landscape, 
perhaps the motivation is not to exploit their capabilities, but rather, to learn how to 
compete under a different set of rules. Hillman and Hitt (1999) comment that many local 
firms are dominant in their home market because of their quasi-monopoly status. This 
suggests that most local firms might lack the resources or capabilities to compete in 
developed markets. However, local firms can still benefit from international 
diversification by transferring back their learning experiences. 
 43 
 
 
 
Hitt et al. (2000) suggest that emerging market firms may lack the necessary 
absorptive capacity to learn from developed market sources. However, under a 
regulatory punctuation that demands local firms to operate under developed market like 
conditions (i.e., market oriented conditions), international diversification might help 
local firms understand how to better align with the new environment. Thus, the lack of 
technological absorptive capacity might not be problematic for the local firm seeking 
internationalization, at least at the punctuation’s start. In this sense, by centering their 
attention on how to better understand the external environment, rather than the internal 
aspects of their firm, local firms should expedite their environmental learning (e.g., 
D’Aveni and Macmillan, 1990). 
Alternatively, local firms that do not engage in international diversification might 
take more time to understand how to compete under the new business environment. For 
instance, Gillespie and Teegen (1995) note that local firms only gain limited knowledge 
about international markets when forming an international strategic alliance. Thus, I 
hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 6. Among local firms competing in an emerging market, more 
internationally diversified local firms will outperform less internationally  diversified 
local firms. 
Non-Market Capabilities 
Because local firm advantages in emerging markets can be derived from 
asymmetric access to resources (Guillen, 2000), it follows that their competitive 
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advantage hinges on their ability to access asymmetric information or opportunities, 
rather than in their market capabilities (Wan, 2005). For instance, according to Gruben 
and Welch (1996), the high price-to-book ratios offered by Mexican investors to buy the 
state-owned banks in the early 1990s were a sign that these investors expected the 
industry to remain uncompetitive. In other words, a certain (monopolistic) performance 
expectation had already been set (by these investors) by virtue of being part of the 
selected group of new bank owners. Table 3.1 shows the prices that Mexican investors 
paid for the formerly state owned banks. 
As regulatory punctuations (e.g., liberalization) abruptly changed the emerging 
markets business landscape, some domestic firms opted to focus on developing market-
oriented capabilities (e.g., efficiency, technology) to defend their market share. For 
instance, Chang and Velasco (2000) suggest that liberalization policies encourage 
greater risk taking by competitive banks to defend their market share. However, 
Mortimore (2000) suggests that firms operating in countries or regions not accustomed 
to fierce competition (e.g., Latin America), could soon face a traumatic experience. 
Indeed, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) find that financial crises occur when an economy 
is fueled by overlending. For these authors, overlending is a classic example of an ‘ultra’ 
competitive behavior exhibited by most financial institutions after financial deregulation. 
Also, Sachs et al. (1996) find that countries that experienced lending booms, as a result 
of liberalization, were more likely to suffer currency crises. 
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TABLE 3.1 
Commercial Banks Reprivatized by the Mexican Government (1991-1992) 
Date Bank Name 
% of Shares 
Sold 
Amount received 
(Millions of USD*) 
Price/Book 
Value 
6/7/1991 Mercantil de Mexico (Probursa) 77.2 202 2.66 
6/14/1991 Banpais 100 180 3.03 
6/21/1991 Banca Cremi 66.7 248 3.40 
8/2/1991 Confia 78.7 295 3.73 
8/9/1991 Banco de Oriente 66 74 4.04 
8/16/1991 Bancrecer 100 141 2.53 
8/23/1991 Banamex 70.7 3,227 2.63 
10/25/1991 Bancomer 56 2,848 2.99 
11/8/1991 BCH 100 291 2.68 
1/24/1992 Serfin 51 915 2.69 
2/7/1992 Comermex 66.5 876 3.73 
2/28/1992 Somex 81.6 607 3.31 
3/27/1992 Atlantico 68.5 475 5.30 
4/3/1992 Promex 66 348 4.23 
4/10/1992 Banoro 66 368 3.95 
6/12/1992 Mercantil del Norte (Banorte) 66 575 4.25 
6/26/1992 Internacional (Bital) 51 481 2.95 
7/3/1992 Centro 66.3 281 4.65 
6/7/1991 Mercantil de Mexico (Probursa) 77.2 202 2.66 
6/14/1991 Banpais 100 180 3.03 
6/21/1991 Banca Cremi 66.7 248 3.40 
 Total  $12.433  
*Dollar-Peso Average Exchange Rage 
1991=3.01615 
1992=3.09408 
The amount paid does not assume 100% ownership. In all cases, however, the 
controlling interest surpassed 51%. 
Source: Hovey (1996: 247-250); Rogozinski (1998: 131) 
 
Essentially, local firms which usually obtain their competitive advantage through 
monopolistic status (Chazan, 2000) were forced to compete under a more leveled 
playing field (after liberalization). For instance, both Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998), and 
Sachs et al. (1996) find that by increasing their lending portfolios, banks tried to defend 
their market positions (gained through monopolistic status). However, these authors also 
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find that countries in which financial institutions did not engage in overlending did not 
experience currency crises. 
Because local firms’ competitive expertise rests within the realm of non-market 
capabilities such as social ties (Wan, 2005), it is unlikely that they can develop market 
capabilities as soon as the environment demands it. Thus, it follows that local firms 
enjoying monopolistic status are unlikely to maintain their market status by engaging in 
aggressive market-oriented (as opposed to non-market-oriented) growth strategies (e.g., 
overlending) against their foreign counterparts or other local firms. In this sense, firms 
that deviate from their strengths (i.e., non-market capabilities) by engaging in aggressive 
market-oriented growth strategies, rather than keeping their focus on developing socio-
political relational advantages (asymmetric access to resources), should be less 
successful in their respective industry. Thus, in congruence with this argument, I predict 
the following: 
Hypothesis 7. Among local firms competing in an emerging market, local firms 
following less aggressive (market-oriented) growth strategies will outperform local firms 
following more aggressive (market-oriented) growth strategies. 
Strategic Alliances 
Business scholars argue that strategic alliances improve the firms’ ability to 
acquire knowledge, thereby increasing their ability to adapt to the changing business 
landscape (Kraatz, 1998; Doz, 1996). Also, Osborn and Hagedoorn (1997) acknowledge 
that strategic alliances have gained popularity as a means for entering international 
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markets. Firms entering new markets often need to obtain certain resources or develop 
certain capabilities to become competitive (Hitt et al., 1999). 
Ataullah and Le (2004) demonstrated that liberalization had a positive effect on 
foreign banks operating in India and Pakistan. Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) found 
that under financial market deregulation, local firms were more likely to exit the market 
than foreign firms. Taken together, these studies show that market liberalization 
decreases the negative effects of LOF at the expense of the local firms. In this sense, as 
LOF decreases for MNEs under market liberalization policies, local firms’ advantages or 
the benefit of being local also decreases. Thus, after the playing field is leveled, MNE 
production, distribution, and other economic-based advantages (e.g., Dunning, 1977; 
Rugman, 1981) are likely to offset the remaining disadvantages of LOF. In contrast, 
local firms need to learn to operate in a new environment while competing with new 
rivals. 
According to Sun Tzu (600 BC) (1988), if an army knows the enemy and itself, 
in a hundred battles it will never be defeated. However, if an army is ignorant of the 
enemy but knows itself, its chances of winning or losing are equal. And if ignorant both 
of the enemy and itself, then, defeat will be guaranteed in every battle. Because local 
firms are, to a large extent, ignorant of both the new environment and their new foreign 
competitors (i.e., after the regulatory punctuation), continuing their same strategies 
should guarantee them “defeat in every battle.” Therefore, the pursuit of strategic 
alliances with foreign partners should allow EMFs to gain important knowledge about 
both the new environment and their new competitors. This is because local firms cannot 
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gain this knowledge from other local firms or through prior experience. According to 
Miner et al. (1990), interorganizational linkages increase a corporation’s ability to 
transform by having a more complete understanding (thus, less uncertainty) of the new 
environment. Further, forming an international strategic alliance with an MNE might 
help the local firm to acquire knowledge about how to operate in the new environment 
and compete against new rivals. Thus, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 8. Among local firms competing in an emerging market, local firms 
forming strategic alliances with international partners will outperform local firms that 
did not. 
Social Capital 
According to Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994), social capital is both the glue of 
the network and the lubricant that enables network interaction. From this perspective, 
emerging market firms seek to gain a competitive advantage through non-market 
capabilities (Wan, 2005) by filling structural holes, that is, by developing their social 
capital. For Burt (1997), structural holes are the disconnection between individuals (or 
organizations) in a marketplace. Because this disconnection leaves individuals unaware 
of the benefits they could offer one another, filling the disconnection (i.e., the structural 
hole) creates information benefits (e.g., access, timing, referrals). Thus, social capital is a 
function of brokerage opportunities in a network (Burt, 1997). In this sense, because 
domestic firms attempting to develop their social capital can gain broker advantages as a 
member of a tight network (Kogut & Zander, 1996), they are also able to influence and 
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interpret the local environment efficiently. In other words, local firms high in social 
capital are able to connect the structural holes that exist in the market and gain 
information benefits such as access, timing or referrals, or as Guillen (2000) puts it gain 
asymmetric access to resources. 
Because local firms are often part of a network of firms, it is easy to think of 
them as embedded in a network. For Uzzi (1996), embeddedness is the process by which 
social relations shape economic action in ways that economic schemes incorrectly 
specify when they assume that social ties affect economic behavior only minimally. 
Further, Granovetter (1985) suggests that embeddedness stresses the role of social 
structures and relations in the generation of trust and the discouragement of malfeasance. 
Uzzi (1997) also notes that embedded ties facilitate efficient investments by reducing 
risks (matching known investors through a network structure) and increasing good will 
and reciprocity. In addition, he notes that embedded ties promote economies of time (the 
ability to capitalize quickly on market opportunities) due to lower costs of monitoring 
and establishing contractual safeguards. 
However, abrupt changes of the business landscape may diminish the value of 
social capital. For instance, Uzzi (1997) states three reasons that turn embeddedness into 
a liability. First, the unexpected loss of a core network member might disrupt the 
benefits of network membership. Second, and related to the first, is a change in the 
institutional arrangements that underscore the network. And third, is the problem of 
being overembedded in a network, where too high a proportion of embedded ties in a 
network lead to too few links to outside members who might contribute innovative ideas. 
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Under emerging market arrangements, local firms such as grupo firms that are 
embedded in a network of firms have obtained a competitive advantage (e.g., Guillen, 
2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). However, regulatory punctuations such as liberalization 
policies might turn embeddedness into a liability. For instance, because local firms 
might no longer have superior knowledge about the local business landscape because 
liberalization requires a higher emphasis in market capabilities (Wan, 2005), the value of 
the social ties could be lost. In this sense, following inertial practices on how to transact 
(after the regulatory punctuation) might translate in a liability for the embedded firms. 
On the other hand, Blyler and Coff (2003) propose that social capital is a 
necessary condition to develop dynamic capabilities. Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000: 1007) define dynamic capabilities as the firm’s “processes to integrate, 
reconfigure, gain and release resources, to match and even create market change.” 
According to Teece et al. (1997), dynamic capabilities allow firms to gain a competitive 
advantage by reconfiguring or adapting to the environment. And Grant (1987) suggests 
that social capital is a key mechanism for knowledge integration. 
Although, it is clear that after regulatory punctuations that favor liberalization 
local firms lose some of their advantages against foreign firms, it is also clear that not all 
domestic firms lose their advantages (e.g., Ataullah and Le, 2004; Zaheer and 
Mosakowski, 1997). For instance, Guillen (2000) argues that local firms prosper under 
asymmetrical paths to development. He advocates that either through export-led or 
import substitution policies, the local government aims to favor (some) local firms. 
Moreover, though necessary, social capital is not sufficient (alone) to allow a firm to 
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foster dynamic capabilities. However, absent social capital, firms would be unable to 
interpret the flow of information in a volatile environment (Blyler and Coff, 2003). 
In sum, while social capital alone might not be enough to allow domestic firms to 
overcome the market capabilities of MNEs, social capital might still provide advantages 
against other domestic firms. Social capital is an essential component of a dynamic 
capability in that it enables resource management (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Thus, 
in congruence with this argument, I predict the following: 
Hypothesis 9. Among local firms competing in an emerging market, local firms 
with higher social capital will outperform local firms with lower social capital. 
MNEs vs Domestic Firms 
Acquisition Strategies 
Mergers and acquisitions are perhaps the most aggressive organizational 
response to resource dependence. Through an acquisition, the organization is trying to 
mitigate the resource dependence through internalization. In other words, the acquiring 
firm tries to bring the resource dependence under its control. For instance, Burt 
(1977: 70) states that “the most direct strategy for eliminating a source of market 
constraint would be to purchase an establishment within the constraining sector.” Also, 
according to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), horizontal acquisitions (i.e., acquisitions of 
firms competing in the same industry as their acquirers), seeks to reduce commensalistic 
dependence by simultaneously reducing competition and increasing power. 
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In contrast to internationalization or strategic alliances, which help firms 
understand how to better align with the new environment, acquiring a local competitor 
does not necessarily improve the knowledge stock about the new environment. However, 
through a domestic acquisition, the buyer does ‘buy’ time by virtue of mitigating its 
resource dependence. In this sense, firms that acquire their competitors are able to cope 
with adversity for a longer period of time than those firms that did not acquire 
competitors nor gain new insights on how to compete under the new regulations. Also 
inherent to any merger and acquisition is the concept of growth, which increases the 
probability of survival (Katz & Kahn, 1966). Thus, in congruence with this argument, I 
predict the following: 
Hypothesis 10. Among both MNEs and emerging market firms operating in an 
emerging market, those that engage in more acquisition activity will outperform those 
with less acquisition activity. 
Summary 
Chapter III presents a total of 10 hypotheses (see Table 3.2 for a summary of the 
hypotheses). The first section compares the performance of MNEs operating in a host 
emerging market, under a regulatory punctuation (e.g., liberalization). One particular 
characteristic and two strategic responses are examined. The MNE characteristic argued 
to positively affect MNE performance is the extent of the MNEs’ sociopolitical-
relational ties with the host nation institutions. In terms of the responses, this section 
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suggests that alliances and international diversification strategies are positively related to 
MNE performance. 
 
TABLE 3.2 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Among MNEs competing in an emerging host market MNEs from countries 
with stronger (closer) ties to that host market will outperform  MNEs from 
countries with weaker (more distant) ties to that host market. 
Hypothesis 2: Among MNEs competing in an emerging host market MNEs forming strategic 
alliances with local partners will outperform MNEs that do not. 
Hypothesis 3: Among MNEs competing in an emerging host market more internationally 
diversified MNEs will outperform less internationally diversified MNEs. 
Hypothesis 4: Among local firms competing in an emerging market those local firms that are 
members of a grupo will outperform local firms without such membership. 
Hypothesis 5: Among local firms competing in an emerging market local firms with higher 
product diversification will outperform local firms with lower product 
diversification. 
Hypothesis 6: Among local firms competing in an emerging market more internationally 
diversified local firms will outperform less internationally diversified local 
firms. 
Hypothesis 7: Among local firms competing in an emerging market local firms following less 
aggressive (market-oriented) growth strategies will outperform local firms 
following more aggressive (market-oriented) growth strategies. 
Hypothesis 8: Among local firms competing in an emerging market local firms forming 
strategic alliances with international partners will outperform local firms that did 
not. 
Hypothesis 9: Among local firms competing in an emerging market local firms with higher 
social capital will outperform local firms with lower social capital. 
Hypothesis 10: Among both MNEs and emerging market firms operating in an emerging market 
those that engage in more acquisition activity will outperform those with less 
acquisition activity. 
 
 
The next section compares the performance of domestic firms operating in an 
emerging market, under a regulatory punctuation. The section examines the following 
domestic firm strategic responses: corporate diversification, product diversification, 
international diversification, aggressive market-oriented growth strategies, alliances, and 
social capital. All diversification strategies are hypothesized to be positively related to 
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firm performance. Furthermore, aggressive market-oriented growth is the only 
hypothesis of this section that suggests a negative relation to firm performance. Lastly, 
the chapter ends with a general hypothesis about acquisition strategies, where it is 
argued that acquisition strategies for either MNEs or domestic firms are positively 
related to firm performance. 
 55 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
PILOT TEST: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Chapter IV is both a pilot test and a descriptive analysis of hypotheses 1, 2, 4, 
and 7, presented in three sections. In the first section, the chapter begins with a brief 
summary of the four regulatory punctuations that most affected the Mexican banking 
industry (1990-2004). Next, the chapter presents an account of how these punctuations 
affected the banks operating in Mexico during that period and identifies why some banks 
perform better than others. Essentially, the first section represents the descriptive 
account of the regulatory punctuations. The second section, on the other hand, tests the 
effectiveness of the firms’ characteristics and strategic responses to these punctuations 
(hypotheses 1, 2, 4, and 7). Finally, a summary of the results and a brief commentary is 
offered. 
The strategic management and international business literatures have produced a 
wealth of research gauging the actions and strategic shifts of large multinational 
corporations (e.g., Ferrier, 2001; Luo & Peng, 1999). However, this research has 
emphasized performance comparisons between multinational and domestic firms, largely 
overlooking the performance differences among foreign multinational firms competing 
in a third host market (Rangan & Drummond, 2004). Likewise, a review of these 
literatures reveals a need to better understand emerging market firms strategic responses 
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to radical environmental change. For instance, Doh (2000) recognized the scarcity of 
studies on firm-level responses to regulatory punctuations such as mass privatization. 
To contribute to the extant literature in strategic management and international 
business, the present study uses the case of the Mexican banking industry as its sample. 
Mexico is classified as an emerging market by Hoskisson et al. (1999) and the banking 
industry had several regulatory punctuations. Thus, this sample is adequate to test the 
proposed hypotheses. 
The Four Regulatory Punctuations 
Theoretical and Empirical Antecedents 
In the past fifteen years, the Mexican banking industry has experienced several 
regulatory punctuations. Several authors have explained the reasons and effects of these 
punctuations at the country and industry levels. For instance, White (1991) touches on 
the political reasons and implications of the nationalization, whereas Zebadúa and Kolari 
(1997) take a historical perspective. Ortiz 1994) and Hovey (1996) offer a detailed 
description about how the reprivatization process unfolded, whereas Unal and Navarro 
(1999) and Haber and Kantor (2003) take a more critical perspective. In fact, according 
to Haber and Kantor (2003: 12) “The Mexican banking system was set for collapse right 
from the start of the privatization.” Finally, most studies about the industry’s 
liberalization consider the role played by Mexico’s exchange rate crisis (1994-1995). For 
instance, Froot and McBrady (1996), and Maskooki (1994) recount how the crisis 
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unfolded. And Yacaman (2000) and Murillo (2000) present an account of the industry’s 
evolution once the crisis onsets (1995-2000). 
Although there are plenty of studies about the Mexican banking industry from a 
macroeconomics perspective (i.e., country level of analysis), there are no comprehensive 
studies about the effects of regulatory punctuations at the firm level, either for 
multinational or domestic banks. In other words, previous researchers have not studied 
why some banks performed better than others under the new state constraints or new 
“rules of the game.” 
The Punctuations 
1. Reprivatization of the Mexican Banking Industry (1990-1992). In 1990, the 
Mexican Congress authorized two main modifications to the banking law. 
The first change would allow for the return of (domestic) private banks to do 
business in Mexico. The second, and perhaps more important change, would 
allow for banking services to be treated as a regular economic activity, rather 
than as a concession from the government. This change was important in the 
sense that the Mexican government would no longer be able to nationalize 
banks (legally). It could however, revoke their authorization to operate, but 
not take them over as it did in the 1982 nationalization (Ortiz, 1994). 
As the authorization took place, Mexican President Salinas issued a document 
providing the basis for the sale of the 18 commercial banks owned by the government 
(Table 3.1). This document also established the Bank Divesture Committee, created to 
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oversee the sale of the state-owned banks (Ortiz, 1994). Also, the reprivatization era 
marked the first time in history that Mexican authorities granted bank authorizations (not 
concessions) for new institutions. The first such institutions (Interestatal and 
Interacciones) began operations in the last quarter of 1993. 
2. Mexican Banking Industry Provisions for NAFTA (1994). The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took effect on January 1, 1994. 
About the provisions of the Mexican banking industry in light of NAFTA, 
there are some important limitations. Although Mexico would grant 
permission to American and Canadian financial firms to operate in Mexico, 
these firms would face certain market share limitations. These limitations 
would start immediately (1/1/1994) and would be phased out through the year 
2000 (Ortiz, 1994: 181). During the transition period, the maximum market 
share allowed for banking institutions from the US and Canada would be 
gradually increased from 8% to 15%; although the maximum individual 
market share for an American or Canadian bank could not exceed 1.5% of the 
Mexican banking industry. After the transition period, American and 
Canadian banks would be permitted to gain up to 4% of individual market 
share had this come as a result of buying a Mexican bank. However, Mexican 
authorities could stop the growth of foreign bank subsidiaries for up to three 
years if the combined market share of foreign banks amounted 25% (or more) 
of the industry (Ortiz, 1994: 181-182). 
 59 
 
 
 
3. Exchange Rate Crisis, FDI Restrictions Relaxed (1995). In December 20, 
1994, the Mexican government implemented a 15% devaluation of the peso 
(Froot & McBrady, 1996; Maskooki, 1994). Applying this policy change 
marked the beginning of the worst economic recession of this country’s 
history. However, the extent of the crisis became clearer during the first days 
of 1995. In fact, American President Clinton had to approve an economic 
rescue package for Mexico on January 11, 1995 as the Mexican GDP fell 7% 
in 1995 (Krueger & Tornell, 1999; Wilson et al., 2000). 
The crisis also forced the Mexican authorities to carry out a radical revision to 
the country’s banking law, which came into effect in March 1995. This adjustment 
reduced market-share limitations imposed in the NAFTA’s transition period, increasing 
both the individual and industry-wide market share that international banks could hold. 
From this date on, each foreign bank could control up to 6% of the Mexican banking 
industry, and in total, all foreign banks combined could have up to 25% market share of 
the industry. Had this change not occurred, foreign banks could only have controlled 
1.5% individually and 9% in total. This modification did not include the largest three 
Mexican banks (i.e., Banamex, Bancomer and Serfin). That is, these three banks could 
only be owned by Mexican nationals (Mendoza & Torre, 1999). 
4. FDI Restrictions Canceled (1998). To avoid future costly financial rescue 
packages, the Mexican lawmakers passed four significant banking law 
amendments (12/14/1998). The first amendment allowed for the creation of 
the Institute for the Protection of Bank Savings, which oversees the 
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establishment of a new deposit insurance program. The insurance aims to 
mimic what has already been established in countries such as the United 
States. The insurance deposit amounted to 400,000 UDIS, roughly $127,000 
(dollars). Amendments two and three had to do with crisis support programs, 
and the last and most important modification, at least for this study, reads as 
follows: 
“Foreign investors will be allowed to hold a majority share in Mexican 
commercial banks, regardless of size. Under the previous law, foreign investors 
were not permitted to hold a majority share in banks that had a capital share in 
excess to 6% of the aggregate capital of the system. This restriction is eliminated 
in the new law” (Mexico’s Finance Secretariat 12/14/1998). 
Firm Responses to Regulatory Punctuations 
To facilitate the analysis of these regulatory punctuations in the Mexican banking 
industry, Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix C presents a ranking order of 
multinational banks, original domestic banks and new domestic banks respectively. This 
ranking is based on the banks’ markets share, ROA, and ROE. Thus, this ranking allows 
us to identify successful from unsuccessful banks (i.e., firm performance).
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MNEs vs MNEs 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that MNEs from countries with stronger ties to that host 
market will outperform MNEs from countries with weaker ties to that host market. To 
test the strength or closeness of the ties between the emerging host country and the MNE 
country of origin, Hofstede (1980) cultural distance, as well as the commercial distance 
between the host country and the MNE country origin is used. Also, to avoid 
measurement bias, The Banker’s (7/2003) classification of the Top 1,000 Banks of the 
world is used as a (performance) control measure. The Banker’s top 1,000 banks list 
considers the following factors for its rankings: bank strength, size, soundness, profits, 
performance, BIS capital ratio, and NPL to total loans (see Appendix D for finer detail). 
Our assumption is as follows: if all multinational banks are equally capable to enter and 
perform well in the Mexican banking industry, then there should be no difference 
between the top banks’ asset allocation in the Mexican banking industry and that of the 
rest of the world’s banking industry. In other words, if a top bank has a 10% market 
share of the world’s banking industry (excluding Mexico), that top bank should have a 
similar market share in the Mexican banking industry, if indeed the Mexican market 
presents and equal opportunity to enter and perform well for that MNE. 
About the ability to enter the Mexican banking industry: because there were only 
20 plus MNEs entering the Mexican market, only the top 25 banks of the world 
(according to The Banker 6/2003) are used to calculate an average weight by nationality. 
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The weight by nationality of the top 25 banks of the world in the world’s banking 
industry (shown in Table 4.1) is as follows: USA 24%, UK 16%, Japan 16%, France 8%, 
Germany 8%, China 12%, The Netherlands 12%, and Switzerland 4%. However, the 
actual weight by nationality of the MNEs that entered the Mexican banking industry is 
as follows: USA 46%, Netherlands 8%, Japan 8%, Spain 8%, France 8%, Germany 8%, 
Switzerland 4%, UK 4%, and Canada 4% (shown in Table 4.2). Comparing the two 
tables produce the following results. Germany, Switzerland, and France have exactly the 
same values in both tables. The countries that ‘lost’ representation in the Mexican 
market (compared to the world market) are: the UK, Japan, China, and the Netherlands. 
In contrast, the MNEs from the USA, Spain, and Canada have a larger presence in the 
Mexican market, that is, beyond the representation that these countries’ MNEs have in 
the world’s banking industry. 
About the ability to perform: firm performance is based on the ranking developed 
in Appendix A. The nationalities of the top five (75th percentile) multinational banks 
operating in Mexico are compared to the nationality of the bottom five banks on 
Table 4.2. The top five MNEs and their nationalities are: BBVA (Spain), Citibank 
(USA), Santander (Spain), HSBC (UK), and Scotiabank (Canada). The bottom five 
MNEs and their nationalities are: Fuji (Japan), Societe General (France), BNP (France), 
Dresdner (Germany), ABN AMRO (Netherlands). 
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TABLE 4.1 
Top 25 Banks of the World (The Banker 6/2003) 
Top 25 Banks Country Country # Banks % Weight 
Citigroup USA USA 6 24% 
Bank of America USA UK 4 16% 
HSBC UK JAPAN 4 16% 
JP Morgan Chase USA CHINA 3 12% 
Credit Agricole Groupe FRANCE NETHERLANDS 3 12% 
Mizuho Financial JAPAN FRANCE 2 8% 
Royal Bank of Scotland UK GERMANY 2 8% 
Sumitomo Mitsui JAPAN SWITZERLAND 1 4% 
Mitsubishi Tokyo JAPAN    
BNP Paribas FRANCE    
Bank One USA    
Deutsche Bank GERMANY    
HBOS UK    
Barclays Bank UK    
Bank of China CHINA    
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China CHINA    
Wells Fargo USA    
Wachovia  USA    
UFJ  JAPAN    
HypoVereinsbank GERMANY    
UBS SWITZERLAND    
ING NETHERLANDS    
ABN AMRO NETHERLANDS    
Rabobank NETHERLANDS    
Agricultural Bank of China CHINA    
Source: Banco de México (1991-2004) 
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TABLE 4.2 
Entries and Market Share of Multinational Banks in Mexico 
Market Share 
Bank Name/Country 
Entry 
Date 
Last Report 
Date Assets Equity Country # Bank Entries Percentage 
BBV/ Spain Jun-95 Mar-04 24.42% 24.80% USA 11 46% 
Citibank/USA Dec-94 Mar-04 22.60% 26.96% France 2 8% 
Santander/ Spain Dec-94 Mar-04 13.57% 12.15% Germany 2 8% 
HSBC (5)/ UK Sep-95 Mar-04 9.87% 5.62% Japan 2 8% 
Scotiabank Inverlat/ Canada Mar-96 Mar-04 4.71% 3.84% Netherlands 2 8% 
Bank of America/ USA Jun-95 Mar-04 1.71% 0.35% Spain 2 8% 
ING/ Netherlands Dec-95 Mar-04 1.51% 1.00% Canada 1 4% 
JP Morgan/USA Mar-95 Mar-04 1.03% 1.17% Switzerland 1 4% 
Deutsche/ Germany Sep-00 Mar-04 0.67% 0.62% UK 1 4% 
Bank of Boston/ USA Sep-95 Mar-04 0.33% 0.31% Total 24  
Credit Suisse/Switzerland Sep-03 Mar-04 0.31% 0.32%    
GE Capital/ USA Sep-97 Mar-04 0.31% 0.32% Top 5 Banks Bottom 5 Banks  
American Express/ USA Jun-96 Mar-04 0.18% 0.22% BBV Fuji  
Comerica Bank/USA Sep-97 Mar-04 0.18% 0.15% Citibank Societe General  
Bank of Tokyo/ Japan Mar-95 Mar-04 0.13% 0.17% Santander BNP  
First Chicago(3)/ USA Mar-96 Mar-04 0.06% 0.20% HSBC Dresdner  
ABN AMRO/ Netherlands Sep-95 Mar-04 0.03% 0.11% Scotia Bank ABN AMRO  
BNP*/ France Sep-95 Sep-01 0.02% 0.18%    
Dresdner*/ Germany Dec-95 Jun-03 0.02% 0.16% (1) Chase acquires Chemical (1996)  
Fuji*/ Japan Mar-95 Sep-99 0.01% 0.17% (2) JP Morgan and Chase merge (2000)  
Societe General*/ France Dec-95 Jun-00 0.01% 0.15% (3) Bank One acquires First Chicago (1998)  
Chase(2)/ USA Mar-95       (4) Bank of America acquires Nations Bank (1998) 
Chemical(1)/USA Mar-95       (5) HSBC acquires Republic Bank NY (2000)  
Nations Bank(4)/ USA Sep-96       * These banks exited the Mexican banking industry 
Source: Banco de México (1991-2004)  
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According to Hofstede’s cultural distance values, of the listed countries in the top 
25 world banks, Mexico is closest to Spain, while commercially, Mexico is closest to its 
North American neighbors (i.e., USA and Canada). Judging from the results of this 
analysis, both on the ability to enter the Mexican banking industry and the ability to 
perform once the MNE enters the Mexican market, it is clear that the two distances (i.e., 
cultural and commercial) are related to firm performance. In the first test, the ability to 
enter the market, the banks from ‘closer’ countries (i.e., Spain, Canada and the US) were 
the top performers. For the second test, the nationalities of four of the top five MNEs are 
very close to Mexico, commercially (USA and Canada), and culturally (Spain). In 
contrast, all of the bottom five multinational banks’ nationalities were either culturally, 
or commercially farther to Mexico: France, Japan, Germany and the Netherlands. These 
results provide support for hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that MNEs that formed alliances with local partners 
should outperform MNEs that did not. Multinational banks arrived during the second 
regulatory punctuation (NAFTA), but dramatically increased their presence once the 
crisis onset. Table 4.3 and Figures 4.1 through 4.5 illustrate the individual influence of 
MBs in the Mexican banking industry. During the third punctuation, foreign banks 
increased their market share in the Mexican banking industry from 6.4% to 66.2% 
(Murillo, 2000), and by March 2004 the MBs had 82% of the industry’s market share. 
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TABLE 4.3 
Mexican Banking Industry Entries, Exits and Other Statistics 
# BANK ENTRIES    
Regulatory Punctuation Domestic Banks Foreign Banks  
Privatization 20 0  
NAFTA 11 2  
FDI relaxed 4 20  
FDI total openness 2 2  
    
# BANK EXITS    
Regulatory Punctuation Domestic Banks Foreign Banks  
Privatization 0 0  
NAFTA 2 0  
FDI relaxed 17 0  
FDI total openness 2 4  
    
TOTAL # BANKS    
Regulatory Punctuation Domestic Banks Foreign Banks  
Privatization 20 0  
NAFTA 29 2  
FDI relaxed 15 20  
FDI total openness 12 17  
    
M&A Activity    
Regulatory Punctuation Domestic-Domestic Foreign-Domestic Domestic-Foreign 
Privatization 0 0 0 
NAFTA 1 0 0 
FDI relaxed 9 6 0 
FDI total openness 1 4 1 
    
Market Share (%) in the Mexican Banking Industry 
Regulatory Punctuation  
Domestic Banks 
(Total) 
Foreign Banks 
(Total) 
Foreign Banks 
(Controlling Interest) 
Privatization 94.5 5.5 0.6 
NAFTA 93.6 6.4 1.3 
FDI relaxed 33.8 66.2 16.4 
FDI total openness 18.0 82.0 82.0 
Source: Banco de México (1991-2004) 
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FIGURE 4.4
Market Share Participation
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Out of the 20 net foreign entries (i.e., without considering international M&As 
such as HSBC acquiring Republics Bank of NY), 16 MBs still remain operating in 
Mexico by 2004. Out of those 16 MBs, the top two control 47% of the Mexican banking 
industry (i.e., BBVA and Citibank), while the top five control 75% (i.e., BBVA, 
Citibank, HSBC, Santander, and Bank of Nova Scotia). All of these top five banks had 
alliances with local banks: BBVA with Probursa, Citibank with Confia, Santander with 
InverMexico, Bank of Nova Scotia with Inverlat and HSBC with Bital. In contrast, none 
of the four banks that exited the Mexican banking industry established an alliance with a 
local bank. 
When comparing the rest of the foreign banks operating in Mexico, it is also 
clear that those banks that formed alliances with local partners fared much better than 
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those banks that did not. For instance, ABN AMRO, American Express, Boston Bank, 
Bank One, Comerica Bank, GE Capital and Deutsche Bank (i.e., banks that did not form 
alliances with local partners), had a combined 1.58% of market share in the Mexican 
market. In contrast, ING and JP Morgan had a combined 2.54% of the Mexican market. 
The former banks had assets of roughly 2700 billions worldwide, while the latter banks 
(ING and JP Morgan), had assets of roughly 1260 billions worldwide. In other words, 
size was apparently not a factor. Based on this descriptive analysis, hypothesis 2 is 
supported. 
Domestic vs Domestic 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that local firms that are members of a grupo will 
outperform local firms without such membership. To analyze whether belonging to a 
grupo gives a local firm a competitive advantage in the Mexican banking industry, the 
domestic banks competing in this industry are split in two groups: original banks, and 
new banks. Appendix B (original banks) and Appendix C (new banks) present the 
ranking of the Mexican banks that is used as a proxy for firm performance. Both 
rankings (for the original and new banks) consider size, financial health, length of 
survival (as independent banks), investor’s rate of return (if applicable), equity, loans, 
and client holdings market share. 
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For the 18 original banks set, four of the banks can be considered grupo members 
as these banks, although legally independent, are tied to other businesses from other 
industries. The grupo banks are: Banorte (Grupo Maseca), Bancomer (Grupo Femsa), 
Bital (Grupo El Asturiano and Grupo Mabe), and Serfin (Grupo Vitro), which are ranked 
number 1, 3, 4, and 7, respectively (Appendix B). The rest of the banks in this group do 
not belong to grupos. 
For the new banks set, comprised of 18 banks, three can be considered grupo 
members, namely: Inbursa (Grupo Carso), Azteca (Grupo Elektra), Ixe (Grupo Soriana, 
and Gigante), and Quadrum (Grupo San Luis) which are ranked number 1, 3, 4, and 11, 
respectively (Appendix C). The rest of the banks in this group do not belong to grupos. 
According to these results, 75% of the banks that belonged to conglomerates 
were among the top four banks in each group (i.e., original and new banks). The results 
suggest that banks that belong to grupos outperform those without such membership, 
thereby providing support for hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7 suggests that local banks following less aggressive (market-
oriented) growth strategies will outperform local banks following more aggressive 
(market-oriented) growth strategies. Table 4.4 shows the conditions of the original 
banks, relative to the industry, in each of the four regulatory punctuations (periods). 
During the first period, (1991-1993), from reprivatization to the start of NAFTA, there 
were seven out of 18 banks in which market share in assets was lower than market share 
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in equity. Such a situation (when market share assets / market share equity < 1), implies 
that relative to the industry, those banks that have a lower asset market share (than 
equity market share) are lending relatively less than their counterparts. In other words, 
based on their equity, these banks were less aggressive. In this first period, the ratio was 
not important, since there were no economic difficulties and no bankruptcies. 
At the start of period 2 (NAFTA), there were five banks with a ratio of less 
than 1 (assets market share/ equity market share) and 13 banks with a ratio of 1 or more. 
At the end of the second period, none of the banks with a ratio of less than 1 failed, 
while 4 of the 13 banks with a ratio of 1 or higher went bankrupt (i.e., 31%). At the start 
of period 3, there were 4 banks with a ratio of less than 1, and 10 banks with a ratio of 1 
or higher. At the end of this third period, 1 of the 4 banks with a ratio of less than 1 
failed (25% failure), while 8 of the 10 banks with a ratio of 1 or more went bankrupt 
(80%). At the start of period 4, there were 2 banks with a ratio of less than 1, and 3 with 
a ratio of 1 or more. At the end of the fourth period, both of the banks with a ratio of less 
than 1 outperformed the other 3 banks (i.e., those with a ratio of 1 or more). 
Therefore, based on these results, it is evident that among the original banks 
group, those that were less aggressive in their lending policies outperform those trying to 
maintain or even gain market share quickly through these punctuations. However, in the 
new banks group, there was no relationship between aggressive (market-oriented) 
growth strategies and bank performance. Thus, hypothesis 7 received only partial 
support. 
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TABLE 4.4 
Market Share of Original Banks per Period 
Market Share Market Share Market Share Market Share Market Share 
Bank Name Entry Assets Equity 
End of 
Period 
(P)1 Assets Equity 
End of 
P2/last 
report Assets Equity 
End of 
P3/last 
report Assets Equity 
3/2004 
or last 
report Assets Equity 
Atlantico Mar-92 2.6% 1.8% Dec-93 3.9% 4.1% Dec-94 5.2% 3.5% Sep-97 4.2% 3.1% Sep-97   
Banamex Sep-91 24.2% 28.5% Dec-93 21.3% 26.3% Dec-94 22.4% 25.4% Dec-98 20.7% 25.8% Sep-01 20.0% 28.5% 
Bancomer Dec-91 22.7% 24.2% Dec-93 17.9% 22.9% Dec-94 18.8% 20.3% Dec-98 20.8% 19.2% Sep-00 21.6% 18.5% 
Bancrecer Sep-91 3.6% 0.9% Dec-93 2.6% 1.9% Dec-94 2.5% 2.0% Sep-97 8.9% 3.1% Sep-97   
Banoro Jun-92 0.9% 1.9% Dec-93 0.8% 1.8% Dec-94 1.3% 1.5% Dec-96 2.2% 1.6% Dec-96   
Banorte Sep-92 1.6% 2.5% Dec-93 2.0% 2.6% Dec-94 2.5% 2.8% Dec-98 7.39% 6.40% Mar-04 10.7% 5.7% 
Banpaís  Sep-91 1.0% 1.1% Dec-93 4.3% 2.8% Sep-94 3.7% 2.9% Sep-94   Sep-94   
Centro Sep-92 1.0% 1.2% Dec-93 1.3% 1.2% Dec-94 2.4% 1.4% Jun-95 2.4% 2.1% Jun-95   
Comermex Mar-92 6.7% 5.1% Dec-93 6.0% 3.9% Dec-94 6.6% 4.8% Jun-95 6.1% 6.1% Jun-95   
Confia Sep-91 2.1% 1.7% Dec-93 2.0% 1.7% Dec-94 2.7% 2.1% Jun-97 3.7% 1.1% Jun-97   
Cremi Sep-91 2.1% 2.0% Dec-93 2.5% 2.2% Jun-94 2.4% 2.0% Dec-94   Dec-94   
De Oriente Sep-91 0.3% 0.5% Dec-93 0.6% 0.4% Dec-94 0.5% 0.6% Dec-94   Dec-94   
Internacional Sep-92 6.3% 3.9% Dec-93 5.8% 4.0% Dec-94 5.3% 4.3% Dec-98 8.4% 6.1% Jun-02 7.8% 4.2% 
M. Probursa Sep-91 2.4% 1.8% Dec-93 4.3% 2.1% Dec-94 2.5% 1.7% Jun-95 2.8% 2.1% Jun-95   
Mexicano Mar-92 3.8% 3.1% Dec-93 6.9% 4.4% Dec-94 7.5% 5.8% Sep-96 8.3% 3.4% Sep-96   
Promex Jun-92 1.0% 1.6% Dec-93 1.9% 1.9% Dec-94 3.4% 2.4% Dec-97 3.8% 3.2% Dec-97   
Serfin Mar-92 14.0% 9.9% Dec-93 10.6% 10.2% Dec-94 13.1% 10.4% Dec-98 13.6% 9.0% Sep-99 13.4% 8.1% 
Union Dec-91 1.6% 1.6% Dec-93 3.4% 3.2% Jun-94 3.1% 3.4% Dec-94   Dec-94   
                
          Centro 1.8% 1.2%    
          Banpaís 2.3% 1.3%    
          Banorte 3.2% 3.9%    
           7.39% 6.40%    
Source: Banco de México (1991-2004) 
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Summary 
The present descriptive analysis serves two purposes: 1) to show why some 
MNEs perform better than other MNEs, in an emerging market host nation under an 
environment of regulatory punctuations; and 2) to show why some local firms perform 
better than other local firms under those same conditions. On the MNE side, the study 
sheds light on the importance of the ties between the MNEs’ home countries and the host 
country. Of particular interest is the fact that geographical, commercial, and cultural 
distances ties between the MNEs’ home countries and the host country seem equally 
effective at predicting firm performance. Also, the results support the notion that MNEs 
which formed strategic alliances with local banks outperform those that did not. 
On the domestic side, it is important to note that domestic firms that formed part 
of a grupo outperformed their domestic counterparts that did not follow that business 
structure. Also, another novel finding was that original domestic banks fare much better 
when they followed a less aggressive growth (market-oriented) strategy.  
Although this is only a descriptive analysis, the results of this pilot test are 
encouraging. Perhaps, the main conclusion from Chapter IV is that the developing of 
hard data to test the suggested hypotheses more rigidly is indeed worthwhile pursuing. 
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CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY 
The main objective of Chapter V is to explain the methodology used to test the 
hypotheses elaborated in the previous chapter. Thus, the present chapter is organized in 
the following sections: First, the chapter describes the sample and its sources of data. 
The next section elaborates on the measures. Here, detailed information about the 
dependent, independent, and control variables is presented. After the measures section, 
the chapter presents the statistical models that will be used to test the hypotheses 
developed in the previous chapter. Finally, the last section justifies the method selected. 
Sample 
The Mexican banking industry is this study’s sample9 to test firm strategic 
responses to regulatory punctuations. The database consists of all private commercial 
banks, domestic10 and multinational subsidiaries, operating in the Mexican banking 
industry from 3/1991 to 3/2004. Quarterly data was collected from two sources, the 
(Mexican) National Commission of Banking and Securities’ Statistical Bulletins and the 
                                                 
9 In page 49 it is justified why the Mexican banking industry is a good sample to test the 
hypotheses. 
10 There are two main classifications of domestic banks; formerly state owned banks or the 
original banks (Table 3.1 and Appendix B presents detailed information about them) and new banks, those 
established ‘de novo’ by Mexican nationals since 1993 (Appendix C presents detailed information about 
these banks). 
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Bankscope dataset. The bulletins have all the financial data available for both 
multinational and domestic banks, such as loan portfolio, net income, assets, market 
share, etc. This financial information also allows the calculating of other measures such 
as loan portfolio entropy, and identifying when a bank entered or exited the industry. 
Other non-financial information used in this dataset, such as the number of international 
strategic alliances per bank, was retrieved from several scholarly articles on the subject. 
For instance, Guillen and Tschoegl (1999) depict all the international strategic alliances 
of Spanish banks in Latin-America (including Mexico). Also, Mailander (1999) provides 
information about the ownership percentage that multinational banks have in some 
Mexican banks. More details about how the database was used are presented in the 
measures section. 
Measures 
The measures of dependent (Table 5.1), independent (Table 5.2), and control 
variables (Table 5.3) are described in the following paragraphs. 
Dependent Variables 
I used two approaches to measuring the dependent variable. In the first approach 
(continuous-time hazard model), the he dependent variable is a continuous variable that 
signals the hazard or probability of a bank to survive, (i.e., not exit) the Mexican banking 
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industry between 3/1991-3/200411. This ability is measured in number of financial 
quarters, which ranges from 1 to 52. In turn, the dependent variable is named 
NuQuarters, as it records the number of quarters between when the bank entered the 
Mexican banking industry (i.e., started the risk period) and when the bank either exited 
or was censored (from 1 to 52). In this approach, the NuQuarters variable is used in 
combination with the variable Exit. Exit records whether the event actually occurred, 
that is, whether a bank exited the industry (exit=1) or was censored (exit= 0). For this 
dataset, almost 50% of the banks at risk of exiting the Mexican banking industry, within 
the 52 quarters, did exit the industry. 
 
TABLE 5.1 
Dependent Variables 
Constructs Variable Name Units 
Number of months a bank operated in the 
Mexican banking industry 
3/1991-3/2004 
NuQuarters Number of Quarters 
Probability of exit records whether the event 
occurs. If a bank exits the banking industry, 
this variable takes a value of 1, and zero 
otherwise. 
Exit Dummy 
                                                 
11 The year of 1991 was selected as the starting point of the period of study because it was 5/1991 
when the first bank was reprivatized. 
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TABLE 5.2 
Independent Variables 
Constructs  
Variable 
Name Units 
Sociopolitical-relational ties   
 Commercial distance: FDI Factor 
Measured as exports, and FDI from X firm country of origin   
to Y host country. Also considers FDI from X country firm   
country of origin to neighboring regions of Y host country   
   
 Cultural distance:   
The GLOBE index GCDI Index 
   
Diversification   
 International Diversification Intl Div Ordinal  
 Portfolio Entropy Entropy Entropy equation 
   
Grupo Membership Grupo Dummy 
   
Aggressive Growth Strategies  AGS Ratio  
(market share assets/ market share equity)   
   
International Strategic Alliances ISA Dummy 
   
Acquisition Acq_Cumul Ordinal 
   
Social Capital   
 -Bank's Reputation and Access to Asymmetric Information 
(BRAAI) 
  
 *Bank Reputation= Franchise Saturation= # branches Saturation Equation 
 *Access to Asymmetric information = Bank deposits / # 
accounts 
Assym Inf Equation 
 -Owners’ Power and Access to Asymmetric Information (OPAI)   
 *Club Membership= Mexican Association of Businessmen Own_Power Dummy 
 *Owners Asymmetric information measures if board 
members have regional or national reputation. National =1 
OA Info Dummy 
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TABLE 5.3 
Control Variables 
Constructs 
Variable 
Name Units 
Liberalization. Acquires the value of 0 for the first two 
periods, 1 for the third period and 0 for the fourth period. 
Lib Dummy 
Top 1000 banks, four ranges: top 25, top 200, top 1000, 
the rest Franchise Experience, number of years operating 
in the Mexican banking industry since 9/1982. 
Bankers ZM  Ordinal 
 
 
For the discrete-time approach, a “life table” of subject-time units is created 
(Cox, 1972). Here, the dependent variable is the hazard rate or probability that a bank 
exits the Mexican banking industry in a given quarter. The banks at risk are those 
already operating in the Mexican banking industry. Thus, the hazard of exiting starts 
when a bank enters the industry. 
For both cases, when the dummy variable Exit equals one, it means that a bank 
went bankrupt, exited the industry, or was sold at a loss. The implication for all three 
cases is that the bank performed poorly. Censoring (Exit=0) will occur at the end of the 
observation period if the event did not occur or if a bank was sold at a premium. 
Independent Variables 
Sociopolitical-Relational Ties 
Sociopolitical-relational ties are separated into two distinct variables, 
a) commercial distance and b) cultural distance. 
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a) Commercial distance. Liability of Foreignness suggests that firms are at a 
disadvantage because of sociopolitical-relational costs that foreign firms must 
incur to do business in a host market. Eden and Miller (2004) suggest that 
these sociopolitical-relational costs can be understood as: unfamiliarity, 
relational, and discriminatory hazards. However, it is worth noting that not all 
foreign firms face the same LOF. Presumably, MNEs from countries that are 
closer, in some dimension, to a given host country would have lesser 
sociopolitical-relational costs than MNEs from more distant countries. For 
instance, international business scholars have used Hofstede’s (1980) index 
to measure cultural distance, arguing that MNEs from culturally closer 
countries to that of the host market would have an advantage over a MNEs 
from more culturally distant countries (e.g., Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001). 
Thus, while recognizing that cultural distance plays an important role in the 
international business literature, certainly there are other ways to measure country 
distance (i.e., a proxy for LOF distance). For instance, because globalization reduces 
country barriers (Hitt et al., 2002), it make sense to measure closeness or distance 
between countries by measuring how commercially close they are. The underlying 
assumption on this construct is that there is no need to be similar (i.e., culturally close), 
in order to know how to do business in a foreign country (e.g., several American firms 
have succeeded in China). 
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Furthermore, the knowledge on how to conduct business in another country’s 
home market is a multi-dimensional construct. Because this stock of knowledge is at the 
country-level, firms are likely to tap into their country’s general knowledge of a certain 
host market. Thus, the following dimensions of commercial distance and how to 
measure them are proposed: 1) country of origin to host country exports. I argue that the 
more exports (from country X to Y host country), the more the knowledge available to X 
country firms to conduct business in the Y host market. 2) FDI, the inflow of foreign 
direct investment from country X firms to country Y host market suggest a certain level 
of knowledge about the Y market. Thus, the more FDI from country X to country Y, the 
more the stock of knowledge available to country X firms about the Y host market. Also, 
higher FDI inflows might decrease LOF as country X firms gain more legitimacy with 
domestic institutions. 
b) Cultural distance. Cultural distance will be measured using the Globe’s12 nine 
scales (House et al., 2004). These nine scales will be weighted equally to 
determine the distance between Mexico’s scales and that of the multinational 
banks’ country of origin. 
                                                 
12 This book, authored by House et al. 2004 (Culture, leadership, and organizations: The GLOBE 
study of 62 societies), seek to refine Hofstede’s measure of cultural distance. Peterson (2004) provides a 
good review on this book and the Globe project. Also, while this book is only two years old, it is already 
been cited more than 20 times (Luthans & Ibrayeva, 2006; Newburry & Yakova, 2006; Stahl & Caligiuri, 
2005; Teagarden, 2005). 
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International Strategic Alliance (ISA) 
For MNEs, this dummy variable records whether a multinational bank has a 
strategic alliance with a local partner. For local banks, this variable records whether the 
local bank had an alliance with a multinational bank. ISA equals 1 if an ISA takes place 
and 0 otherwise. 
International Diversification 
Because Bankscope does not report the revenues of a bank at a country or 
regional level, an entropy measure cannot be calculated. Following Barkema and 
Vermeulen (1998), the number of foreign countries where a bank has subsidiaries is used 
as a proxy for the level of international diversification. The data was collected from the 
Directory of Corporate Affiliations. 
Grupo Membership 
This is a dummy variable that captures whether the local bank is part of a grupo 
(grupo membership=1) or if it does not have such membership (grupo membership=0). 
Loan Portfolio Entropy 
According to Hitt et al. (1997), the entropy index has been the popular way to 
measure product diversification among strategic management researchers. This index 
has been used to estimate a firm’s proportion of sales across the different industries in 
which it operates (i.e., corporate diversification). However, there is no precedent for 
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measuring loan portfolio diversification, which can equate a strategic business unit’s 
proportion of sales across product lines. Certainly, the formula to calculate the loan 
portfolio entropy is similar to that used to calculate the corporate diversification 
(entropy) index. Following Hitt et al. (1997) loan portfolio entropy is calculated as 
follows: 
SBU_Div = ∑ [Pi * ln (1/Pi)],  
Where: 
P is the sales attributed to line of business i and ln (1/P) is the weight given to 
each product lines (i.e., type of loan), or the natural logarithm of the inverse of its sales. 
The measure considers both the number of product lines in which a firm operates and the 
proportion of total sales each product line represents. Therefore, in this case, the higher 
the SBU_Div index, the higher the bank’s product diversification. 
For the loan portfolio we consider the following types of loans: commercial, real 
estate, consumer, government and financial institutions loans. 
Aggressive Growth Strategies (AGS) 
This variable illustrates whether a bank is aggressively expanding its loan 
portfolio, in relation to other bank. In other words, AGS is the result of dividing the 
banks market share in loans by its market share in equity. This ratio (market share 
assets/equity) reflects the bank’s relative aggressiveness; the higher the ratio the higher 
the bank’s aggressiveness. For instance, a bank’s ratio of two means that relative to the 
industry, this bank is loaning twice as much as a bank with similar equity levels. 
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Acquisitions 
This is an ordinal variable that records the cumulative number of acquisitions 
that a focal bank made through out the observation period. 
Social Capital 
Because social capital is a multi-dimensional construct, the variable is further 
separated in two components: bank reputation and access to asymmetric information 
(BRAAI) and ownership power and access to asymmetric information (OPAI). 
a) BRAAI. Two dimensions, 1) bank reputation and 2) the bank’s ability to 
access asymmetric information. 1) Mehra (1996) suggests that a bank’s 
reputation resides on the value of its franchise. In other words, reputation is 
the bank’s ability to be recognized in the market place. Following Sirmon 
(2004), franchise saturation is used as a proxy for reputation. In turn, the 
bank’s number of branches is the proxy for franchise saturation. 2) To 
measure the bank’s ability to acquire asymmetric information, Sirmon’s 
argument is also followed (2004). He argues that deposit size indicates the 
bank’s potential for garnering asymmetric information. In his view, larger 
deposits allow the bank to invest more time cultivating the client-bank 
relationship, which increase the bank’s potential access to information 
asymmetries. In other words, banks with smaller size deposits are at a 
disadvantage. BRAAI’s second dimension is measured as the average bank 
deposits calculated as follows: bank’s total deposits divided by the number of 
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accounts. Because it is assumed that banks are going to pay more attention to 
their important clients, only the number of investment accounts is used to 
calculate this variable. 
b) OPAI. This variable also has two dimensions: 1) owners’ power and 2) 
owners’ access to asymmetric information. To measure 1) owners’ power, 
data on a bank’s board “club” membership to exclusive ‘executive clubs’ was 
collected. For instance, Ortiz-Rivera (2000) suggests that the Mexican 
Businessmen Council (MBC) is the most exclusive and influential group of 
businessmen in Mexico. According to Ortiz-Rivera, there are less than 30 
MBC active members. Utilizing organizational membership is consistent with 
empirical approaches used by Putnam (2000) and Glaser et al. (2002) to 
measure social capital. 2) To measure owners’ asymmetric information board 
members were identify according to their ability to obtain information from 
different sources. Thus, owners were split in two categories, those with 
regional reputation and those with national reputation, where national =1.This 
measure was proposed as a proxy for measuring access to asymmetric 
information. The rationale is the following: board members with national 
reputation have the ability to tap into more sources of information than those 
with only regional influence.  
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Control Variables 
Liberalization 
The dummy “liberalization” represents the regulatory punctuation that took place 
in the Mexican banking industry. Chapter IV describes, in detail, all four regulatory 
punctuations. We classify regulatory periods one and two as liberalization equaling zero 
(liberalization = 0), because in these periods, the regulatory framework had several 
protectionist policies. In contrast, periods three and four saw the demise of these polices, 
thus facilitating liberalization. Therefore, periods three and four have a value of 1 
(liberalization=1). 
Top 1000 Banks of the World 
Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) used the Top 200 banks of the world (reported 
by the Banker) as a control variable. This variable is important because it controls for 
overall size, reputation, and the overall performance of the bank. In other words, this 
variable controls for the possible positive (or negative) effects of a bank’s international 
franchise. The Banker’s ranking factors include: strength, size, soundness, profits, 
performance, BIS capital ratio, and NPL to total loans (see Appendix D). This variable is 
presented annually and as an ordinal measure as there will be four ranges for this 
variable: Top-25, Top-200, Top-1000, and the rest. 
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Statistical Models 
To measure performance, defined in this study as the ability of a firm to survive, 
I utilized a continuous-time hazard model approach (maximum-likelihood). However, to 
enhance the quality of the analysis I developed a “life table” for both the foreign and 
domestic banks datasets. For each bank-quarter period point, I coded the dependent 
variable as 1 if a bank failed (i.e., changed its ownership or exited the industry) and 0 
otherwise. For this method, the bank’s hazard of “dying” starts when it enters the 
Mexican banking industry (at age quarter #0) and finishes if the event occurs or when 
the observation is censored (quarter # 52, 3/2004). 
About the specific models used in this dissertation, I used the exponential, 
Weibull and Gompertz models according to how the time is to be entered the equation. 
Allison (1984) notes that the exponential model implies that a hazard is constant over 
time, which mean that logarithms of the survival function (ln (S (t)) are linearly related 
to time t. In other words, the exponential model assumes that the subjects studied (e.g., 
firms) are no more likely or less likely to fail towards the end of the period observation 
than they were at its star. The exponential model can be express by the following 
equation: 
log h (t ) = a + b1Χ1 + b2Χ2 
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The Weibull model allows the log of hazard to increase or increase linearly with 
the log of time (Hamilton, 1998) and can be express by the following equation (where c 
is a constant that can be positive or negative): 
log h (t ) = a + b1Χ1 + b2Χ2 + c log t 
The Gompertz model is appropriate to use when a hazard increases with time 
(Cleves, Gould and Gutierrez, 2004) and can be express by the following equation: 
log h (t ) = a + b1Χ1 + b2Χ2 + ct 
To determine the suitability of the model to be used, I first ran a Weibull 
distribution model because it provides information about the distribution shape 
parameter p.  According to Cleves et al. (2004), a p value of 1 corresponds to an 
exponential model; where the hazard does not change with time. A p value >1, on the 
other hand, indicates that the hazard increases with time, and thus, that the Gompertz 
model is the appropriate model to be used. Finally, if p value <1, that it, that the hazard 
decreases with time these authors suggest the Weibull model as the appropriate model to 
be used.  
The use of a maximum likelihood approach was preferred over the partial 
likelihood approach (i.e., Cox model) mainly because the Cox model is unable to model 
variables that predict success perfectly. This is because the partial likelihood estimation 
is a product of likelihoods for all events that are observed to occur; whereas the 
maximum likelihood estimation is a product of the likelihoods for all individuals in the 
sample (not only the ones that occurred). 
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Model Justification 
The hazard models utilized to test the hypotheses are the best way to model firm 
performance. This is because out of the 65 banks that entered the Mexican banking 
industry from 3/1991-3/2004, only 30 banks survived. Thus, survival indeed reflects 
firm performance. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter is divided in three sections. The first section reports the descriptive 
statistics and correlations among the variables included in the two datasets employed in 
the present study. The second section presents the results of the ten hypotheses 
developed in Chapter III. The last section presents an ex-post analysis of the results. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1 shows the means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients of 
the variables identified in the foreign banks dataset. The foreign banks dataset was 
created to test hypotheses regarding commercial distance, cultural distance, international 
strategic alliances, international diversification and number of acquisitions and their 
effect on firm performance (survival). This dataset consists of one observation per 
foreign bank per quarter for the years of 1994-2004 (# foreign banks=26; time-subject 
observations or # of periods at risk=644). The time period does include attrition and 
accretion changes. Potential multicollinearity between variables was checked and 
controlled.13 
                                                 
13 I dropped one of the two variables measuring commercial distance, that is, country of origin to 
host country exports. This variable was measured as the total of exports from country X to Mexico divided 
by the total amount of Mexican imports. The variable strongly correlates with the FDI variable, measured 
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Table 6.2 reports the means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients of 
the variables identified in the domestic banks dataset. The domestic dataset was created 
to test hypotheses regarding grupo affiliation, (loan portfolio) entropy, international 
diversification, aggressiveness, social capital (saturation, asymmetric information, 
power), and number of acquisitions and their effect on firm performance (survival). This 
dataset consists of one observation per domestic bank per quarter for the years of 1991-
2004 (#domestic banks=37; time-subject observations or # of periods at risk=872). The 
time period considers attrition and accretion changes. Potential multicollinearity between 
variables was checked and controlled.14 
                                                                                                                                                
as the total amount of FDI from each of the nine countries of origin represented divided by the total 
amount of FDI received by Mexico. While both constructs overlapped, I kept FDI because this variable is 
more congruent with the theoretical argument espoused in hypothesis 1. 
14 I dropped one of the four variables measuring social capital, that is, ownership asymmetric 
information. This variable was a dummy variable (0, 1), where 1 means that the main bank shareholder has 
a national reputation as opposed to only a regional reputation (0). The variable strongly correlates with the 
ownership power variable, dummy variable (0, 1) where 1 means that at least one of the bank’s board 
members belong to the exclusive Mexican Businessmen Council. While both constructs overlapped, I 
decided to keep ownership power given there is at least one author (e.g., Ortiz-Rivera, 2000) who has 
written extensively about the influence of this group of businessmen in the Mexican economy. 
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TABLE 6.1 
Foreign Banks Database Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Exit 0.01  0.08  0 1 1.00        
2. Liberalization 0.85  0.36  0 1 -0.02 1.00       
3. Bankers_ZM index 1.61  0.77  1 4 -0.01 0.01 1.00      
4. FDI 34.38  30.54  -14.59 77.32  -0.09* 0.07 0.18* 1.00     
5. GCDI¹ 1.15  0.59  0.57 3 0.03 -0.05 -0.26* -0.55* 1.00    
6. ISA² 0.20  0.40  0 1 0.01 0.02 0.04 -0.29* 0.00 1.00   
7. NLACOWB³ 3.15  3.32  0 12 0.01 0.00 -0.34* -0.14* 0.04 0.23* 1.00  
8. Acq_Cumulative 0.36  0.86  0 4 -0.03 -0.08* 0.19* -0.16* -0.32* 0.02 0.10* 1.00 
Note N=644; *p<0.05,  
¹ The Globe Cultural Distance index 
² International Strategic Alliance 
³ Number of Latin American countries with banking operations 
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TABLE 6.2 
Domestic Banks Database Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Exit 0.03 0.16 0 1 1.00            
2. Liberalization 0.55 0.50 0 1 0.08* 1.00           
3. Bankers_ZM index 3.66 0.55 2 4 0.02 -0.03 1.00          
4. Grupo 0.25 0.43 0 1 -0.05 0.03 0.44* 1.00         
5. Entropy 52.71 37.35 0.01 136.65 0.05 -0.03 0.55* 0.31* 1.00        
6. Intl_Diversification 0.45 0.79 0 2 -0.06 0.02 0.54* 0.63* 0.29* 1.00       
7. Aggressiveness 96.80 59.74 -45.87 380.24 0.09* -0.14* -0.25* 0.13* 0.48* 0.14* 1.00      
8. ISA¹ 0.22 0.42 0 1 0.04 0.10* -0.34* 0.30* 0.30* 0.03 0.30* 1.00     
9. Saturation 2,302 2,230 0.22 17,523 0.02 0.11* -0.28* 0.38* 0.27* 0.33* 0.03 0.12* 1.00    
10. Assymetric Information 450 1,109 0 24,000 -0.03 0.17* 0.19* 0.02 -0.18* 0.04 -0.15* -0.17* 0.10* 1.00   
11. Ownership Power 0.30 0.46 0 1 -0.02 0.04 -0.50* 0.57* 0.39* 0.44* -0.04 0.36* 0.33* 0.06 1.00  
12. Acq_Cumulative 0.16 0.51 0 3 0.02 0.11* -0.24* 0.32* 0.36* 0.25* 0.41* -0.01 0.17* -0.09* -0.08* 1.00 
Note N=872; *p<0.05  ¹ international Strategic Alliance 
 94 
 
 
 
Results of Hypothesis Testing 
This section presents the results of testing Hypotheses 1 through 10, in which the 
relationships between both domestic and foreign firm strategies and characteristics and 
their likelihood of survival were examined. To test these hypotheses, maximum 
likelihood (ML) continuous-time survival methods were utilized on both the domestic 
and the foreign banks datasets. In treating the samples from both databases as panel data, 
the robust specification was included to avoid heteroscedasticity problems. In other 
words, the robust specification justifies the conventional variance estimate assumption 
(the independence of observations). 
Foreign Banks 
The sample from the foreign banks dataset was used to test the first set of 
hypotheses (1-3 and 1015). First, I ran the Weibull (distribution) method with only the 
control variables as predictors (Table 6.3). The Weibull Table displays the Weibull 
distribution shape parameter p, which has a value of 2.986 and is statistically significant 
(p< 0.001). A p value > 1 indicates that the hazard increases with time, and that the 
Gompertz distribution is the appropriate one to use (Cleves et al., 2004; Hamilton, 
1998). After switching to the Gompertz method, I included the independent variables as 
well. Therefore, the fully specified model (shown in Table 6.3) contains two control 
                                                 
15 Hypothesis 10 tests both datasets separately. I this instance hypothesis 10 is tested by using the 
foreign banks dataset. 
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variables (liberalization and Top 1000 banks of the world) and five independent 
variables, namely: commercial distance, cultural distance, international strategic 
alliances, international diversification and number of acquisitions. 
Overall, the theoretical model of firm strategies and characteristics presented in 
Figure 1.1 is generally supported by the data. I present the statistical evidence of each 
hypothesis in turn. 
Hypothesis 1: Among MNEs competing in an emerging host market, MNEs from 
countries with stronger (closer) ties to that host market will outperform MNEs from 
countries with weaker (more distant) ties to that host market. 
Hypothesis 1 suggests a positive relationship between foreign firms from 
countries with stronger (closer) ties to the host market (i.e., Mexico) and their 
performance (survival). To test this hypothesis, I used two variables: commercial 
distance and cultural distance. Commercial distance was measured as the total amount of 
FDI from each of the nine countries of origin represented (i.e., USA, UK, Spain, 
Netherlands, Germany, France, Japan, Switzerland, and Canada) divided by the total 
amount of FDI received by Mexico. In other words, the higher the FDI by country of 
origin X to Mexico, the stronger the commercial tie, and in turn, the higher the likelihood 
of survival. 
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TABLE 6.3 
Foreign Banks Weibull Distribution (Model 1, Control Variables) 
Foreign Banks Gompertz Distribution (Model 2, Full Model) Dependent Variable = Exit 
 
 Model 1 (Control Variables) Weibull Distribution Model 2 (Full Model) Gompertz Distribution 
  
Hazard 
Ratio S.E. Coeff. S.E. Z P > z  
Hazard 
Ratio S.E. Coeff. S.E. Z P > z 
Control Variables               
Liberalization  1.50 1.76 0.40 1.18 0.34 0.73  1.23 2.20 0.21 1.79 0.12 0.91 
Bankers_ZM index  0.98 0.51 -0.02 0.52 -0.03 0.97  1.90 2.26 0.64 1.19 0.54 0.59 
Independent Variables               
FDI         0.91 0.03 -0.09 0.04 -2.59 0.01** 
GCDI         0.15 0.18 -1.92 1.26 -1.53 0.13 
ISA         1.32 0.67 0.28 0.51 0.54 0.59 
NLACOWB         0.97 0.12 -0.03 0.12 -0.22 0.82 
Acq_Cumulative         6.14E-09 1.33E-08 -18.90 2.16 -8.74 0.00*** 
Intercept    -12.12 1.92 -6.31 0.00**    -5.71 3.21 -1.78 0.08† 
/ln_p  1.09 0.16 1.09 0.16 6.82 0.00***        
p  2.98 0.48 2.98           
γ         0.19 0.11 0.19 0.11 1.72 0.09 
N = 644       644       
Wald χ 2 = 0.14       384.05       
Prob > χ 2 = 0.93       0.00       
Number of subjects = 26       26       
Number of failures = 4       4       
Notes: 
Two-tailed z-statistics where: †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<.001  
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As shown in Table 6.3, the commercial distance variable (i.e., FDI) is statistically 
significant. The FDI hazard ratio equals 0.913 (p<0.011), which means that for every 
percentage point of FDI increase, the hazard of exiting the industry decreases by roughly 
9% (i.e., 100 * (0.913-1.00) = -9%). Therefore the argument that banks from countries 
with stronger commercial ties to Mexico are less likely to exit the Mexican banking 
industry is supported. 
For cultural distance, I used The Globe’s (House et al., 2004) nine scales of 
country culture to calculate the cultural distance index for each of the nine foreign 
countries represented in the banking industry. The Globe’s cultural distance index 
(GCDI) variable was not statistically significant. The results of commercial and cultural 
distance indicate partial support to hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2: Among MNEs competing in an emerging host market, MNEs 
forming strategic alliances with local partners will outperform MNEs that do not. 
Hypothesis 2 implies a positive relationship between firms that engage in 
strategic alliances with local partners and firm survival. To measure international 
strategic alliance activity, I use a dummy variable (0, 1) where the variable is 1 if the 
foreign firm formed an alliance with a local bank during the time of the study16. 
Unfortunately, Table 6.3 shows that the international strategic alliance variable has a 
                                                 
16 The international strategic alliance dummy variable regains a value of zero when the alliance 
dissolves. This includes acquisitions. That is, when foreign firms acquired their local partner, then the 
alliance regained the value of zero. Note: even without regained the value of zero after acquiring the local 
partner the variable was still statistically not significant. 
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hazard ratio of 1.32 and is not statistically significant (p < 0.59). These results provide 
no support for hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 3: Among MNEs competing in an emerging host market, more 
internationally diversified MNEs will outperform less internationally diversified MNEs. 
Hypothesis 3 suggests a positive relationship between international 
diversification (number of Latin-American countries where the focal banks have other 
banks) and firm survival. The hazard ratio for this variable (nlacowb) is 0.97 and it is not 
statistically significant (p < 0.83). Even when using total number of: overall banks, 
financial services firms (non-banks), and the combination of both, the variable remains 
insignificant. Thus, the results provide no support for hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 10: Among both MNEs and emerging market firms operating in an 
emerging market, those that engage in more acquisition activity will outperform those 
with less acquisition activity. 
Hypothesis 10 suggests that there is a positive relationship between a foreign 
firm’s acquisition activity and its likelihood of survival. The acquisition variable is a 
count (cumulative) variable that reflects the number of domestic banks acquisitions 
made by a foreign bank (ranging from 0-4). Table 6.3 shows the acquisition variable 
with a hazard ratio of 6.14E-09 (p<0.001). In other words, the hazard of exiting the 
industry, by a foreign bank, decreases by roughly 100% for every increase in the number 
of acquisitions (i.e., 100 * (0.00 – 1.00) = 100%). Thus, the acquisition variable is highly 
statistically significant. The results provide support for the hypothesis. 
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Domestic Banks 
The sample from the domestic banks dataset was used to test the second set of 
hypotheses (4-1017). First, I ran the Weibull (distribution) method with only the control 
variables as predictors (Table 6.4). The Weibull Table displays the Weibull distribution 
shape parameter p, which has a value of 1.33 and is marginally statistically significant 
(p< 0.06). A p value of 1 indicates that the hazard is constant. This means that these 
domestic banks are no more or less likely to fail late in the period of observation than 
they were at its start. Thus, the appropriate distribution to use is the exponential 
distribution (Cleves et al., 2002; Hamilton, 1998). 
However, because of the border line p value (p<0.06) of the control variables 
model, I re-ran the Weibull distribution with the full model (model 2). I obtained the 
following values: parameter p = 1.26 (p<0.33). These results further support the 
suitability of the exponential distribution (Table 6.4). 
The fully specified model (model 3), shown in Table 6.5, uses the exponential 
distribution. It contains two control variables (liberalization and Top 1000 banks of the 
world) and nine independent variables, namely: grupo, (portfolio) entropy, international 
diversification, aggressiveness, social capital (saturation, asymmetric information, 
power), and number of acquisitions. 
                                                 
17 In this instance, hypothesis 10 is tested using the domestic banks sample. 
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TABLE 6.4 
Domestic Banks Weibull Distribution (Model 1, Control Variables) 
Domestic Banks Weibull Distribution (Model 2, Full Model) Dependent Variable = Exit 
 
 Model 1 (Control Variables) Weibull Distribution Model 2 (Full Model) Gompertz Distribution 
  
Hazar
d 
Ratio S.E. Coeff. S.E. Z P > z  
Hazard 
Ratio S.E. Coeff. S.E. Z P > z 
Control Variables               
Liberalization  2.53 1.76 0.93 0.52 1.80 0.07  3.81 2.29 1.34 0.60 2.23 0.03* 
Bankers_ZM index  1.37 0.51 0.32 0.45 0.70 0.48  1.26 0.67 0.23 0.53 0.44 0.66 
Independent Variables               
Grupo         0.33 0.20 -1.11 0.62 -1.80 0.07† 
Entropy         1.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.61 0.55 
Intl_Diversification         0.41 0.16 -0.89 0.40 -2.24 0.03* 
Aggressiveness         1.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 2.38 0.02* 
ISA         0.76 0.38 -0.27 0.50 -0.55 0.58 
Saturation         1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.16 0.25 
Assymetric_Inforrmaition         1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.19 0.24 
Ownership Power         2.17 1.11 0.77 0.51 1.51 0.13 
Acq_Cumulative         0.86 0.52 -0.15 0.60 -0.24 0.81 
Intercept    -6.56 1.91 -3.45 0.001    -7.12 2.30 -3.09 0.002** 
/ln_p  0.29 0.16 1.09 0.16 1.87 0.06  0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.98 0.33 
p  1.33 0.21 1.33 0.21    1.26 0.29 1.26 0.29   
N = 872       872       
Wald χ 2 = 4.20       45.25       
Prob > χ 2 = 0.12       0.000       
Number of subjects = 37       37       
Number of failures = 24       24       
Notes: 
Two-tailed z-statistics where: †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<.001 
 
 101 
 
 
 
Overall, the theoretical model of firm strategies and characteristics presented in 
Figure 1.1 is generally supported by the empirical results. I present the statistical 
evidence of each hypothesis in turn. 
Hypothesis 4: Among local firms competing in an emerging market, those local 
firms that are members of a grupo will outperform local firms without such membership. 
Hypothesis 4 implies a positive relationship between domestic firms that are part 
of a grupo and their ability to survive. To measure the grupo variable, I use a dummy 
variable (0, 1) where the variable is 1 if the domestic bank is part of a grupo firm. 
According to Table 6.5, the variable grupo has a hazard ratio of 0.36 (p<0.071). Thus, 
the idea that grupo affiliation enhances firm survival is marginally supported. Further, 
the hazard ratio suggests that banks that belong to grupo firms are 64% less likely to exit 
the industry (100 * (0.36-1) = -64%). 
Hypothesis 5: Among local firms competing in an emerging market, local firms 
with higher product diversification will outperform local firms with lower product 
diversification. 
Hypothesis 5 suggests that higher loan diversification, measured as loan portfolio 
entropy, is positively related to firm survival. Table 6.5 presents the statistics for 
entropy: hazard ratio 1.01 with p<.37, and therefore not statistically significant. Thus, 
hypothesis 5 is not supported. 
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TABLE 6.5 
Domestic Banks Exponential Distribution (Model 3, Full Model) 
Dependent Variable = Exit 
 Model 3 (Full Model) Exponential Distribution 
  
Hazard 
Ratio S.E. Coeff. S.E. z P > z 
Control Variables        
Liberalization  4.40 2.43 1.48 0.60 2.69 0.01** 
Bankers_ZM index  1.26 0.67 0.23 0.53 0.42 0.67 
Independent Variables        
Grupo   0.36 0.20 -1.03 0.62 -1.81 0.07† 
Entropy  1.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.91 0.36 
Intl_Diversification  0.41 0.16 -0.88 0.40 -2.27 0.023* 
Aggressiveness  1.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 2.47 0.013* 
ISA  0.80 0.39 -0.22 0.50 -0.45 0.65 
Saturation  1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.19 0.23 
Assymetric_Information  1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.12 0.26 
Ownwership Power  1.99 0.98 0.69 0.51 1.41 0.16 
Acq_Cumulative  0.89 0.54 -0.11 0.60 -0.18 0.86 
Intercept    -6.49 2.25 -2.88 0.004** 
N = 872       
Wald χ ² =  75.84***       
Prob > χ ² = 0.000       
Number of subjects = 37       
Number of failures = 24       
Two-tailed z-statistics where: †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<.001 
 
 
Hypothesis 6: Among local firms competing in an emerging market, more 
internationally diversified local firms will outperform less internationally diversified 
local firms. 
Hypothesis 6 suggests that international diversification is positively related with 
firm survival. International diversification is a count variable (range 0-2), where 0 equals 
no international diversification by the focal bank or any of its grupo firms. A count of 1 
means that a bank, or any of its grupo firms, has at least one subsidiary in any Latin-
American country or in any developed market country. A count of 2 means that a bank, 
or any of its grupo firms, has at least one subsidiary in any Latin-American country and 
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in any developed market country. According to Table 6.5, international diversification is 
statistically significant. The hazard ratio is 0.41 (p<0.024), which means that for every 
unit of international diversification increased (from 0-1, and from 1-2), the likelihood of 
exiting the industry decreases by 59% (i.e., 100* (0.41-1.00) = -59%). These results 
support hypothesis 6. 
Hypothesis 7: Among local firms competing in an emerging market, local firms 
following less aggressive (market-oriented) growth strategies will outperform local firms 
following more aggressive (market-oriented) growth strategies. 
Hypothesis 7 implies that market growth (aggressiveness), measured as the 
bank’s share of the Mexican divided by the bank’s share of the Mexican equity market, 
will be negatively related with survival. According to Table 6.5, the aggressiveness 
index is statistically significant. The hazard ratio is 1.01 (p<0.014), which means that 
every percentage point increase in the aggressiveness index increases the likelihood of 
exiting the industry by 1% (that is, 100 * (1.01-1.00) = 1%). These results support 
hypothesis 7. 
Hypothesis 8: Among local firms competing in an emerging market, local firms 
forming strategic alliances with international partners will outperform local firms that 
did not. 
Hypothesis 8 suggests a positive relationship between domestic firms that engage 
in strategic alliances with foreign partners and firm survival. To measure ISA activity,18 
                                                 
18 The ISA dummy variable regains a value of zero when the ISA dissolves. 
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I use a dummy variable (0, 1) where the variable 1 if the domestic had an alliance with a 
foreign bank. Unfortunately, Table 6.5 shows that the ISA variable is not statistically 
significant. The hazard ratio is 0.80, p < 0.66. These results do not support hypothesis 8. 
Hypothesis 9: Among local firms competing in an emerging market, local firms 
with higher social capital will outperform local firms with lower social capital. 
To measure social capital, I considered both the social capital of the bank itself 
(e.g., reputation) and the social capital of its main shareholders (e.g., power). A bank’s 
social capital is measured by the following variables: 1) saturation in the market place 
(number of accounts divided by number of branches) and 2) asymmetric information 
(total deposits divided by number of branches). The social capital of ownership is 
measured by one variable: ownership power. To measure ownership power, I used a 
dummy variable (0, 1) where the variable is 1 if at least one board member of a bank 
belongs to the Mexican Businessmen Council.19 This club has approximately 30 
members and according to Ortiz-Rivera (2000) is the most exclusive and influential 
group of businessmen in Mexico. 
According to Table 6.5, none of the variables is statistically significant. Hazard 
ratios for the variables are as follows: saturation is 1.00 (p<0.24), asymmetric 
information is also 1.00 (p<0.27), and ownership power is 1.99 (p<0.16). These results 
provide no support for hypothesis 9. 
                                                 
19 The membership includes the years 1987-1997. 
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Hypothesis 10: Among both MNEs and emerging market firms operating in an 
emerging market, those that engage in more acquisition activity will outperform those 
with less acquisition activity. 
Hypothesis 10 suggests that there is a positive relationship between a domestic 
bank’s acquisition activity and its likelihood of survival. The acquisition variable is a 
count (cumulative) variable that reflects the number of banks acquired by a domestic 
bank within the Mexican banking industry (ranging from 0-3). Table 6.5 shows the 
acquisition variable is not significant. The hazard ratio is 0.90, p<0.86. These results do 
not support hypothesis 10. 
Ex-Post Analysis of Results 
To confirm the robustness of the results, I conducted several additional tests 
using three alternative statistical models. The first statistical model is a cross section 
time-series linear model using both random and fixed effects (within) regression 
estimators.20 Certo and Semadeni (2006) present a good review on the use of these 
particular models. The other two statistical methods are logistic regression and partial 
likelihood survival analysis21. To conduct these tests both the foreign and domestic 
databases were utilized. However, the time-series model was not used for the domestic 
                                                 
20 Please note that the cross sectional time-series linear model uses ROE as its dependent 
variable. Furthermore, to avoid confounding results, the return component of ROE is measured as the 
bank’s service revenue, not its net income.  
21 Please note that both logistic regression and the partial likelihood survival analysis (Cox) use 
Exit (0,1) as their dependent variable.  
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database due to its high attrition (24 out of the 37 subjects exited the industry). Under 
those conditions (65% exit rate), measuring performance using rates of return on equity 
(ROE) or assets (ROA) would not be meaningful. In contrast, because of the 
characteristics of the foreign banks database where only 4 out of the 26 subjects exited 
the industry, using a time-series model is more logical. 
Foreign Banks Database 
First, I ran the fixed effects model with the proposed full model (see Table 6.3). 
Not surprisingly the cultural distance index variable drops out because this variable does 
not vary over time. Thus, I ran the random effects model without the GCDI variable 
(Table 6.6). Immediately after, I ran the Hausman test to determine which of these 
models was more appropriate to use (Table 6.6). The Hausman test indicates (albeit 
weakly) there is no difference between these two models (p<.07). 
While the fixed effects model is more restrictive (e.g., non-varying variables 
drop), some researchers advocate its use when all members of a group are included in a 
sample (Wooldridge, 2002). Fortunately, there is no reason to further explore the 
advantages of one method over the other as the results are strikingly similar. Also, 
adding the GCDI variable to the random effects model does not alter the results.  
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TABLE 6.6 
Foreign Banks Database (Fixed Effects, Random Effects Regressions and Hausman Test) 
Dependent Variable = ROE 
 Fixed Effects Model Random Effects Model 
  Coeff. S.E. t P > t  Coeff. S.E. z P > z  
Control Variables            
Liberalization  -6.31 2.24 -2.81 0.005** Liberalization -5.42 2.14 -2.53 0.011*  
Bankers_ZM index  7.96 5.94 1.34 0.18 Bankers_ZM index† 6.27 3.81 1.65 0.10  
Independent Variables            
FDI  0.44 0.14 3.08 0.002** FDI 0.20 0.09 2.09 0.037*  
ISA  -5.35 4.61 -1.16 0.25 ISA -5.25 3.30 -1.59 0.11  
NLACOWB  1.85 0.77 2.41 0.016* NLACOWB 1.81 0.77 2.33 0.02*  
Acq_Cumulative  12.20 4.79 2.55 0.011* Acq_Cumulative 8.93 3.55 2.51 0.012*  
Intercept  -19.35 11.70 -1.65 0.099†  -7.61 7.19 -1.06 0.29  
N = 644     N = 644     
F = 5.23     Prob > χ 2 = 29.04     
Prob > F = 0.000***     Wald χ 2 = 0.000***     
Dependent Variable:  Return on Equity (service revenue) 
Number of groups: 26      26     
Observations per group: 4038      4-38     
Two-tailed z-statistics where: †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<.001 
            
 Hausman Test       
 Coefficients       
 Fixed Random Difference 
Sqrt (diag 
[V_fixed-V_ 
random]) S,E,       
Liberalization -6.31 -5.42 -0.89 0.76       
Bankers_ZM index 7.96 6.27 1.69 1.83       
FDI 0.44 0.20 0.24 0.13       
ISA -5.35 -5.25 -0.10 1.59       
NLACOWB 1.85 1.81 0.04 0.323       
Acq_Cumulative 12.20 8.93 3.27 2.24       
Test Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic; χ 2 = 11.76; Prob > χ 2 = .07†       
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More importantly though, these results are similar to those presented in the main 
model (Table 6.7 compares these results.) In both cases the FDI and the ACQ-CUMUL 
variables are statistically significant. In both cases the ISA and GCDI22 variables are not 
statistically significant. The only difference is in the international diversification 
variable. In the main model international diversification (NLACOWB) is not statistically 
significant, whereas in both the fixed and random effects models hypothesis 3 is 
supported. 
Domestic Database 
Table 6.8 compares the results obtained using logistic regression and Cox 
survival analysis. The results are mostly similar to those presented in the main model. In 
the case of the logistic regression all results are exactly the same: the coefficients on 
INTL_DIV and AGS are statistically significant; the coefficient on GRUPO is 
marginally significant; and all other variables are not statistically significant. For the 
Cox model, the statistically significant variables became marginally significant and all 
other variables have exactly the same interpretation as in the main model. 
                                                 
22 This is only true for the random effect model. However, in the fix effects model this variable 
drops. 
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TABLE 6.7 
Foreign Banks Database (Ex-post Analysis Comparison: Gompertz, Fixed and 
Random Effects) Dependent Variable = Exit, ROE, and ROE, Respectively 
 Gompertz Model Fixed Effect Reg Random Effects Reg 
 Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z Coeff. P > z 
Control Variables       
Liberalization 0.21 0.91 -6.31 0.005** -5.42 0.011* 
Bankers_ZM index 0.64 0.59 7.96 0.18 6.27 0.099† 
Independent Variables       
FDI 0.09 0.01* 0.44 0.002** 0.20 0.037* 
GCDI -1.92 0.13     
ISA 0.28 0.59 -5.35 0.25 -5.25 0.11 
NLACOWB -0.03 0.82 1.85 0.016* 1.81 0.02* 
Acq_Cumulative -18.90 0.000*** 12.20 0.011* 8.93 0.012* 
Note: Two-tailed z-statistics where: †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<.001 
 
Summary 
This chapter presents evidence regarding firm strategies and characteristics and 
their effect on firm performance (survival and ROE). As predicted by the theoretical 
arguments developed in Chapter III, evidence supports that commercial distance and 
acquisition activity increase the likelihood of survival for foreign firms. For the domestic 
firms’ sample, the findings suggest that grupo affiliation and international diversification 
improve their likelihood of survival, whereas aggressiveness decreases their ability to 
survive.  
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TABLE 6.8 
Domestic Banks Database (Ex-post Analysis Comparison: Exponential Model, 
Logistics Regression, and Cox Model) Dependent Variable = Exit 
 Exponential Model Logistic Regression Cox Model 
 
Hazard 
Ratio Coeff. P > z 
Odds 
Ratio Coeff. P > z 
Hazard 
Ratio Coeff. P > z 
Control Variables          
Liberalization 4.40 1.48 0.01* 4.81 1.57 0.013* 6.76 1.91 0.018* 
Bankers_ZM index 1.26 0.23 0.67 1.27 0.24 0.69 1.06 0.06 0.91 
Independent Variables          
Grupo 0.36 -1.03 0.07† 0.33 -1.10 0.282† 0.26 -1.36 0.051† 
Entropy 1.01 0.01 0.36 1.01 0.01 0.41 1.01 0.01 0.22 
Intl_Diversification 0.41 -0.88 0.023* 0.40 -0.92 0.018* 0.46 -0.77 0.057† 
Aggressiveness 1.01 0.01 0.013* 1.01 0.01 0.028* 1.01 0.01 0.07† 
ISA 0.80 -0.22 0.65 0.80 -0.22 0.67 0.91 -0.10 0.85 
Saturation 1.00 0.00 0.23 1.00 0.00 0.29 1.00 0.00 0.23 
Assymetric_Information 1.00 0.00 0.26 1.00 0.00 0.27 1.00 0.00 0.35 
Ownership Power 1.99 0.69 0.16 2.04 0.71 0.18 1.83 0.61 0.30 
Acq_Cumulative 0.89 -0.11 0.86 0.88 -0.12 0.85 0.82 -0.19 0.78 
Dependent Variable: Exit          
Note: Two-tailed z-statistics where: †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<.001 
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Discussion 
Corresponding to the structure of the preceding chapters, Chapter VII is divided 
in three sections. The first section discusses the results regarding the performance of 
both foreign and domestic banks in the presence of radical environment change (i.e., 
liberalization) in a host emerging market. This section includes explanations about the 
lack of support for some hypotheses. The next section presents the overall conclusions of 
this research by answering the three research questions put forth in the introductory 
chapter. This section considers the present study’s research and practical implications. 
Finally, the chapter concludes by stating this dissertation’s limitations and provides 
some suggestions for future research. 
Foreign Multinational Banks 
Chapter III proposes that the performance of multinational banks will be 
positively affected by the following strategies and characteristics: 1) the home country’s 
commercial and cultural closeness to the host country; 2) the formation of strategic 
alliances between the foreign bank and the host country’s domestic banks; 
3) international diversification by the foreign bank (particularly in the region of the focal 
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host market); and 4) the acquisition of domestic banks by the foreign bank. Each of these 
strategies and characteristics is further evaluated. 
Commercial and Cultural Distance 
Eden and Miller (2004) identify institutional forces as key drivers of liability of 
foreignness. According to these authors, legitimacy and institutional distance explain 
how MNEs adjust to the ‘rules of the game’ of a host-country. However, during a 
regulatory punctuation (e.g., liberalization), emerging market institutions are in a state of 
flux. According to Gersick (1991), during a revolutionary period (e.g., a regulatory 
punctuation), firms try to adapt to a new set of environmental rules. Under these 
circumstances of evolving institutionalization where new rules for economic exchange 
are being developed, an MNE with prior knowledge about a host market’s institutions 
should be better able to adapt to the new environmental rules. Thus, Eden and Miller’s 
(2004) assertion that institutional distance explains the MNEs ability or inability to adapt 
to the new ‘rules of the game’ of a host country, should become even more important 
during regulatory punctuations. 
The empirical evidence reported in Chapter VI strongly supports the argument 
that there is a positive relationship between foreign firms from countries with closer 
commercial ties to the host market (i.e., Mexico) and their performance (survival). The 
liability of foreignness literature (e.g., Eden and Miller, 2004) suggests that compared to 
domestic firms, foreign firms are at a disadvantage because of the unfamiliarity, 
relational, and discriminatory costs that they must incur to do business in a host market. 
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However, these results suggest that not all foreign firms face the same liability of 
foreignness. This study demonstrates that foreign banks from countries that are 
commercially closer to the focal host country outperformed those from countries that are 
commercially more distant to that host country. This is because the closer commercial 
ties afford them to be better aligned to the host market’s business landscape. 
Furthermore, because new institutions in emerging markets would evolve slowly after 
regulatory punctuations and would not become exact replicas of those from developed 
markets, MNEs from countries with closer ties to the target host market should be in a 
better position to align with the evolving institutions. 
In contrast, there was no statistical evidence of a positive relationship between 
foreign firms from countries with closer cultural ties to the host market and their 
performance (survival). Perhaps, firms from culturally closer countries cannot reap the 
benefits of understanding the host market’s culture when that market is under a 
regulatory punctuation. Conceivably, the belief that they understand the culture, and 
because of it have an advantage, might have caused them to neglect the implications of 
the host country’s radical environmental change. This alternative explanation is 
congruent with O’Grady and Lane’s (1996) empirical evidence, which suggests that the 
assumed “country closeness” can prevent executives from learning critical differences 
among cultures. 
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Strategic Alliances 
Particular to the context of emerging markets, Hitt et al. (2000) argue that when 
forming strategic alliances, MNEs also seek to learn about the culture and idiosyncrasies 
of the host market. Thus, they conclude that MNEs form strategic alliances with 
emerging market firms mainly to gain knowledge about the local (emerging) market. 
Congruent with these arguments, I proposed a positive relationship between foreign 
firms that engage in strategic alliances with local partners and firm survival. However, 
the empirical evidence does not support this argument. 
It might be possible that strategic alliances are outcomes in their own right. For 
instance, perhaps commercially closer foreign firms or more internationally diversified 
foreign firms are more likely to engage in strategic alliances than more distant or less 
diversified foreign firms. Thus, it might still be possible that strategic alliances have a 
positive influence on foreign firm performance, albeit indirectly. 
Also, the measure used to determine the effect of strategic alliances (i.e., dummy 
variable) needs to be further evaluated. For instance, a categorization of alliances could 
be developed. Perhaps there were at least two types of domestic firms willing to form an 
alliance with a foreign partner: 1) healthy and proactive firms; and 2) desperate and 
reactive firms. While both types of firms can subscribe to one or more of the reason 
stated by Oliver (1990),23 the first type of domestic firm would enter an alliance to 
                                                 
23 1) asymmetry, to increase power and market share; 2) reciprocity, to obtain synergies in 
technology and information sharing; 3) efficiency, to achieve economies of scale; 4) stability, to share 
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enhance its already good or stable market position. On the other hand, the second type of 
firms would form an alliance trying to overcome or correct a precarious position. In this 
instance, the second type of firm would be almost obliged to enter the alliance. 
Under the described scenario, domestic firms that enter an alliance for proactive 
reasons should offer their foreign counterparts a better opportunity to adapt to the host 
country environment. Conversely, domestic firms entering an alliance for corrective 
purposes might not offer this advantage to their foreign counterparts. Thus, perhaps 
omitting this distinction hides the positive effects of forming a strategic alliance for 
either foreign or domestic firms. 
International Diversification 
According to Delios and Beamish (1999), the positive effect of international 
diversification on firm performance comes as a result of both the possession of superior 
resources (i.e., proprietary assets) and the acquired ability to develop new technological 
expertise. For instance, Kim et al. (1993) argue that the more internationally diversified 
a firm, the greater the opportunities to leverage its resources and increase its 
performance. However, the extant literature has yet to test the link between the MNE’s 
international diversification and the performance of its subsidiary in a focal emerging 
market.24 To test this link, I proposed a positive relationship between international 
                                                                                                                                                
risks when entering new markets, and 5) legitimacy, for enhancing the profile of the organization within 
the industry. 
24 The extant literature claim only considers published journal articles. 
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diversification (e.g., number of Latin-American countries where the focal banks have 
other banks) and firm survival. 
The empirical results show no relationship when using event history modeling. 
However, analyzing the data using cross-section time-series models (Chapter VI ex-post 
analysis) the results show a statistical significant relationship. Thus, the results can be 
interpreted as follows. International diversification does not positively affect firm 
performance when performance is measured in terms of firm survival. However, 
international diversification does have a positive effect on firm ROE. 
Perhaps the conflicting results obtained by using a different statistical model 
(cross section time-series instead of survival analysis) and a different way to measure 
performance (i.e., ROE instead of Exit) can be explained by the extant liability of 
foreignness literature. For instance, Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) suggest that LOF 
decreases after the first two years of operating in the host-country and last no more than 
16 years. Accordingly, it might be possible that foreign firms entering a new market will 
commit to that foreign market for a number of years (i.e., not exiting that market), 
despite less than desirable results. In fact, the sample from the foreign banks dataset 
includes roughly 10 years of study (12/1994-3/2004). Therefore, the possibility of a 
“commitment period” gives an alternative explanation about the lack of relationship 
between international diversification and survivability. 
Also, Lu and Beamish (2001) demonstrate that after an initial negative 
relationship between a firm’s FDI activity and its ROA, ROA markedly improves as 
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LOF decreases.25 Therefore, the present study’s finding (a positive relationship between 
international diversification and ROE) is consistent with extant international business 
literature. However, this finding further contributes to the literature because it 
demonstrates that internalization has a positive effect on performance (ROE) at the 
subsidiary level. 
Acquisitions 
In contrast to internationalization or strategic alliances, which help firms 
understand how to better align with the new environment, acquiring a local competitor 
does not necessarily improve the knowledge stock about the new environment. Also 
important to mergers and acquisitions is the concept of growth, which generally 
increases the probability of survival (Katz & Kahn, 1966). Thus, in congruence with this 
argument, I expected a positive relationship between foreign firms’ acquisition activity 
and their likelihood of survival. 
The empirical evidence reported in Chapter VI strongly supports the argument 
that acquisition activity (i.e., acquiring a local bank) has a statistically positive 
relationship to firm performance (survival). In fact, the banks’ hazard of exiting the 
industry decreases by roughly 100% for every local bank acquired. 
Although the period studied is one of radical environmental change, aggressive 
growth strategies (i.e., acquisition activity) had a positive effect on the performance of 
                                                 
25 They actually found evidence of an S curve relationship between a firm’s FDI activity 
(internationalization) and its performance. Explaining the whole aspect of the relationship is beyond the 
scope of the question of when LOF exist. 
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foreign firms. Interestingly, and although its effect was not hypothesized for foreign 
firms, the aggressiveness variable (domestic firms hypothesis #7) also had a positive 
effect on firm performance (albeit only marginally26). Thus, these findings suggest that 
for foreign firms, aggressive growth strategies have a positive effect on performance. 
Domestic Banks 
Chapter III proposes that the performance of domestic banks will be positively 
affected by the following strategies and characteristics: 1) grupo affiliation; 2) product 
diversification (i.e., portfolio entropy); 3) international diversification; 4) non-aggressive 
loan growth; 5) the formation of strategic alliances with foreign banks,27 5) social 
capital; and 6) the acquisition of domestic or foreign banks. Each of these strategies and 
characteristics is further evaluated. 
Grupo Affiliation 
Guillen (2000) argues that business grupos have been able to resist the threat of 
international competition in their home market because of their superior informational 
capabilities. Also, some researchers suggest that emerging market firms succeed with 
grupo-like structures because they foster social ties with key stakeholders such as 
government officials or bank officers (e.g., Wan, 2005). According to these arguments 
superiority in local information exchange capabilities should give grupo firms an 
advantage over non-grupo firms. In other words, grupo affiliation should result in a 
                                                 
26 Not shown. Hazard ration 0.79; coefficient -0.24; p<0.10. 
27 Already discussed in the foreign bank section. 
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positive relationship between domestic firms that are part of a grupo and their ability to 
survive. 
The empirical evidence reported in Chapter VI provides at least marginal support 
for a positive relationship between grupo affiliation and firm survival. The results are 
noteworthy as they appear to suggest that information capabilities are more important 
than focus strategies during liberalization. Thus, consistent with the resource-based view 
of the firm, grupo affiliation provided local firms with a resource advantage that 
outweighed the inefficiencies of this business structure. 
Portfolio Entropy 
Wan and Hoskisson (200) demonstrate that product diversification is positively 
related to firm performance in the context of less munificent environments. Thus, it 
follows that under emerging market contexts, ‘non-market capabilities’ (e.g. social ties) 
should be more important than market capabilities (Wan, 2005). Accordingly, I expected 
higher product diversification (portfolio entropy) to be positively related to firm 
survival. 
The empirical evidence reported in Chapter VI, however, shows no support for 
this argument. A possible explanation of this finding is that perhaps it is not as relevant 
to diversified by products, but rather, have more diverse sets of clients. Perhaps single-
clients had several types of loans, which indeed negated the benefits of diversification. 
Under these conditions (bank-clients with several types of loans), the risk of default is 
highly related to the client and not only the type of loan. Conceivably, loan portfolio 
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diversification could also be measured by calculating the variance or standard deviation 
of each client outstanding loan balance. 
It is also possible that diversification is of less value in an environment where an 
environmental punctuation occurs. Thus, munificence may be of less importance than 
the significant change brought about by the punctuation. 
International Diversification 
International business scholars argue that MNEs have two main motivations to 
engage in international diversification: 1) exploiting their capabilities in international 
environments (Hymer, 1976; Dunning, 1977), and 2) exploring or augmenting their 
knowledge base (Cantwell, 1989). For local firms facing a new business landscape, 
perhaps the motivation is not to exploit their capabilities, but rather, to learn how to 
compete under a different set of rules. In this sense, I proposed a positive relationship 
between international diversification and firm survival. Congruent with these arguments, 
the empirical evidence reported in Chapter VI shows strong statistical support for these 
claims. Indeed, international diversification increases the domestic firms’ ability to 
survive. 
Aggressive Growth (loan) Strategies 
Sachs et al. (1996) find that countries experiencing lending booms, as a result of 
liberalization, are more likely to suffer crises. These crises come as a result of financial 
deregulation, which is likely to cause overlending (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1998). 
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Interestingly, Sachs et al. (1996) find that countries in which financial institutions did 
not engage in overlending did not experience crises. 
Liberalization encourages greater risk taking by competitive banks to defend 
their market share (Chang & Velasco, 2000). However, because of the evidence at the 
country-level (i.e., overlending causing crises) and that emerging market firms’ 
competitive advantage rests on their non-market capabilities, I expected a negative 
relationship between aggressive (loan) growth and firm survival. 
The empirical evidence reported in Chapter VI strongly supports the argument 
that there is a negative relationship between aggressive (loan) growth and firm survival. 
Thus, these results demonstrate that domestic firms should favor less market aggressive 
policies and perhaps further emphasize their non-market capabilities. 
Social Capital  
According to Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994), social capital is both the glue of 
the network and the lubricant that enables network interaction. From this perspective, 
emerging market firms seek to gain a competitive advantage through non-market 
capabilities (Wan, 2005) by filling structural holes, that is, by developing their social 
capital. 
Congruent with these arguments, I proposed a positive relationship between 
social capital and firm survival. However, the empirical evidence does not support this 
argument. A possible explanation of these findings is that the value of social capital 
diminishes once liberalization occurs. For instance, Uzzi (1997) states three reasons that 
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turn embeddedness into a liability. First, the unexpected loss of a core network member 
might disrupt the benefits of network membership. Second, and related to the first, is a 
change in the institutional arrangements that underscore the network. And third, is the 
problem of having too high a proportion of embedded ties in a network, which leads to 
too few links to outside members who might contribute innovative ideas. 
Also, regulatory punctuations such as liberalization policies might turn 
embeddedness into a liability for local firms such as grupo firms, which are embedded in 
a network. Also, because liberalization requires a higher emphasis in market capabilities 
the value of social ties could be lost (Wan, 2005). In this sense, following inertial 
practices on how to transact (after the regulatory punctuation) might translate in a 
liability for the embedded firms. In short, perhaps the benefits of social capital are offset 
by the increased liability incurred by local firms once regulatory punctuation occurs. 
Acquisitions 
Congruent with the arguments espoused for the foreign banks, I also expected a 
positive relationship between domestic firms’ acquisition activity and their likelihood of 
survival. The empirical evidence presented in Chapter VI, however, does not support 
these claims as the results are not statistically significant. While for foreign banks 
acquisition strategies do increase their performance, for domestic banks this was not the 
case. 
Perhaps, the foreign banks were able to reduce their liability of foreignness by 
acquiring local firms. Thus, domestic firms had less to gain from the acquisition of other 
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domestic banks than their foreign counterparts. Also, foreign banks might have had the 
extra-benefit of being more selective when acquiring a local bank. Presumably, foreign 
banks have more experience conducting mergers and acquisitions than domestic 
competitors. In turn, the additional experience should yield the foreign banks a 
competitive advantage over the local firm through acquisition cost. 
Burt (1977: 70) states that “the most direct strategy for eliminating a source of 
market constraint would be to purchase an establishment within the constraining sector.” 
And Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest that horizontal acquisitions reduce 
commensalistic dependence by simultaneously reducing competition and increasing 
power. However, it is not clear what would be effect for the firms operating in a 
particular industry (i.e., Mexican banking industry) if there are several acquisitions 
taking place (and especially by foreign banks). Under this scenario, it might be possible 
that domestic banks receive only marginal benefits by acquiring one other bank. In 
contrast, it might be possible that the positive relationship between a domestic bank’s 
acquisition activity and its likelihood of survival is only effective after more than one 
transaction. 
Conclusions 
While the importance of radical change has been recognized (e.g., Gersick, 
1991), firm strategies and characteristics that affect firm performance, under radical 
change, have not received the same attention (Keister, 2002). In particular, emerging 
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economies often have experienced a more radical change in their business landscapes. 
Thus, examining (foreign and domestic) firms operating in these regions provided a 
natural way to identify the causes (strategies and characteristics) behind successful or 
failed adaptation. 
For foreign multinational firms, the strategic management and international 
business literatures have produced a wealth of research interpreting their actions and 
strategic shifts (e.g., Ferrier, 2001; Luo & Peng, 1999; De Castro & Uhlenbruck, 1997). 
However, this research has emphasized performance comparisons between foreign 
multinational firms and their domestic counterparts, largely overlooking the performance 
differences among foreign multinational firms competing in a third host market (Rangan 
& Drummond, 2004). 
Likewise, there has been a dearth of research determining how domestic firms in 
emerging markets are adjusting to the radical environmental changes (e.g., 
globalization). For instance, Doh (2000) recognized the scarcity of studies on firm-level 
responses to privatization, while Hoskisson et al. (2000) commented on the need to study 
the effects of larger institutional context on individual firm responses. 
Therefore, the present research is a first effort in studying the characteristics and 
strategies of successful multinational and domestic firms attempting to adapt to 
regulatory punctuations in an emerging market. Analyzing the foreign multinational 
firms, this dissertation explores how the following firm strategies and characteristics 
affect these firms ability to perform (survive). 
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Research Implications 
From an academic perspective, it is worth noting that studies about strategic 
responses of either multinational or domestic firms operating in emerging markets, when 
the rules of business have changed so radically, have been scarce. Thus, the present 
study contributes to the business literature by addressing these gaps. Particularly, this 
research explains why, despite regulatory punctuations’ normally positive effects on 
foreign firms, there are some foreign firms that perform poorly. Conversely, this study 
also explains why, despite regulatory punctuations’ normally negative effects on 
domestic firms, there are some domestic firms that manage to overcome the negative 
effects and experience positive outcomes. Lastly, this research also explores whether 
there are certain “universal” firm strategies or firm characteristics that enable either 
MNEs or domestic firms to better align with the new business landscape after a 
regulatory punctuation.  
In other words, the study does answer the three research questions put forth in the 
introductory chapter, namely: 
1. Why are some MNEs more likely than other MNEs to survive regulatory 
punctuations in an emerging host market? 
2. Why are some domestic firms more likely than other domestic firms to 
survive regulatory punctuations in their home emerging market? and 
3. Are there any similarities between successful MNEs and successful domestic 
firms in their strategic responses to regulatory punctuations in an emerging 
market? 
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In answering the first research question, the present study demonstrates that 
banks from countries with closer commercial ties to the host market (i.e., Mexico) and 
banks that engage in acquisition strategies were more likely to survive regulatory 
punctuations in an emerging host market. Because liability of foreignness research has 
largely overlooked the performance differences among MNEs competing in a third host 
market, the first finding contributes to the liability of foreignness literature by 
identifying the existence of a country of origin liability (effect). 
Also, while there has been a significant amount of research done on mergers and 
acquisitions, there is a lack of sufficient research examining how acquisitions affect the 
performance of foreign firms when environmental punctuations occur. Thus, another 
major potential contribution about this first research question is that it addresses a gap in 
the strategic management literature by identifying a positive relationship between 
acquisition activity (a growth strategy) and firm performance during regulatory 
punctuations. 
By answering the second research question, the present study identifies grupo 
affiliation, international diversification strategies and less aggressive (loan) growth 
strategies as the characteristics and strategies that relate to domestic firm survival during 
regulatory punctuations. The grupo affiliation and less aggressive growth strategies 
findings contribute to the literature on emerging markets in the following aspects. First, 
it confirms the arguments espoused by Khanna and Palepu (1997) in so far as grupo 
affiliation and less market aggressive strategies, which emphasize the use of ‘non-
market’ capabilities, are successful strategies for emerging market firms. Also, the grupo 
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affiliation finding answers Toulan (2002: 559) call about “…the need of further research 
in the impact of market liberalization on the horizontal scope of the firm. 
The international diversification finding contributes to both the emerging market 
literature and geographical diversification literatures by illustrating that emerging market 
firms benefit from transferring back to their home country what they learn abroad. 
About the third research question or the “universality” of firm strategies or firm 
characteristics that enable either MNEs or domestic firms to better align with the new 
business landscape, this dissertation suggests the following. Strategic alliances did not 
have an effect on either MNEs or domestic firms’ ability to survive. However, 
acquisition strategies and international diversification affected MNEs and domestic firms 
differently. Acquisition strategies increased the MNEs ability to survive, whereas it did 
not affect domestic firms’ ability to survive. On the contrary, international 
diversification increased the domestic firms ability to survive, but did not affect the 
survivability of the foreign entrants. An interesting aspect of international 
diversification, though, is that when foreign firm performance is measured as ROE, 
international diversification becomes statistically significant. 
Essentially, the answer to research question three is that there is no “universal” 
strategy that is more effective. Even if firms face the same business landscape, their 
stock of resources demands the use of different strategies to take advantage of them. 
This is even more evident in the opposite result obtained for the aggressive growth 
variable. For the domestic firms, aggressive loan strategies increased the likelihood of 
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exiting the banking industry. For foreign banks, however, aggressive loan strategies 
decreased the likelihood of exiting the banking industry.28 
Several researchers have suggested that successful organizations will be those 
with the ability to adapt to radical environmental change (e.g., Richardson, 1996; 
Volberda, 1996). However, comprehensive studies about which firm strategies and 
characteristics better help organizations to successfully adapt to radical change are 
scarce.29 In this sense, this research contributes to the extant literature by extending 
current theories when considering the effect of radical change. For instance, while 
punctuated equilibrium provides a good “environmental” explanation about a firm’s 
need to adapt to radical change, it does not suggest how firms should adapt to this 
change. However, by providing an explanation on how firms suppose to adapt to this 
radical change, this dissertation had expanded the theoretical implication of the 
punctuated equilibrium model. Similarly, the present dissertation provides a theoretical 
extension to liability of foreignness by finding that not all foreign firms face the same 
liability of foreignness. Lastly, RBV is also extended by this dissertation research, as 
RBV is found to have implications for emerging markets firms that are different from 
foreign developed market firms. 
                                                 
28 As previously indicated, there was no hypothesis for this finding. And the result was 
marginally statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
29 Notable exceptions are Hitt et al. (2004); Rangan and Drummond, (2004); Toulan (2002). 
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Practical Implications 
One of the objectives of this work was to provide some answers to the new 
business realities of our time. Particularly, the profound transformations of the business 
landscape that have taken place as a result of globalization and technological advances 
(Hitt et al., 1998). As expressed by Niccolo Machiavelli centuries ago: “There is nothing 
more difficult than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things." To this 
end, I believe this research has practical managerial implications for multinational firms 
that want to enter new emerging markets, especially when these markets are in a state of 
flux. For instance, by knowing that commercial distance has a negative relationship with 
firm survival, foreign firm managers could be better prepare to device a more effective 
(geographical) expansion. 
Also, this research has practical implications for the managers of emerging-
market domestic firms, which are trying to implement strategies to defend their local 
position from international competitors. For instance, because of liberalization, it 
appears that domestic firms should be quick to internationalize in order to improve their 
knowledge of their own business landscape. In contrast, it appears that domestic firms 
should not be as quick to embrace focus strategies. 
In short, the results show that certain strategies work better for domestic firms 
than for foreigner firms and vice versa. Therefore, the present study provides helpful 
guidelines to help managers of both foreign and domestic firms in their ever complex 
decision-making process. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
As with most studies, the present research has limitations that must be noted. 
First, the degree to which these results can be generalizable to the experience of other 
foreign and domestic firms operating in other emerging markets needs to be considered. 
While emerging markets are not homogenous (Hoskisson et al., 2000), the regulatory 
punctuations (e.g., liberalization, privatization) faced by foreign and emerging market 
firms operating in them have commonalities. For instance, several streams of literature 
(e.g., economics, political science, management) suggest that these regulatory 
punctuations were widespread. Thus, it might be possible to conclude that these findings 
can be generalizable to other emerging markets, or to the Latin-American region at the 
very least, because this study is conducted in Mexico. For example, the present study 
may have useful implications for the banking industry in the People’s Republic of China, 
which is currently undergoing a similar regulatory punctuation involving deregulation, 
privatization and liberalization. 
Second, that all firms come from the banking industry might be a limitation. 
However, it is also worth noting that several international business studies have been 
conducted using financial institutions as their sample. This is particularly clear in those 
studies testing liability of foreignness (Miller & Parkhe, 2002; Zaheer & Mosakowski, 
1997). Moreover, regulatory punctuations in the 1980s and 1990s often took place at the 
industry level as government deregulated, privatized and liberalized industries that 
historically had been under strong government regulations, such as telecommunications, 
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banking and public sector utilities. Nonetheless, for both the first and second limitations, 
future research should investigate more industries in more than one country. 
Another limitation of this study is the measurement of some of the variables. 
However, it is also worth mentioning that conducting empirical research in emerging 
markets adds another degree of difficulty. These difficulties were apparent in the use of a 
categorical variable (0-2) to measure international diversification for domestic banks. 
Although, more fine-grained measures would have been preferred, the availability (or 
lack of) archival sources made this task unattainable. Yet, I anticipate the potential effect 
on the results to be even more positive had I attained a more-fine grain measures. This is 
because the variable became more statistically significant when I changed the 
measurement from a dummy variable (p>.041) to a categorical variable (p>0.024). 
This study also brings out interesting issues that raise various other new 
questions for future research. For instance, drawing from the underlying theories used, 
this study identifies that liability of foreignness is not the same for all foreign firms. As 
Eden and Miller (2004: 196) put it, the main disadvantage of an international firm when 
going abroad is being a “stranger in a strange land.” However, this study shows that 
some lands are more strange for some strangers. Thus, it would be interesting to explore 
if this differences in liability of foreignness change with time. Does it necessarily 
decrease with time? Or, are there certain conditions under which it can be enhanced? Are 
these results different without a (regulatory) punctuation? 
Besides finding that banks from countries with closer commercial ties to the host 
market are more likely to survive, the present study finds that foreign banks that engage 
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in acquisition strategies and banks that lend more aggressively30 are more likely to 
survive regulatory punctuations in an emerging host market. Thus, it follows that 
aggressive growth strategies were successful for this set of banks. This is an interesting 
finding because it is counterintuitive in that the results show that it pays to take desperate 
(bold) measures in desperate (not so stable) times. However, it is unclear if other factors 
facilitated the success of these aggressive strategies. In other words, perhaps for more 
diversified banks it is easier to implement aggressive strategies. It might be that in so 
doing, these banks are in fact reducing their company-wide risk. Thus, future research 
should test for interaction effects. Likewise, it would be interesting to find how 
aggressiveness affects other types of firms. Do aggressive strategies only benefit banks? 
Should an aggressiveness index be developed? 
In following with the topic of aggressive responses, this study finds that for 
(emerging market) domestic firms, aggressive (loan) growth strategies relate negatively 
to firm survival during regulatory punctuations. Sachs et al. (1996) find that (emerging 
market) countries that experienced lending booms, as a result of liberalization, were 
more likely to suffer currency crises. In this sense, it would be interesting to test if 
aggressive growth strategies have a negative effect on firms from countries that 
experience lending booms (e.g., Mexico). Do aggressive policies affect banks from 
countries that did not experience lending booms? Future research should strive to obtain 
answers to these questions.
                                                 
30 See comment in footnote #26. 
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(Rank) Bank’s 
Name/ 
Brief Explanation Other Remarks and 
Numbers 
(1) BBVA 
Renamed BBVA-
Bancomer 
BBVA bought a minority stake in 
Probursa in 1993. After the crisis 
onset, Probursa was nearing. 
BBVA saw the acquisition of 
Probursa (1995) as an opportunity 
to increase its presence in Latin 
America. In 1999, the Spanish 
bank offered to buy a controlling 
interest of Bancomer (32.2%). 
After several months of discussion 
and a competing offer from 
Banamex, the board accepted 
BBVA’s offer in 2000. 
Currently (12/2004), BBVA hold 
more than 98% of Bancomer’s 
shares. 
BBVA had 8% of market share in 
Latin America (excluding Brazil) 
in 2003. 
Probursa acquisition: 
$350 US Millions for 60% 
of its equity. 
Probursa had 146 branches, 
3200 employees and 2.8% 
market share of the 
industry.  
 
Bancomer acquisition: 
BBVA invested $2.5 US 
billions for a controlling 
32.2% of Bancomer. At the 
time, Bancomer had 1320 
branches,  
25,000 employees and a 
19.7% market share of the 
industry. 
BBVA ended up paying 
about $8.3 US billions for 
98% of Bancomer shares. 
Former shareholder groups 
include: The Mexican 
government (11%); and the 
Bank of Montreal (17%).  
 
In sum, BBVA invested 
roughly $8.6 US billions. 
BBVA led Banamex 
(Citibank) in both asset and 
loan portfolio by 2 and 7 
percentage points, 
respectively. 
 151 
 
 
 
(2) Citibank 
Renamed Banamex 
America’s Citibank has been in 
Mexico since 1929. However, it 
was until 1994 that it established a 
subsidiary in this country. 
Citibank established an alliance 
with Confia in 1995. This alliance 
would allow Citibank’s clients to 
utilize Confia’s network of 
branches. 
Confia went bankrupt in 1997; the 
Mexican government retook and 
sold it to Citibank in 1998. 
Citibank lost its bid to acquire 
Serfin in 2000. In 2001, Citibank 
bid to acquire the largest Banamex, 
the largest Mexican bank with 20% 
of the industry’s assets.  
Citibank had 7% of market share in 
Latin America (excluding Brazil) 
in 2003. 
Confia acquisition: 
$180 US Millions for 100% 
of the bank. Confia had 300 
branches, and roughly 3.5% 
of the assets of the system.  
 
Banamex acquisition: 
$12.5 US Billion for 100% 
of the banks. 
Banamex had 1363 
branches, roughly 20% of 
the assets of the system. 
 
Note: Citibank also 
acquired Banamex’s 
brokerage house and the 
rest of the financial group.  
(3) Santander The Spanish bank Santander 
established a subsidiary office in 
12/1994. Around those years, 
Santander bough 8% of Bital and 
eventually acquired 27% of it 
before selling its position to HSBC 
in 2002.  
Santander’s first big acquisition 
was Mexicano bank in 1996. 
Santander’s second acquisition was 
Serfin in 2000. 
Both banks (Mexicano and Serfin) 
are to form one entity in 2005. 
However, all the branches were 
renamed Santander Serfin.  
Santander had 9% of market share 
in Latin America (excluding 
Brazil) in 2003. 
Mexicano acquisition: 
$379 US Millions for 70% 
of its equity. Mexicano had 
236 branches, 7400 
employees and 8.3% market 
share of the industry. 
 
Serfin acquisition: 
Santander bough Serfin in 
$1.56 US billions. Serfin 
had 8.5% of market share, 
572 branches and 9150 
employees. 
 
Bank of America bought 
24.9% of Santander’s 
Mexican subsidiary, 
Santander Mexicano for 1.6 
US billions. 
 
It is safe to say that 
Santander’s equity in 
Santander Serfin (75.1%) is 
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the result of profits obtained 
in Mexican operations. That 
is why, despite that 
Mexicano and Serfin 
(separately) had 16.8% of 
market share (when bought) 
and now only has 13.5%, 
Santander should still be 
considered a winner in this 
process. 
(4) HSBC The English HSBC entered the 
Mexican market (in 2000) as it 
acquired the Republic Bank of 
New York, which had a subsidiary 
in Mexico since 1995. 
HSBC increase its presence in 
Mexico when it bought Bital in 
2002, Mexico’s 4th largest bank. 
HSBC had 4% of market share in 
Latin-America (excluding Brazil) 
in 2003. 
The Republic Bank of NY 
had only one office with 83 
employees in Mexico, and 
0.25% of market share.  
 
Bital was acquired in June 
2002 for $1.1 US billions. 
Bital had 1,374 offices, 
14,649 employees and 
7.89% of market share. 
(5) Bank of Nova 
Scotia (BNS) 
Renamed Scotiabank 
Inverlat 
In 1994, Canada’s BNS purchased 
8.1% of the shares of Inverlat for 
$154.1 US millions. After the 
crisis, Inverlat went bankrupt and 
BNS stock was valued at $0.00. 
However, the Mexican government 
hired BNS to manage the 
bankrupted Inverlat. 
In 1996, BNS bough 16% of stock 
and in 2000 an additional 39%. 
BNS had 1% of market share in 
Latin America (excluding Brazil) 
in 2003 
At the time of the 
bankruptcy, Inverlat had 
6.1% of market share. 
When BNS became the 
majority owner in 2000, its 
market share stand at 
4.16%. 
Currently (3/2004), 
Scotiabank Inverlat, as 
Inverlat is now known, 
holds a market share of 
4.71% 
(6) Bank of America Bank of America (BOFA) initiated 
operations with one office and 83 
employees in 2/1995. After almost 
10 years, BOFA has still one office 
and 5 employees more (88). 
BOFA took over the Mexican 
operations of Nations Bank in 
1998. 
BOFA’s increase in market 
share (assets) from 0.8% 
(1995) to 1.7% (3/2004). 
Several news articles have 
suggested that BOFA 
bought 24.9% of Santander-
Serfin to learn about the 
Mexican market and 
transfer that knowledge to 
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target the Hispanic market 
in the US.  
BOFA’s loan portfolio in 
Mexico is only $30 US 
millions or 0.03% of that 
market, but its market share 
of deposits stands at 0.43%. 
These numbers does not 
consider BOFA 
participation in Santander-
Serfin. 
(6) ING  ING bough 17% of Serfin, but after 
less than a year sold its position to 
HSBC. 
ING does not have other alliances 
with Mexican banks, but it has 
been active forming alliances with 
other types of financial institutions 
(e.g., insurance, pension funds). 
(ING) is a global financial 
institution of Dutch origin that 
offers banking, insurance and asset 
management to more than 60 
million clients in more than 50 
countries 
ING has only 62 
employees. However, it has 
1.51% of market 
participation (assets). 
Its loan portfolio is 10 times 
larger than that of BOFA; it 
stands at roughly $300 US 
million, 0.32% of that 
market. Its market share of 
deposits stands at 0.45%. 
(8) GE Capital GE Capital, a subsidiary of GE 
Financial, was established in 
9/1997 after acquiring Alianza 
Bank (0.02% market share). 
Alianza was a very small bank, but 
the acquisition allowed GE Capital 
to integrate other financial firms of 
group Alianza.  
GE Capital started with 
only 0.02% of market share 
(assets), but after less than 6 
years, GE Capital holds 
0.31% of market share 
(assets). Its loan portfolio 
represents 0.54% of the 
Mexican market and has 
deposits for 0.33% of that 
market. 
(9) Bank of Boston Bank of Boston established its 
Mexican subsidiary in 1995. 
As of April 2004, Bank of Boston 
became part of BOFA. 
Bank of Boston started with 
only 0.01% of market share 
(assets), but after roughly 9 
years, Bank of Boston holds 
0.33% of market share 
(assets). Its loan portfolio 
represents 0.23% of the 
Mexican market and has 
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deposits for 0.23% of that 
market. 
(10) Comerica Bank Comerica Bank established its 
Mexican subsidiary in 9/1997. 
Comerica Bank is owned by 
Comerica Incorporated, a financial 
services company, with business in 
banking, and personal financial 
services and wealth and 
institutional management divisions.
The only other foreign subsidiary 
of this American company (besides 
Mexico) is in Canada.  
 
Comerica started with 
0.05% of market share 
(assets). After roughly 7 
years, Comerica holds 
0.18% market share 
(assets). Its loan portfolio 
represents 0.25% of the 
Mexican market, and has 
deposits for 0.19% of that 
market 
(10) American 
Express 
American Express established its 
Mexican subsidiary in mid-1996. 
American Express is in the 
business of providing travel-related 
services, financial advisory 
services and international banking 
services throughout the world. 
 
 
American Express started 
with 0.01% of market share 
(assets). After roughly 8 
years, Amex holds 0.18% 
market share (assets). Its 
loan portfolio represents 
0.26% of the Mexican 
market, and has deposits for 
0.17% of that market 
(12) Bank of Tokyo  
Renamed Tokyo-
Mitsubishi (TM) 
 
The Japanese TM established its 
Mexican subsidiary in the first 
quarter on 1995. 
The bank provides a full range of 
domestic and international 
financial services, including 
commercial banking.  
TM started with 0.07% of 
market share (assets). After 
roughly 9 years, TM holds 
0.13% market share 
(assets). Its loan portfolio 
represents 0.15% of the 
Mexican market, and has 
deposits for 0.12% of that 
market 
(12) JP Morgan JP Morgan established its presence 
in Mexico in early 1995. In 1997 
bought 9% in Serfin, but later sold 
its position to Santander. 
JP Morgan and Chase Merge in 
December 2000. JP Morgan was 
elected as the name of the Mexican 
subsidiary. 
JP Morgan had 2% of market share 
in Latin America (excluding 
Brazil) in 2003. 
JP Morgan has a market 
share of 1.03% in Mexico 
(3/2004). However, its loan 
portfolio equals zero. Its 
assets are mainly money 
market deposits in its name. 
Since the merger with 
Chase, JP Morgan has not 
only decreased its assets 
market share (from 1.51% 
to 1.03%) but also its 
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deposits market share from 
0.17% to 0.07%. 
(14) Deutsche Bank The German bank established its 
Mexican subsidiary 9/2000.  
Deutsche Bank has a market 
share of 0.67% assets. 
However, its loan portfolio 
equals zero. Its market 
share on total deposits 
stands at 0.03% 
(14) Bank One Bank One’s presence in Mexico is 
due to its acquisition of First 
Chicago in 1998, which entered the 
Mexican market in the first quarter 
of 1996. 
America’s Bank One has a 
market share of 0.06% 
assets. Its loan portfolio 
represents exactly 0.06% of 
the market, while its 
deposits share of the market 
stand at 0.02%. 
(16) ABN AMRO ABN AMRO established its 
Mexican subsidiary in 9/1995.  
The Dutch ABN AMRO is an 
international banking group 
offering a range of banking 
products and financial services on 
a global basis. 
ABN AMRO has a market 
share of 0.03% (assets), 
second to last. Its loans 
portfolio and client deposits 
equals zero. 
(17) Dresdner 
 
Germany’s 3rd largest bank, 
Dresdner entered the Mexican 
market during the last quarter of 
1995.  
Dresdner’s performance in 
Mexico picked in the 3rd 
quarter of 1998. Dresdner 
had 0.28% of the loan 
portfolio market and 0.27% 
of the industry’s deposits.  
Dresdner sold its Mexican 
subsidiary to a group of 
Mexican investors (former 
members of Bital’s board) 
in July 2003. At the time of 
the sale, Dresdner had a 
market share of 0.02%, 
which garner it the last 
place in that category. 
(18) BNP The French BNP entered the 
Mexican market 9/1995. In 
February 1999, BNP bid to acquire 
two French banks, Paribas and 
Societe General. It failed to acquire 
Societe General. In contrast, the 
BNP’s performance in 
Mexico picked in the last 
quarter of 1998. BNP had 
0.11% of the loan portfolio 
market and .014% of the 
industry’s deposits. By June 
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Paribas acquisition was confirmed 
by the respective boards and 
authorities in May of 2000.  
2000, BPN-Paribas had 
only 0.04% of the loans and 
deposits of the industry. 
BNP-Paribas exited the 
Mexican market in the third 
quarter of 2001. 
(19) Societe General France’s Societe General entered 
the Mexican market in the first 
quarter of 1996.  
 
Societe General’s 
performance in Mexico 
picked in the 2nd quarter of 
1998. Societe had 0.06% of 
the loan portfolio market 
and .014% of the industry’s 
deposits.  
By March 2000, Societe 
had only 0.01% of the loans 
and deposits of the industry. 
Societe General exited the 
Mexican market in the third 
quarter of 2000. 
(20) Fuji The Japanese Fuji entered the 
Mexican market during the first 
quarter of 1995. 
In the autumn of 2000, Dai-Ichi 
Kangyo Bank, Fuji Bank and the 
Industrial Bank of Japan formed 
the Mizuho Financial Group.  
The Mizuho Financial Group is the 
#1 bank of the world in terms of 
assets. 
Fuji’s performance in 
Mexico picked in the 3rd 
quarter of 1998. Fuji had 
0.11% of the loan portfolio 
market and .09% of the 
industry’s deposits.  
Fuji decided to exit the 
Mexican market during the 
3rd quarter of 1999. 
 
Sources: Banco de México (1991-2004); Gruben & McComb (1997); The Banker 
(2005); Woodstock Institute (2001); Guillen and Tschoegl (1999); Goldberg et al., 
(2000); Gross (2000); Mailander (1999); Murillo (2000); Sanchez-Peinado (2003); Small 
(2004); Steinfeld (2004); Tschoegl (2003); Biles (2004. 
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(Rank) Bank’s 
Name/ 
Alliances 
Brief Explanation Other Remarks and 
Numbers 
(1) Mercantil del 
Norte 
Renamed Banorte/ 
100% domestic 
The only remaining bank operating 
under its original ownership. After 
successfully acquiring 3 domestic 
banks that had gone bankrupted, 
Banorte’s market share rose from 
1.6% (1992) to 10.6% (2004). 
 
Banorte’s main investor and 
chairman of the board, owns Grupo 
Maseca: a corn flour, wheat flour 
and tortilla producer and distributor 
in the world. Maseca’s main 
markets are the United States, 
Mexico and Venezuela 
Bancen and Banpaís are 
bought in 1997. At the time, 
the banks had 2.12% and 
2.21% of market share. 
Bancrecer is acquired in 
2001 with 3.95% of market 
share. 
All in all, Banorte’s owners 
bought 1.6% of market 
share in 1992 and their bank 
generated enough cash flow 
to buy 8.28% of additional 
market share. 
(2) Banamex/ 
100% domestic 
before its 
acquisition by 
Citibank. 
 
Banamex was the 
only Mexican bank 
with a bank 
subsidiary 
operating in the 
USA, which also 
target the 
American market, 
California 
Commerce 
Bought by Citibank in 2001, 
Banamex was the leader of the 
industry for several years (1991-
2000). Citibank paid $12.5 billions 
of dollars for Banamex, but kept its 
top management in place. 
Banamex is ranked as a success 
since the control group had paid 
only 3.23 billions for 70.7% of 
Banamex’ equity. 
 
Banamex’s controlled group owned 
Accival, a brokerage house, which 
operation style in the Mexican 
market resembles that of Goldman 
Sachs in the US. 
Banamex’s chairman is a member of 
the Mexican council of businessmen 
(MCB). 
Capital Gain (original 
owners): 
12.5 * .707 = $8.83 billions, 
amount received by   
Banamex’s control group. 
50% in cash and 50% in 
Citibank stock. 
3.23 billions = Amount paid 
by Banamex’s control group 
in acquiring the bank. 
Capital Gain= 8.83-3.23 = 
$5.6 billions or 173% rate 
of return for roughly 9 
years. Equivalent to a 12% 
yearly return. 
(This rate of return does not 
consider dividends). 
(3) Bancomer. 
Renamed BBVA-
Bancomer/ 
17% owned by 
Bank of Montreal 
before BBVA 
bough it 
The Spanish BBVA acquired the 
perennial #2 Bancomer in 2000. 
This acquisition was more complex 
than the straight forward operation 
made by Citibank-Banamex. At the 
beginning, BBVA acquired a 
controlling interest of 32.2% by 
Capital Gain (original 
owners): 
BBVA injected $1.4 billions 
plus 100% of its Mexican 
subsidiary’s equity. 
The transaction was valued 
at 
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offering $2.5 US billions to the 
Mexican controlling group. 
Subsequently, BBVA increased its 
stake in Bancomer up to 98%. 
Bancomer’s control group had 
initially bought 56% of the bank’s 
equity for 2.85 US billions. 
 
Bancomer’s controlled group also 
owned FEMSA and Cerveceria, 
among other businesses. FEMSA 
produces markets and distributes 
Coca-Cola trademark beverages 
through standard bottler agreements 
with the Coca-Cola Company. 
FEMSA operates in some parts of 
Mexico, Central America, 
Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and 
Argentina. 
Cerveceria holds roughly 50% of 
the beer market in Mexico and 
exports its beers to North America 
and Europe (e.g., XX, Tecate). 
Bancomer’s chairman of the board 
is an MCB member. 
$2.5 billions, and in 
exchange, BBVA 
stockholders would received 
32.2% of the new entity’s 
equity. 
In other words, the original 
stockholders of Bancomer 
would now have 67.8% of 
equity participation in the 
new firm. 
Bancomer‘s ownership paid 
$2.85 billions for 56% of its 
equity.  
67.8% of 56% approximates 
38%. This means that 
Bancomer’s original 
ownership would now 
control 38% instead of 56%. 
In February 2004, BBVA 
bought 38.4% for $3.88 
billions increasing its 
ownership from 59.4% to 
98% 
Prior to this transaction, 
BBVA had bought 16% and 
11% stock packages from 
Bank of Montreal and the 
Mexican government, 
respectively. 
Capital Gain: 
3.84 (38/38.4*3.88) – 2.85 
= $0.99 billions or 35% rate 
of return for roughly 12 
years. Around 2.5% annual 
yields. 
(This rate of return does not 
consider dividends). 
(4) Internacional. 
Renamed Bital 
Renamed HSBC/ 
26% owned by 
Santander and 
17% by ING 
Bital was the 4th largest bank of the 
industry at the time HSBC bought it 
for $1.14 US billions (2002). The 
original owners had paid $0.48 
billions for 51% of Bital’s equity 
(1992).  
Capital Gain (original 
owners): 
1.14 * .51 = 0.58 billions, 
amount received by Bital’s 
control group. They bought 
it for 0.48 billions. Thus, the 
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before its sale to 
HSBC 
Before the sale, the Berrondo family 
controlled 52% of Bital. The 
Berrondo’s also own Mabe, 
Mexico's biggest white goods 
manufacturer.  
Member of the board, Mr. Berrondo 
is also an MCB member, as well as 
Bital’s chairman of the board, for a 
number of years, Antonio Del Valle.
rate of return is marginal, 
only 21% in roughly ten 
years. That is a 2% rate of 
return a year. 
(This rate of return does not 
consider dividends). 
(5) Mercantil de 
Mexico 
Renamed 
Probursa. 
Renamed BBV-
Probursa. 
Now BBVA-
Bancomer/ 
BBVA had bought 
a minority stake in 
Probursa before 
the Mexican crisis 
Mercantil de Mexico, renamed 
Probursa, was the first bank 
reprivatized by the Mexican 
government (6/1991). Despite its 
early success, losses in money 
market operations along with the 
exchange rate crisis weakened the 
bank. Probursa’s ownership was 
force to sell due to capitalization 
problems. Ironically, Probursa 
became the first multinational bank 
subsidiary. However, the original 
control group kept a minority stake. 
 
Mercantil had been acquired by 
Probursa brokerage house, a top 5 
brokerage house in Mexico and a 
group of investors. Among the 
investors, there was the CEO of 
Sidek, a Mexican steel company, 
which went bankrupted after the 
crisis. He was a member of the 
MCB for just 1 year. 
Original ownership paid 
$202 millions for 77% of 
the bank. 
BBV capitalized the bank 
by injecting $350 millions 
in exchange for roughly 
60% of Probursa’s equity.  
This meant that the original 
control group would now 
hold only 30%. In other 
words, by mid-1995 the 
original ownership had 
already lost 47 percentage 
points of the banks equity 
equivalent to $120 millions 
of their original investment 
(47 / 77 * 202).  
 
(6) Mexicano 
Renamed 
Santander-Serfin/ 
100% domestic 
before its sale to 
Santander 
Formerly known as Somex, 
Mexicano also enjoyed early 
success. However, just as in the case 
of Probursa, Mexicano’s control 
group was forced to relinquish its 
controlling interest. Although, 
original ownership was able to keep 
a minority interest. 
 
Mexicano had been acquired by 
InverMexico brokerage house, a top 
Original ownership paid 
$607 millions for 82% of 
the bank. 
Santander capitalized the 
bank by injecting $379 
millions in exchange for 
roughly 70% of Mexicano’s 
equity. This meant that the 
original control group 
would now hold only 
24.6%. In other words, by 
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5 brokerage house in Mexico and a 
group of investors. Among the 
investors, there was the CEO of 
Grupo Desc, a Mexican 
conglomerate with $2 US billions 
on annual sales (2203). He is also a 
member of the MCB 
mid-1996 the original 
ownership has already lost 
57.4 percentage points of 
the banks equity equivalent 
to $425 millions of their 
original investment (57.4 / 
82 * 607).  
(7) Serfin 
Renamed 
Santander-Serfin/ 
20% owned by 
HSBC, 
9% by JP Morgan 
in 1997 
Despite having equity alliances with 
HSBC and JP Morgan, being 
capitalized over and over again by 
its original owners and its size (13% 
of market share), Serfin’s 
stockholder lost 100% of their 
original investment. 
Santander bought it from the 
Mexican government in 2000. 
 
Former Serfin’s chairman is a MCB 
member. He also is Vitro’s CEO, a 
glass manufacturer company with 
annual sales of $2.3 US billions.  
It is ranked above others 
based on its longevity, 
seven years (1992-1999). 
Even though its original 
investors lost all their 
money, the bank was 
cleaned by the government 
and sold to Santander. Its 
name still lives. 
(8) Banoro 
100% domestic 
before the merger 
By December 1996, Banoro had 
more than doubled its 1992 market 
share in the Mexican banking 
industry (from 0.9% to 2.2%). The 
bank did not have capitalization 
problems when it merged with 
Bancrecer. The new entity took the 
Bancrecer name. Unfortunately, just 
9 months after the merger, 
Bancrecer was bankrupted.  
Before the merger, Banoro 
was owned by Estrategia 
Bursatil brokerage house, a 
small broker. This 
brokerage house and the rest 
of its financial group went 
bankrupt due to fraud in 
1996. 
(9) Atlantico 
     Bancrecer 
     Promex 
All 100% domestic 
All of these banks acquired or 
merged with another domestic bank. 
And all of them went technically 
bankrupted. Once the Mexican 
government “clean” them, their 
clients and branches were acquired 
by Bital, Banorte and Bancomer, 
respectively. 
In the beginning, Atlantico and 
Promex were acquired by GBM 
(and 2 MCB members) and 
Finamex, respectively, two middle 
*Atlantico- last report 
9/1997 
Renamed Bital (3/2002) 
*Bancrecer- last report 
9/1997 Renamed Banorte 
(3/2002) 
*Promex- last report 
12/1997  
Renamed BBVA-Bancomer 
(2000) 
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size Mexican brokerage houses. 
Bancrecer was acquired by private 
investors from Southern Mexico 
(Guanajuato and Mexico City). 
(12) Confia 
Renamed Citibank/ 
Citibank owned a 
minority stake 
before the bank 
went bankrupt 
Reasonably successful in the 
beginning. However, the exchange 
rate crisis forced its ownership to 
capitalize the bank. The owners 
would not consider a controlling 
interest offer made by Citibank 
(similar to what BBV and Santander 
did with Probursa and Mexicano, 
respectively). 
6/1997 is Confia’s last quarter 
reported. 
Confia had been acquired by Abaco 
brokerage house, a middle size 
brokerage house from Northern 
Mexico. 
 
In an incredible lack of 
judgment the ownership 
finance the bank’s 
capitalization with off-shore 
CD’s from their clients. 
When large deposits were 
called, the bank went 
bankrupted.  
Confia’s CEO was found 
guilty of fraud. 
Ironically, Citibank ended 
up buying Confia from the 
government. Had Confia’s 
ownership accepted 
Citibank’s offer, they could 
have salvage some of their 
initial investment 
(13) Comermex 
Renamed Inverlat,  
Renamed Scotia 
Bank Inverlat/ 
Scotia Bank 
owned a minority 
stake before it 
finally took over 
the bank 
Despite its early alliance with 
Canada’s Bank of Nova Scotia, 
Inverlat lost almost a point of 
market share within 15 months of 
being privatized. 
 
At the time of its bankruptcy 
(6/1995), Inverlat was the 4th largest 
bank in Mexico. 
 
Comermex had been acquired by 
Inverlat, one of the largest 
brokerage houses in Mexico, owned 
by Mr. Legorreta. Legorreta, main 
shareholder of Inverlat, had been the 
CEO of Banamex before the 
nationalization. Legorreta was a 
member of the MCB until 1997. 
For all practical purposes, 
both Inverlat and Bank of 
Nova Scotia (BNS) had lost 
their investment. After the 
bankruptcy however, the 
Mexican government 
awarded Nova Scotia with a 
contract to operate the bank 
for the next 5 years. 
Eventually, Nova Scotia 
acquired the control of the 
bank.  
 
BNS bought 8.1% in 1994 
for $154 US millions. 
In 1996, its equity was 
worth $10 US millions. 
In 1996 and 2000, BNS 
increased to 55% its 
participation in Inverlat’s 
equity for $175 US dollars.  
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(14) Cremi/ 
100% domestic 
before going out of 
business 
Cremi merged with Union in the last 
quarter of 1994. Similarly to what 
happened to Banoro, a balance 
healthy Cremi went bankrupted 
because of a bad partnership with 
Union bank. Cremi was out of 
business before the end of 1994. 
In the beginning, Cremi was 
acquired by Multivalores, a small 
brokerage house. 
Branches acquired by BBV 
in 1996 
(15) Bancen 
       De Oriente/ 
100% domestic 
before going out of 
business 
Bancen and De Oriente were among 
the first victims of the exchange rate 
crisis. De Oriente was the smallest 
bank of those sold by the 
government, 0.3% market share, 
while Bancen was also among the 
smallest with 1% of market share. 
Both of these banks were acquired 
by very small financial groups. 
The last quarter of 1994 was 
De Oriente’s last financial 
report. While the second 
quarter of 1995 was 
Bancen’s last report.  
Bancen’s branches were 
bough by Banorte in 1997, 
while De Oriente’s offices 
were bought by BBV in 
1996 
(18)  Union  
         Banpaís/ 
100% domestic 
Union and Banpaís went bankrupted 
before 1994’s end. In both cases, the 
banks’ CEOs were accused of fraud. 
In fact, both CEOs exited the 
country. 
Banpaís has been acquired by 
Mexival, one of the smallest 
brokerage houses in Mexico. 
Union by a private investor. 
 
Sources: Banco de México (1991-2004); Gruben & McComb (1997); Woodstock 
Institute (2001); Guillen and Tschoegl, (1999); Goldberg et al. (2000); Murillo (2000); 
Sanchez-Peinado (2003); Tschoegl, (2003); Biles (2004); Mainlander (1999); Steinfeld 
(2004). 
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(Rank) Bank’s 
Name/ 
Ownership-
Alliances 
Brief Explanation Other Remarks and 
Numbers 
(1) Inbursa 
100% domestic 
Although a subsidiary of Inbursa 
financial group, Inbursa bank is also 
the financial arm of Telmex, Grupo 
Carso, and Grupos Sanborns. These 
companies have a 30% plus weight in 
the Mexican stock market index and 
are all controlled by Mr. Carlos Slim 
(MCB member). 
Inbursa is the 8th largest bank 
in Mexico in terms of assets. 
In terms of equity, however, 
Inbursa is the 4th largest bank 
in Mexico. 
In fact, Inbursa’s equity has 
grown 23 times its initial 
investment, from 273 
millions to 1.87 billions US 
dollars (3/2004) 
(2) Del Bajio 
10% owned by 
Spanish bank 
Sabadell 
Banco del Bajio is owned by regional 
investors from the state of Guanajuato. 
These investors did not have previous 
experience in the banking or brokerage 
house industries. 
Del Bajio bought 12 branches from 
bank Industrial, after it went 
bankrupted 
First Mexican bank that 
offered online FX trading 
(2001). 
Also, its equity has more 
than 5 folded its initial 
investment (in dollar terms). 
This growth is only second to 
that of Inbursa. 
Del Bajio holds 0.74% of 
market share, which ranks it 
as the 2nd largest bank among 
the newly established ones.  
(3) Azteca 
100% domestic 
Azteca is part of Grupo Elektra. 
Elektra controls and operates an 
influential department store (Elektra), 
which targets low and middle income 
families. Elektra also owns Television 
Azteca, the 2nd largest broadcast 
company in Mexico.  
Although Grupo Elektra does have 
some experience in financial services, 
it does not have experience managing 
banks. 
The Elektra network of stores 
effectively provided Azteca 
with a ready-made branch 
system. Because its branches 
are inside Elektra’s 
department stores, the bank 
began operations with 815 
branches in 230 Mexican 
cities  
Azteca has immediate plans 
to expand to Central 
America. 
(4) Ixe 
100% domestic 
The financial group, 
however, has a 
broker dealer 
subsidiary in NY, in 
Ixe was established by Mr. Rangel de 
Alba, a regional entrepreneur (car-
dealerships) from the center of Mexico 
in 1994. In 2000, Rangel de Alba sold 
Ixe to a group of individual investors 
linked to influential public 
The change of ownership has 
not stop Ixe’s growth.  
The new owners paid 86 US 
million for the bank in 
October 2000. 
The former owners made a 
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partnership with  
Deutsche 
corporations such as Grupo Soriana, 
the largest retailer in Northern 
Mexico, which chairman is an MCB 
member. Grupo Gigante, among the 
top retailers in Southern Mexico. And 
Alejandro Burillo, former #2 executive 
and shareholder of Grupo Televisa, the 
largest broadcasting firm in Latin-
America. 
Neither the current or former group of 
control had direct experience in the 
banking industry prior to establishing 
or buying Ixe. 
profit of 56 US millions 
(86%) in less than 6 years.  
Ixe is the 4th largest bank (in 
assets) among the newly 
established domestic banks. 
The new owners have seen 
Ixe’s market share grew from 
0.32% (12/00) to 0.55% 
(3/04). 
(5) Banregio 
100% domestic 
Owned by regional investors from 
Monterey headed by the Rivero 
brothers, who are among the most 
prominent families of that city.  
Banregio’s owners did not have direct 
experience with the financial sector. 
Had not been for the 
exchange rate devaluation, 
this bank’s growth would be 
second to that of Inbursa. In 
terms of pesos, Banregio’s 
equity more than 7 folded. 
Banregio is the 3rd largest 
banks in terms of equity, 
among the newly established 
ones. 
(6) Afirme 
100% domestic 
Afirme’s owners had more than 5 
years of experience offering financial 
services (e.g., financial leasing). 
Afirme is 1 of only 2 banks owned by 
investors linked mainly with the 
financial sector (but not brokerage 
house industry) and had survived 
(among new banks only). 
Afirme is 1 of only 2 banks 
(the other being Ixe), that 
grew by acquisition. In 1997 
Afirme bought the branches 
of Banco Obrero. 
Afirme is the 5th largest bank 
among newly established 
ones. However, it is only the 
7th largest in terms of equity. 
(7) Mifel 
100% domestic 
Mifel is the other bank whose 
investors are linked with the financial 
sector (but not brokerage house 
industry). 
Mifel is the 9th largest bank 
among the newly established 
ones. Mifel’s has expanded 
its assets 30 times over. This 
growth is only second to that 
obtained by Ixe.  
(8) Bansi 
100% domestic 
Headed by a small group of regional 
investors from the state of Jalisco, 
Bansi began operations with roughly 
$15.1 US millions worth of equity. 
This amount is the smallest initial 
investment for establishing a bank in 
Bansi’s growth has been 
more than satisfactory. 
Bansi’s assets and equity 
have four folded in 9 years of 
operation. 
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Mexico since 1982. 
(9) Invex 
100% domestic 
Invex is 1 of 2 banks (among the 
newly established), in which its 
owners can be directly linked to the 
brokerage house industry.  
When it started, Invex had an 
equity market share of 
0.37%. After 10 years of 
operation, Invex has only 
0.39% of it. In other words, 
its growth has only been 
marginal. 
(10) Interacciones 
100% domestic 
The only other bank (among the newly 
established) whose owners can be 
directly linked to the brokerage house 
industry. Additionally, its chairman of 
the board owned the Laredo National 
Bank (LNB). The LNB was acquired 
by BBVA for 669 millions of Euros 
(9/2004).  
In 1998, Interacciones had 
0.94% of market share 
(assets). By the 1st quarter of 
2004, its market share 
decreased to 0.33%. 
(13) Alianza 
100% domestic 
before its sale to 
GE Capital 
Alianza operated less than 3 fiscal 
quarters. To its defense, the bank was 
sold to GE Mexico. According to 
Alianza’s CEO, the bank was sold 
without loans past due.  
In three quarters the bank 
generated roughly $0.9 US 
millions in profit. The bank’s 
was established with an 
equity of $23 US millions 
(13) Quadrum 
100% domestic 
Among Quadrum’s board of directors 
members (main investors), there are 3 
big personalities. Mr. Ahumada 
Russek, its chairman and main 
shareholder of the second largest 
construction company in Mexico. Mr. 
Madero Bracho, chairman of Grupo 
San Luis. And Mr. Salinas Pliego, 
chairman of Grupo Elektra, who now 
has a bank of his own (Azteca). 
Quadrum operated for 
roughly seven years. Its 
equity market share never 
increased its initial 0.49% of 
the industry. 
(14) Capital 
        Industrial 
100% domestic 
Group of small investors establishing 
banks. 
Capital operated for roughly 
two years and managed to 
obtain 0.31% of the 
industry’s market share. 
Industrial operated for 3 and 
half years and obtained 
0.26% of market share. 
Industrial lasted longer but 
started with less equity and 
never got to 0.31% of market 
share. In the end, both were 
small banks that fail. 
(15) Interestatal  Established by a (Mexican) pacific Interestatal operated for only 
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100% domestic coast group of investors, owners of a 
credit union. 
6 quarters before being 
intervened by the 
government. 
(15) Pronorte 
100% domestic 
Pronorte was established by a Mr. 
Diaz-Rivera, owner of a small 
brokerage house (Valburmex). 
Substantial loses in money market 
operations resulted in the demise of 
both the bank and the brokerage 
house. 
Pronorte operated for 9 fiscal 
quarters before being 
intervened by the 
government. 
(17) Del Sureste 
100% domestic 
The lead investor, Eduardo Creel, had 
won the bid to acquire Somex (now 
Santander Mexicano) from the 
government in 1992. It turns out he 
backed up, which cost him and his 
investor group around $17 US millions 
as a withdraw penalty. In that same 
year, he and his investor group 
purchased Bursamex, a medium size 
brokerage house for $34 US millions. 
A few months later this group received 
the authorization to established Del 
Sureste Bank. 
One of Creel’s main investor, 
Fernando Ponce, is a member of the 
Mexican Council of Businessmen. The 
members of this organization are 
among the 30 most influential 
businessmen in Mexico. 
After just three months of 
operations, Del Sureste had 
decreased its assets and 
equity by 50%. It should not 
be a surprise that after such a 
difficult start, the banks and 
the brokerage house lasted 5 
fiscal quarters more. 
(19) Anahuac 
100% domestic 
Administered by the son and nephew 
of former Mexican president De la 
Madrid (1982-1988), the bank 
operated 5 quarter before being 
intervened by the government. The 
bank’s name was linked to fraudulent 
operations.  
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APPENDIX D 
THE BANKER RANKING FACTORS
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The factors considered for the rankings are strength, size, soundness, profits, 
performance, capital ratio, and non performing loans to total loans. 
Strength: tier one capital, as defined by Basel’s Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). The definition is stricter than total stockholder equity and covers only 
the core of the banks’ strength (i.e., the shareholders’ equity available to cover actual or 
potential losses). Tier 1 includes common stock, disclosed reserves and retained earnings 
and in the case of consolidated accounts, minority interest in the equity of subsidiaries 
that are less than wholly owned, but excluded cumulative preference shares, revaluation 
reserves, hidden reserves, subordinated and other long term debt. 
Strength is measure in dollars and percentage of change (from the previous year). 
Size: size is measured in dollars’ worth of assets and asset change (from the 
previous year). 
Soundness: soundness is measured by calculating the bank’s capital assets ratio 
(i.e., tier 1 capital / total assets). Current and previous percentages are ranked among the 
top 1000 banks. 
Profits: the figure refers to pre-tax profits in dollars and the percentage of change 
from the previous year. 
Performance: the performance measure is broke down in four categories, 
namely: real profits growth, profits on average capital, ROA, and Cost/Income ratio. 
Real profits growth considers inflation. 
Profits on average capital, average capital is calculated as the average of the 
current and previous years’ capital figure. 
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ROA / ROE 
Cost/Income ratio- Cost/Income ratio 
BIS Capital ratio: One of the objects of the survey is to show the banks’ 
soundness in relation to the Basel requirement of a minimum Tier 1 capital on risk-
weighted assets of 4%, and a minimum ratio of capital to risk weighted assets of 8%. 
The BIS capital ratio is the latter, where the minimum ratio should be 8%. 
Non-performing loans: Non performing loans as a percentage of the total loan 
book. 
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